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ABSTRACT 
E ABLING CONDITIO S FOR ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: 
A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES 
Aldemir Drummond Junior 
The significance of international business in the world economy has greatly increased since 
the begirming of the 1980s, mainly as a consequence of the expansion in the flow of foreign 
direct investment. Declining costs of transportation and advances in information technology 
have allowed transnational corporations to spread the production of goods and services 
around the world. Increasing competition has represented a continuous pressure on 
organizations for faster or better adaptation to a changing environment. Despite these 
pressures for change, organizations also need some stability in order to make sense of both 
the direction they want to take, and the actions which can help them to keep the course. 
Knowledge about an organization's internal affairs and its interaction with the external 
environment has become a main source of competitive advantage. The process by which 
organizations create or acquire this knowledge has been called organizational learning. 
This dissertation seeks to identify and discuss some key factors which facilitate the 
occurrence of organizational learning in International Business Ventures (IBVs), here 
understood as the involvement of foreign investing companies in host countries, with some 
degree of management that is shared between nationals of both local and foreign countries. 
The dissertation describes four in-depth case studies in two IBVs, one located in the UK and 
the other in Brazil. The first company is a subsidiary of Toshiba, which produces television 
and air conditioner sets for the European market. The second company is a joint venture 
between Toshiba and Semp, a local company, which produces television sets, VCRs and 
audio equipment for the Brazilian market. 
Due to the lack of empirical research in the field of this study, data collection and analysis 
followed the broad lines of the grounded theory approach. Two processes of organizational 
learning occurring during the last few years in each company were identified and 
reconstructed through semi-structured interviews with their key participants. Data about the 
companies and the processes was supplemented with the use of secondary sources. 
Tlu-oughout the whole study particular attention was directed to the context where the 
processes developed. All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. The data 
were then qualitatively coded in order to help the identification of the main themes and 
categories related to the objective of the study. Literature was reviewed during all stages of 
the research in order both to stimulate theoretical sensitivity and to enhance the 
generalizability into theory of the main findings of the study. 
Some of the main areas of contribution from the research include: the relationship between 
time and behavioural/cognitive changes in processes of organizational learning; the 
relationship between time and acquisition of tacit/explicit knowledge; the analysis of 
outcomes as moments in a process, and their use as leverage for continuous learning; the 
importance of control for guiding the process and evaluating its outcomes; communication as 
a major difficulty in the work of cross-cultural teams, and strategies to overcome such 
difficulties; and the relationship between local and foreign knowledge for the management of 
IBVs. In addition, the analysis of processes of organizational learning and the attention given 
to their context represent a methodological contribution of the study. 
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This dissertation examines organizational learning in international companies through the 
presentation and discussion of in-depth empirical studies in two organizations. Its main 
objective is to identi fy some enabling conditions for organizational learning in these 
companies. The first section of this introductory chapter discusses the growth in international 
business in the last fi fteen years or so, and the fact that international companies have 
expanded their production of goods and services across di ffe rent countries. The second 
section briefly discusses how knowledge is becoming one of the main assets of an 
organization, and its relevance fo r the operation of international companies. The third section 
presents the main research question which guides the study and the research design adopted. 
Finally, the fourth section presents the structure of the dissertation. 
1.1 Recent Growth in International Business 
The signifi cance of international business in the world economy has increased greatly since 
the beginning of the 1980s. The world stock of fore ign direct investment (FDI) expanded 
more than fo urfo ld between I 980 and I 993 , reaching a total of US$ 2, I 35 billions (United 
Nations 1995). As a percentage of the world output, however, it was only in the 1990s that 
the stock of FDI regained the same level as 19 I 4 (Jones I 996), which shows the impact on 
international business of two world wars and the excesses of nationalism in this century. The 
current period represents not only a recuperation of the importance of international business, 
but an essential change in the structure of FDI. Dunning (1992) estimates that in 19 14 natural 
resources represented 55% of the total stock of FDI, with 30% in services and 15% in 
manufacturing. In 1992, services represented 50%, manufac turing 39% and natural resources 
11 % (United Nations 1993). 
The convergence of two initially distinct technologies, computers and transportation, in the 
last decades have virtually ' shrunk ' the world in terms of the higher speed in which people, 
goods, capital and information can move around the globe. In addition, security is higher and 
costs are lower. Transnational corporations (TNCs) have greatly benefited from the 
development of these teclrnologies. With better ways of controlling their operations abroad 
and lower costs of transportation, they have been able to spread the production of goods and 
services over a large number of countries, which has resulted in the increase in FDI 
mentioned above. 
The economic development of Japan since the Korean War, and more recently of the East 
and South East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) has changed the shape of the 
world economy and trade. Whereas some forty or fifty years ago the United States and a few 
countries in Western Europe were responsible for most of the world ' s economic output, the 
global economy is now shaped primarily by the 'Triad ' (Ohmae I 985), with North-America, 
the European Community, and East and South East Asia as vertices of a triangle. According 
to Dicken (1992), those three regions are responsible fo r 77% of world exports and 62% of 
world mar.ufacturing output. They are also the dominant generators and recipients ofFDI. 
More recently, other cow1tries have attracted foreign investment, partly as a result of changes 
in their policies towards it. The big debt cri ses faced by some developing countries in the 
early 1980s is one of the main causes of the such changes in governmental policies, from 
state-led development strategies to private sector-led, outward, non-debt creating policies. 
The high growth rates of the Asian !Cs have made them models of successful outward-
oriented development (United Nat ions I 992). China and some countries in Latin America, 
like Argentina, Brazil and Chile, are examples of countries which have actively tried to 
attract FDI in the last decade or so. 
1.2 Knowledge as an Organizational Asset 
If in the 1970s TNCs came to be seen "as the embodiment of almost anything disconcerting 
about modern industrial society" (Vernon I 977 p.19), in the 1990s they have been called 
"everybody 's favourite monster" (The Economist 1993). During this period, the number of 
TNCs has grown from 7,000 to over 35,000. Although few companies can be truly 
considered global corporations, many TNCs compete in a large number of countries, which 
requires the deployment of a vast an10unt of resources in the form of capital and knowledge. 
If, on the one hand, the technological change in the last few years has collaborated with the 
expansion of TNCs, on the other hand, it has also brought pressure in the form of increasing 
competition for innovation. The presence of a larger number of competitors in almost every 
market, and the fact that consumers are better informed and more demanding in relation to 
qual ity and other benefits they can get from products, have forced companies into a race for 
iru10vation, which can di ffe rentiate them from competitors. 
In spite of the point made by Ohn1ae (1990) that young consumers in the countries of the 
'Triad ' are becoming increasingly homogeneous, it seems that many international products 
still have to undergo some adaptation in order to suit local conditions (Bart lett and Ghoshal 
1989, Sugiura I 990). For the TNCs producing them, international competition is a sum of a 
series of local competitions, with each national or regional market having its particular 
characteristics. Thus, in addition to knowledge about products and processes necessary to 
produce a good or service, they also need to have knowledge about local markets. The 
simultaneous necessity fo r iru10vation of processes and products, and adaptation to local 
conditions, gives to knowledge a paramount role for a firm's competitiveness in an 
international enviroru11ent characterized by change. 
It has been more than twenty years since some authors predicted dramatic changes in work 
and organizations, to an envirorunent where knowledge would be the basis fo r competition 
(Bell 1973 , Nasbitt 1982, Toffler 1980). According to Pava (1983), a gradual shift from 
routine to non-routine work is one of the consequences of such changes fo r office workers. 
However, even in manufacturing organizations where routine jobs are dominant, knowledge 
has become an important issue fo r both employees and companies. Increasing competition 
has meant a continuous pressure towards costs reduction. in western companies this has been 
achieved by a combination of massive redundancies, redesign of working processes and 
products, automation of tasks, and the use of multi-skilled labour. Workers are required to 
have increasingly higher levels of education and training, in order to be more productive. 
Some companies from Asia, particularly Japan, have managed to achieve such costs 
reductions without making workers redundant (Financial 1996). 
For companies, knowledge has become one of the main sources of competitive advantage. 
This sort of statement usually leads us to think of knowledge as linked to advanced 
technological innovations. However, this is not always necessarily the case. In many 
circumstances, faster or better adaptation to a changing environment may give just the edge a 
company needs to be ahead of competitors. In both cases, innovation and adaptation, 
knowledge creation or acquisition seems to play a central role. 
The processes by which people within organizations create and/or acquire knowledge which 
can be used in the organizations' operations has been called organizational learning. The 
development of these processes in international business ventures 1 (IBVs) is the focus of the 
study this dissertation presents and discusses. 
1.3 Main Research Question and Research Design 
Let me first explain the origins of my interest in the subj ect of this dissertation. Before 
engaging myself in the doctoral programme in Cambridge, I took a master' s degree in 
management, for which I undertook a research on international joint ventures in Brazil 
(Drummond 1992). In that research I looked at partner's motivations for forming joint 
ventures, their results and some managerial variables which could be linked to those results. I 
interviewed one manager representing each partner in eight joint ventures. Two issues 
particularly atracted my attention, even though they were not at the centre of that 
investigation: a) how managers had to adapt themselves to the working styles of managers 
from the partner, who were from a different national culture; and b) how some of the 
1 ln this dissertation, international business ventures ( lBVs) refer to the involvement by foreign in vest ing 
companies in host countries. Those lBVs can be new companies or already existent local companies in which 
fore ign companies have acquired a stake. The process is assumed to entai l some degree of management that is 
shared between nationals of both local and foreign countries. 
Brazilian companies improved their managerial systems as a result of the joint ventures. In 
this case, the improvements came either from the contact with the partner or as a requirement 
for competing in international markets, to which they had access through the joint venture. 
I then decided to pursue a PhD degree and continue doing research in international 
companies. In February 1993 , few weeks after arriving in Cambridge, I attended a 
presentation by Professor John Child where he reported on a seminar he had just attended in 
Germany on organizational learning. The links between the points he discussed in the 
seminar and the two issues mentioned in the previous paragraph became evident to me. 
Professor Child then furni shed me with some literature on organizational learning and I later 
decided that would be the main theme ofmy doctoral research. 
Further search of the literature, including that on strategic management, gave me a broader 
perspective on the importance of knowledge for the competitiveness of companies. The 
resource-based view of the firm , which has been developed in the last twelve years or so 
(Prahalad and Hamel 1990, Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1992, Wernerfelt 1984), but whose 
principles ~an be traced back to the work of Selznick (1957) and Penrose (1959), proposes 
that firm-specific resources are critical factors for explaining what makes firms different from 
each other and, consequently, what gives them competitive advantage. These resources can 
be both tangible and intangible assets, and, an10ngst the latter, knowledge occupies centre 
stage. Prahalad and Hamel call those firm -specific resources 'core competencies' , and define 
them as "the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse 
production skill s and integrate multiple streams of technologies" (Prahalad and Hamel 1990 
p.82) . 
Despite the increasing volume of published work on organizational learning (Crossan and 
Guatto 1996), and the acknowledgement of its relevance in the strategic management 
literature, there is still a lack of empirical evidence on both how processes of organizational 
learning develop within organizations, and how they can be a source of competitive 
advantage. If one considers the case of IBVs and the particular circumstances in which they 
operate, the gap is even larger. 
The research discussed in this dissertation aims at identifying some key factors which 
faci litate the occurrence of organizational learning within IBVs. The main research question 
which guides it is : which are the key enabling factors for the occurrence of organizational 
learning in IBVs ? The idea is to analyse in detail the evolution of processes of organisational 
learning within IBVs, and to identify the key enabling conditions for their occurrence. In 
addition to that, there is a secondary objective of identifying whether the occurrence of 
organizational learning has brought the development or improvement of any specific 
organizational capability for the companies involved. This leads to a secondary research 
question: have the processes studied fostered the development or improvement of any 
organizational capability? 
The research was carried out through an empirical study within two companies in the 
consumer electronics sector in different countries, the UK and Brazil. The UK company is a 
subsidiary of Toshiba which produces television and air conditioning sets for the European 
market. The Brazilian company was formerly a locally owned company, in which Toshiba 
has acquired a 40% stake. Its produces television sets, VCRs and audio equipment for the 
Brazilian P1arket. In each company I studied in detail some processes occwTed in the last few 
years which were considered by top managers as bringing important changes or new 
activities for the company . Two issues were central for the choice of processes to be studied, 
their learning potential for the company and their importance for top managers. The former 
was assessed by the changes or innovation the processes represented for each company as a 
whole. The latter was important because I firml y bel ieved that the more relevant the 
processes were considered, the more willing managers would be in collaborating with the 
research. Indeed, I have managed to collect a large amount of data about the companies and 
processes studied, through interviews with people involved in their development, internal 
documents, and some material collected from secondary sources as the business press, 
electronic databases, and sectoral associations to which the companies are affi liated to. 
The undertaking of such an empirical study called for a theoretical basis to assist in both the 
definition of the main points on which the research would be focused, and the interpretation 
of the data collected. However, there was no single theory which I deemed sufficient for this 
task. The already mentioned lack of empirical research in the field of organizational learning 
in IBVs lent this research an exploratory character. Instead of building a theoretical model 
which would be tested in the empirical study, my option has been fo r a broad theoretical 
bas is which primarily indicates the main points to be di scussed in the study This theoretical 
basis draws mainly from the literature on organizational learning, but also gains insights from 
that on international management, organizational strategy, organizational culture and 
organizational change. After the field work, all the material co llected was put together in the 
fo rm of wri tten case studies, which are presented in this disse1iation. In the discussion of 
these cases I then present the main triggers and obj ectives fo r the processes studied, the 
content of learning involved and the main enabling conditions fo r organizational learning to 
occur. 
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is structured in three parts, with the second part sub-divided in two sections, 
as shown in Table 1.1. 
The first part, consisting of chapters 2 and 3, presents the literature review, theoretical basis 
and research methodology . Chapter 2 is a review of existing literature on organizational 
learning, and some other contributions I consider relevant to the theme of this study from the 
literatures on international management, organizational strategy, organizational culture and 
organizational change. During this discussion, I indicate the theoretical basis which was 
developed fo r guiding the study. Chapter 3 presents the research methodology adopted. 
The first section of part two, consisting of chapters 4 and 5, presents and analyses a case 
study at Toshiba Consumer Products, a subsidiary of Toshiba located in Plymouth, UK. 
Chapter 4 is the description of the case, where two processes, the establishment of a new 
division for the production of air condi tioning sets, and the establishment of local design 
centres, are presented. Chapter 5 is the analys is of the case, where each of the two processes 
are discussed, and the main enabling factors fo r the occurrence of organizational learning in 
each process are proposed. 
Table 1.1 
Structure of the Dissertation 
Literature Review, 
Part I Chapters 2 and 3 Theoretical Basis and 
Research Methodology 
British Case Study 
Part 2.1 Chapters 4 and 5 and 
Case Analys is 
Brazilian Case Study 
Part 2.2 Chapters 6 and 7 and 
Case Analys is 
Comparison of Cases, 
Part 3 Chapter 8 and 9 Summary and 
Implications 
The second section of part two, consisting of chapters 6 and 7, presents and anal yses a case 
study at Semp Toshiba, a joint venture between Semp and Toshiba in Sao Paulo, Brazil. 
Chapter 6 is the description of the case, where two processes, productivity improvement, and 
the adoption of a new commercialization policy, are presented. Chapter 7 is the analys is of 
the case, where each of the two processes are discussed, and the main enabling factors for the 
occurrence of organizational learni ng in each process are proposed. 
The third part of the dissertation, consisted of chapters 8 and 9, presents a comparison 
between the cases, and discusses the main contributions and implications of the study to the 
body of knowledge on the subject. Chapter 8 presents a comparison between the cases, where 
the main differences and similarities are highlighted. The enabling factors for the occurrence 
of organizational learning proposed for each case are then put together and discussed. In this 
discussion the theoret ical contributions of the study are suggested. Chapter 9 sununarizes the 
main contributions and limitations of the research and suggests some managerial implications 
and directions for further research. 
PART ONE 
THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL BASES 
Chapter 2 
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING: A DISCUSSION 
ON THE KEYS ISSUES IN THE LITERATURE 
This chapter presents a review of the key points in the literature related to the subject of this 
study. The objective of the review is to develop a theoretical basis fo r the research. The 
chapter is divided in five sections. The first section briefly discusses the resource-based view 
of the firm , an approach to organizational strategy where organizational learning is 
considered as a process by which organizations can acquire or develop resources and, as a 
consequence, gain competitive advantage. The second section discusses some issues 
frequently present in the literature on organizational learning, which are of particular 
importance for this study. The thi rd section proposes that organizational learning is a social 
phenomenon which should be analysed tak ing the organizational context into consideration. 
In this sense, some organizational variables which are relevant for processes of organizational 
learning are discussed. The fourth section discusses some specific issues of international 
business which bear upon the analysis of organizational learning within international 
companies. Finally, the fifth section highlights the contribution of the literature on facto rs 
which can fac ilitate the occurrence of organizational learning. 
2.1 Resource-based View of the Firm 
The field of strategic management was challenged in a major way during the 1980s. 
Economic changes negatively affected the performance of traditional companies, which had 
been fo llowing the general guidelines of the most prominent approach to strategy. According 
to Whittington (1993 p.3), authors associated to this approach, which he calls ' classical' , see 
strategy as "a rational process of deliberate calculation and analysis, designed to maximize 
long-term advantage". Whittington proposes two basic dimensions for distinguishing the 
different approaches to strategy: outcomes and processes. In the classical approach, outcomes 
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are profit-maximizing, and processes are deliberated by top managers. The basic assumptions 
of thi s approach to strategy are criticized by Mintzberg (1990), particularly the belief that a 
strategy can be fully formulated before implementation. 
The belief in the efficacy of designing strategy left many large companies with huge staffs 
dedicated to strategic planning. The acceleration of the pace of both global competition and 
technological change in the 1980s resul ted in smaller, less hierarchical and more adaptive 
companies threatening those large corporations in both traditional and new markets. Plarming 
staffs were amongst the first to be laid off. Authors in the fie lds of strateg ic and general 
management also responded to these changes, basically through the development of a number 
of new contributions, generally focusing in either the external or the internal analys is of the 
organization. Porter' s five fo rces framework (Porter 1980) emphas izes the characteristics of 
an industry, and the relative position of companies within it for determining their competitive 
advantage or disadvantage. Although based on the principles of the ' class ical' approach to 
strategy, it is a powerful fran1ework for analysing industries . Other authors have dedicated 
their attention to the internal side of organizations, many times to very specific aspects of it 
(Deming 1986, Hanm1er and Champy 1993 , Peters and Waterman 1982, Prahalad and Han1el 
1990). 
In the last twelve years, a framework for strategy which combines both internal and external 
analysis of the organization has emerged. Its bas ic premise is that a company's perfo rmance 
is driven by its resources, hence the term ' resource-based view of the fi rm ' . The framework 
incorporates contributions from previous work, such as those mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph. On the external side, the fran1ework has not produced any original contribution 
(Collis 1991), basically relying on the extensive work already existent in the strategy fi eld. 
Its ori ginality stems fro m the attention dedicated to the internal resources of the firm . It 
acknowledges that valuable resources can be both physical and intangibl e (Collis and 
Montgomery 1995). Of particular interest fo r this study is the notion that some resources 
commanded by a finn , specially those which are intangible, can be a result of processes by 
which a firm creates or acquires and adapts knowledge about its operations, that is to say, 
processes of organizational learning. Moreover, such accumulated knowledge can also be 
important for the definition of the uses a company gives to its phys ical resources. 
12 
Some examples of intangible resources which are a result of accumulated knowledge, and 
can give competitive advantage to a company, are: better integration between its many 
activities so it can respond faster to market demands, higher commitment from the workforce 
so it provides a better service to clients, and a high rate of i1rnovative and good quality 
products which attract consumers. Besides yielding services or products which are attractive 
to consumers, such resources have also to bear other characteristics which make them 
distinctive. Of these characteristics, one of the most important is that they must be difficult to 
imitate (Barney 1991 , Dierickx and Cool 1989). This inimitability generally occurs because 
the resources are either a result from a long process of development, which can not be 
accelerated by another company which wants to replicate it, or they contain a causal 
ambiguity (Collis and Montgomery 1995), that is to say, competitors are not able to 
disentangle either what the resources are or how to replicate them. An example of 
inimitability is given by Leonard-Barton (1992b) who describes a U.S. steel producer as a 
learning laboratory. In her words, a "close look at the company reveals an organic learning 
system so tightly integrated that Forward (the company's CEO) says he can tour competitors 
through the plant, show them almost 'everything, and we will be givi ng away nothing 
because they can' t take it home with them" (p.24). But even being difficult to imitate, 
resources which give competitive advantage usually have a limited life, either because a 
competitor innovates with something better, or the external enviro1rn1ent changes, requiring 
different resources from companies. In both cases, if companies do not adopt new resources 
or knowledge, the old ones may be transformed in which Leonard-Barton ( 1992a) calls core 
rigidities, inappropriate sets of knowledge; and Levitt and March ( 1988) ca ll competency 
traps, old and inferior procedures which are performed instead of new and superior ones. 
The perception of this dynamic character of competition has stimulated some authors 
associated with the resource-based view of the firm to propose the concept of dynan1ic 
capabilities (Teece and Pisano 1994, Teece, Pi sano and Shuen 1992). According to Teece and 
Pisano (1994 p.538), "the term 'capabilities' emphasizes the key role of strategic 
management in appropriately adapti ng, integrating, and re-configuring internal and external 
organizational skills, resources, and functional compentences toward changing environment". 
One of the foundations of the dynamics capabilities approach is a focus on how the firm 
learns new ski ll s. Teece, Pisano and Shuen (I 992) recogni ze learning processes as 
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intrinsically social phenomena and also identi fy in organizational routines the locale for 
knowledge generated in the learning processes. These two points will be discussed with more 
detail later in this chapter. 
Despite acknowledging the importance of organizational learning for the acquisition of 
resources, authors associated with the resource-based view of the firm do not di scuss how 
learning processes actually occur within organizations. However, there is a literature 
dedicated to the specific subject of organizational learning which discusses the issue . 
2.2 Organizational Learning 
Organizational learning is a concept which has been discussed since the early 1960s. It was 
then a sort of by product of a broader discussion on how organizations adapt to the 
environment. The discuss ion was mainly focused on the examination of decision-making 
processes and how organizational members would change their behaviour in order to adapt to 
environmen'tal requirements. This process of adaptation was called organi zational learning by 
some authors , and a point of d ivergence amongst them was whether learning is an sporadic 
and stepwise process (Cangelosi and Dill 1965, Chapman et al. 1959, Hirschman and 
Lindblom 1962) or a continuous and gradual one (Cyert and March 1963). Cangelosi and Dill 
( 1965) are perhaps the first authors to propose a specific model of organizational learning, 
where they separate individual and subgroup adaptation from organi zational adaptation, and 
assume that learning of preferences and goals goes together with learning how to achieve 
them. 
After these initial di scussions, organizational learning was left out of the centra l debates in 
organizational theory. These were largely concentrated on how organi zati ons adopt different 
structures and strategies in order to adapt to the enviro1m1ent where they operate, but writers 
would not label these processes as learning (B urns and Stalker I 96 I , Child I 972, Lawrence 
and Lorsch 1967, Miles and Snow I 978, Pfeffer and Salancik I 978, Thompson 1967). From 
the mid-seventies organizational learning started to return to the literature, initially through 
the writings of a small number of authors (Argyris and Schon 1978, Duncan and Weiss 1979, 
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March and Olsen 1976a). It has since then become a concept increasingly more debated by 
authors from different areas within organizational studies and even economics. According to 
Dodgson (1993 p.376), there are three main reasons why organizational learning is currently 
so fashionable: a) organizations are attempting "to develop structures and systems which are 
more adaptable and responsive to change"; b) "the profound influence that rapid 
technological change is having on organizations"; and c) the fac t that " the concept of 
' learning' has a broad analytical value", fo r it "is a dynamic concept, and its use in theory 
emphas izes the continually changing nature of organizations. Furthermore, it is an integrative 
concept that can uni fy various levels of analysis: individual, group, corporate, which is 
particularly helpful in reviewing the cooperative and community nature of organizations." 
It seems that organizational learning has historically been associated to organizational 
adaptation to the environment, and, with the acceleration of the pace of enviro1m1ental change 
in the last few years, the importance of such adaptation has grown. Moreover, some 
researchers have associated organizational learning not only to adaptat ion, but also to 
i1movation, to the creation of knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Practi tioners have 
already macle a similar point, stressing that management i1movation is as important as 
product and process innovation, and organizational learning is the principal process by which 
it occurs (Stata 1989). Stata goes on to affi rm that "the rate at which individuals and 
organizations learn may become the only sustainable competiti ve advantage, especially in 
knowledge-intensive industries" (p.64); a belief which is shared by de Geus (1988). Based on 
both the existent body of theoretical work on the issue and the perception of practitioners like 
Stata, Miner and Mezias (1996 p.90) argue that "organizational learning now stands on the 
threshold of moving center stage in organization theory, both in an applied and theoretical 
context". 
2.2.1 Cognitive and Behavioural Changes 
But fo r all the distinction recently achieved, the concept of organizational learning is defined 
in a wide variety of ways by researchers. This was observed by Fiol and Lyles (1985) some 
ten years ago, and continues to be true. For instance, Huysman (1996) has dedicated a whole 
Ph.D dissertation to the discussion of the ambiguities in the literature on organizational 
IS 
learning, where she thoroughly examines the different perspectives on the concept. This is 
not, however, the objective of this study. I have opted for mentioning here only some of the 
ideas proposed by different researchers and which, in my view, are relevant fo r the study 
discussed in this dissertation. In this sense, two issues seem to stand out as a first step for a 
discussion on organizational learning. First is the idea that organizat ional learning entails 
some sort of change, and this change can involve both cognitive and behavioural aspects . 
Whilst some authors would favour one of these aspects, others would consider both as 
integral part of a learn ing process. Examples of the former are Huber (199 1 p.89), who takes 
a cognitive perspective by saying that "an organizations learns if any of its units acquires 
knowledge that it recognizes as potentially useful to the organization"; and, in a opposite 
standpoint, de Geus (1988 p.71) who states that "the only relevant learning in a company is 
the learning done by those people who have the power to act" . Amongst authors who 
contemplate both cognitive and behavioural aspects, two important contributions are made by 
Fiol and Lyles (1985 p.803), who define organizational learning as "the process of improving 
actions through better knowledge and understanding"; and Child and Mark6czy (1993), who 
propose a typology of managerial learning in joint ventures with six types of learning, 
according to changes occurring in cognition and/or behaviour of managers, and also whether 
those changes occur unilaterally or with managers of all partners. 
2.2.2 Learning as Outcome and Learning as Process 
The second issue relates to what authors look at when analysing organizational learning. 
Many authors only consider the outcomes of organizational processes, assessing whether 
learning has occurred or not. Few others investigate how these outcomes are actua lly 
achieved, examining processes of learning. This appears to be quite relevant, as any deeper 
understanding of how learning occurs depends on the analysis of such processes. The same 
can be said in relation to recommendations to organizations regard ing how they may improve 
their learning processes. The exclusive analysis of outcomes seems to be a result of both the 
difficulties in researching processes of organizational learning and the fact that some authors 
would consider investigation within individual organizations out of the scope of their work. 
The former is true for most of the business and management literature, which usually has a 
normative character mainly based on common sense, without being grounded on any 
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methodologically sound research. The latter can be observed in pa.rt of the more recent 
economics literature (Dosi and Marengo 1994, Hirschman 1985) which, despite 
acknowledging the importance of organizational learning for innovation and survival of 
firm s, and therefore advancing from a neo-classical view which considers knowledge as 
another given resource available to firm s, does not go very much beyond that. However, 
some authors would go a bit further, by indicating other literatures where organizational 
learning is considered more carefully (Hodgson 1995). 
It is important to highlight here that the analysis of outcomes of organizational learning 
processes is important for any assessment of these processes. Changes in organizational 
procedures, and therefore in behaviour, are the most apparent demonstration of the 
occurrence of learning. However, this analys is is not sufficient fo r understanding how 
learning come about in organizations. 
There is a small nwnber of empirical works which investigate processes of organizational 
learning. As the research discussed in this dissertation deal s with such processes, it is 
worthwhile \o briefly describe some of these studies. Moreover, they usually involve a 
munber of issues traditionally related to the debate on organizational learning. The intention 
here is to introduce the reader to the points more frequent ly debated in the organizational 
learning literature and describe how researchers have dea lt with these points in their 
empirical and theoretical work. Thus, the empirical studies on organizational learning 
processes will be presented throughout the chapter, during the discussion of issues to which 
they are related. 
2.2.3 Key Issues in the Debate on Organizational Learning 
Although there is no widely recognized theory of organizational learning, some issues have 
been mentioned consistently by different authors and can be considered as the main 
constituent parts of the debate on the subject. Those which are relevant for the study 
presented in this di ssertation are discussed below. 
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Agents and Levels of Learning 
The concept of organizational learning was some times rejected by authors who used to 
reason that organizations are a construct, and therefore, unable to learn by themselves. 
Argyris and Schon (1996) comment how their initial work (Argyris and Schon 1978) on the 
subj ect was badly received by some well-respected scholars of the time, because the idea of 
organizational learning was considered to be confusing. Nowadays this is no longer the rule, 
with references to organizational learning being conspicuous in the organizational literature. 
But despite the concept being more accepted, many basic questions remain a matter of 
debate. For instance, there is a wide agreement over the idea that organizations learn through 
their members (Argyris and Schon 1978, Simon 1991), but how individual and organizational 
learning are related is contentious. 
The already mentioned lack of empirical research on processes of organizational learning has 
resulted in many authors using models of individual learn ing, usually bo1rnwed from 
psychology, for explaining an organizational phenomenon. Such an approach is clearly 
unsatisfactory as it tends to treat the organization as an individual. Others have proposed the 
existence of different levels of learning within an organization, usually the individual, the 
group and the organization (lnkpen and Crossan 1995) . In this case, model s of individual 
learning are also frequently used for explaining processes at the first level. However, this can 
also be misleading, as there is generally a lack of consideration fo r the organization as a 
social setting involving the individual and, therefore, affecting her/hi s learning processes. 
Child and Heavens (1996) timely note such deficiency in the literature, drawing attention to 
the social constitution and contextual embeddedness of organizations. They argue that both 
the nature of organizational structures, and the dynamic interplay of action and structure in 
the learning process, encompass paradoxes which can both stimulate and impede 
organizational learning, depending partly on how they are managed. Hedberg (198 1) nicely 
defines the relationship between individual and organizational learning when he observes that 
"although organizational learning occurs tlu·ough individuals, it would be a mistake to 
conclude that organizational learning is nothing but the cumulati ve result of their member's 
learning. Organizations do not have brains, but they have cognitive systems and memories. 
As individuals develop their personalities, personal habits, and beliefs over time, 
organizations develop world views and ideo logies. Members come and go, and leadership 
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changes, but organizations' memories preserve certain behaviors, mental maps, norms, and 
values over time" (p.6). 
At the group level, some researchers have given compelling examples of the occurrence of 
learning, with shared understandings and tacitly coordinated behaviour being their most 
relevant characteristics (Brown and Duguid 1991 , Hutchins 1991). Besides being high quality 
pieces ofresearch, these two studies are also relevant due to the increasing significance of the 
work of teams within organizations. It seems important, however, not to assume that a 
group ' s learning is the same as organizational learning, as political questions within 
organizations may result in the content of learning being contested between groups (Child 
and Loveridge 1990). 
Kim (1993) deals with the relationship between individual and organizational learning, 
proposing that the mechanism which transfers learning from one level to the other is the 
sharing of mental models. These are defined by Senge (1990a p.8) as "deeply ingrained 
assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand 
the world and how we take action". Kim argues that "the mental models in individual' s head 
are where a vast majority of an organization' s knowledge (both know-how and know-why) 
lies" (p.44). Thus the importance of individuals making these mental model s explicit, so they 
can be improved and, as a consequence, also improve the level of organizational knowledge. 
A weak point in Kim' s analys is is, however, the fact that he views groups as ' mini-
organizations', proposing that hi s model of learning can represent both group and 
organizational learning. With this assumption, he simply glosses over questions of 
organizational politics mentioned in the previous paragraph. Nevertheless, his idea of sharing 
mental models can be useful in the analysis of team work. 
At the organizational level, some of the learning experiences of past and present members is 
stored in the form of working routines (Levitt and March 1988, Weick 1991) and 
organizational culture (Schein 1985). Nelson and Winter (1982 p.99) argue that 
organizational routines are "the most important fo rm of storage of the organization' s specific 
operational knowledge". Schein (1985 p.9) defines culture as "a pattern of basic assumptions 
- invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of 
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external adaptation and internal integration - that has worked well enough to be considered 
valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and 
feel in relation to those problems", and proposes this definition as va lid for both groups and 
organizations. This proposition seems to be fine, as long as we, again, bear in mind the 
question of politics within organizations and allow for the possibility of different sub-cultures 
within an organization. Both the ideas of organizational culture and operational routines 
imply the occurrence of learning. Moreover, the learning of individuals or groups which 
becomes part of an organization ' s culture and operational routines will define this 
organization 's way of working, until new learning occurs and culture and routines are 
changed. 
To conclude this topic, it seems reasonable to assume that learning occurs through 
individuals, and it may be encoded in group or organizational cultures and routines 1, mainly 
according to the preferences of those who have the power to determine dominant values at 
group and organizational levels. 
Types of Learning 
Writers on organizational learning have consistently suggested the occurrence of two types of 
learning with in organizations2. The basic distinction is between one type of learning which 
results in modifications in organizational procedures without questioning the norms and 
values which guide them, and a second type whereby the norms and va lues which guide 
organizational procedures are questioned and possibly changed. This distinction started with 
Argyris and Schon ( 1978), who proposed the existence of two types of organizational 
learning, single- loop and double-loop learning. The expressions single-loop and double-loop 
refer to the nwnber of feedback loops necessary in a learning episode in order to correct a 
mismatch between the expectations of the agent and the actual consequences of her/his 
action. In single-loop learni ng, a single feedback loop "connects detected error ( .. . ) to 
organizational strategies of action and their underlying asswnptions". In double-loop 
1 I am adopting a broad definition of organizational routines here, one that is not limited to operational routines 
but also includes policy guidelines and strategies. 
2 Some writers use the expression ' levels of learning' for defining what I am ca ll ing ' types of learning'_ I wi ll 
keep here the express ion ' types of learning' to differentiate it from the levels within the organization which I 
have discussed in the previous section. 
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learning, the "double-loop refers to the two feedback loops that connect the observed effects 
of action with strategies and values served by strategies. Strategies and assumptions may 
change concunently with, or as a consequence of, change in values" (Argyris and Schon 
1996 p.21). Argyris and Schon also propose the existence of a special case of double-loop 
learning, called second-order learning, through which members of an organization may 
question and modify the organization's learning system itself. This idea is based on the 
concept of deutero-learning, advanced by Gregory Bateson (1972), who observes that, in 
psychological laboratories, an experimental subject, after being submitted to repeated 
experiments, " learns to learn. He not only solves the problems set him by the experimenter, 
where each solving is a piece of simple learning; but, more than this, he becomes more and 
more skilled in the solving of problems" (p.166). 
Fiol and Lyles (1985) also propose the existence of two types of learning within 
organizations, along simi lar lines to the concepts of Argyris and Schon. The first type, called 
lower-level learning, is a result of repetition and routine, and relates to the development of 
" rudimentary associations of behavior and outcomes" (p.807), impacting only certain parts of 
the organizat;on. The second type, called higher-level learning, "aims at adjusting overall 
rules and norms rather than specific activities and behaviors" (p.808), and has as desired 
consequences the development of new cognitive frameworks fo r decision-ma.king. It is then 
possible to associate lower-level learning to changes in behaviour and higher-level learning 
to changes in cognition. 
Senge (1990b), also based on Argyris and Schon, suggests the existence of adaptive learning, 
which is related to coping with the environment, and generative learning, which is related to 
creating. Generative learning entails the capacity of seeing the systems that controls events 
and being able to identify the source of problems. Senge holds that contemporary 
organizations a.re generally reactive, or at best responsive, but rarely generative, and that is 
mainly because their leaders pay attention only to events or patterns of behaviour, but fail to 
see the systemic structure of reality. He maintains that generative learning is superior than 
adaptive learning in giving competitive advantage to a company. 
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March ( I 991) discusses the choice for organizations between exploitation of old certainties 
and exploration of new possibilities. Whilst the former means the refinement and extension 
of existing competencies, the latter means experimentation with new alternatives. March 
argues that organizations need to strike a balance between the two in order to survive and 
prosper. Although he does not quali fy the two options as types of learning, it is possible to 
assume that each of them entails different types of learning. We can then go a bit further and 
propose that, in the same way as organizations need to balance exploitation and exploration, 
the two types of learning entailed by them are also complementary, both needing to be 
fos tered by organizations. 
Thi s suggestion is similar to one put forward by Edmondson and Moingeon ( 1996). These 
authors also propose the existence of two types of learning, learning how and learning why. 
The first is defined as "organizational members engaging in processes designed to transfer 
and/or improve existing skills and routines". The second as "organizational members 
inquiring into causality using diagnostic skill s. The objective in learning why is to discern 
underlying logic or causal factors" (p.27). These definitions are similar to those from other 
authors. What is interesting in Edmondson and Moingeon 's work is the idea that both 
learning how and learning why are important for organizations in the sense of giving them 
competiti ve advantage. The authors argue that the two types of learning are qualitatively 
different, and are suitable fo r different organizational situations. According to them, "this 
proposal is based on an observation that not all competitive advantage requires frame-
breaking change" (p.28). With this proposition, Edmondson and Moingeon differentiate their 
work from most of the literature on organizational learning which considers double-loop 
learning (or higher-level, or generative, or learning why) as intrinsically better than single-
loop learning. 
Finally, in a more pragmatic approach, a document from CIBAM ( 1993) suggests the 
existence of three types of learning within international strategic alliances: technical, 
systemic and strategic. The technical type refers to the acquisition of new techniques, such as 
quality measurement, which may be confined to individuals or small groups. The systemic 
level refers to the introduction and operation of new systems, such as production control and 
budgeting systems, which impact on relationships and coordinated behaviour within an 
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organization. The strategic type refers to changes in the mind-sets of senior managers, 
especially their criteria of business success and their mental maps of factors which are 
significant fo r achieving that success. Its has consequences for the organization as a whole, 
and involves reflexive cognitive processes with a view to generating new insights and being 
proactive. Higher levels of learning are believed to be more difficult to achieve, mainly due 
to: the increasing cognitive readjustment required, the wider scope of their consequences, and 
the fact that they are usually more sensitive to organizational politics. Child and Faulkner 
(1997) suggest the existence of some degree of parallel between this approach and the usual 
theoretical perspective, with technical learning corresponding to single-loop learning, 
systemic learning to double-loop learning, and strategic learning to second-order learning. 
Tacit and Explicit Knowledge 
Another dichotomy frequently mentioned in the organizat ional learning literature is between 
tacit and explicit forms of knowledge. This is a more recent discussion than the others 
previously mentioned, and it seems that the debate on the issue is still in its early days. The 
idea of explicit knowledge is almost self-explanatory, meaning knowledge that can be readi ly 
co1111T1wlicated to others. The performance of organizational routines, for instance, generally 
involves a set of well defined steps, which can be classified as explicit knowledge. However, 
researchers have increasingly perceived that those routines also involve knowledge which 
does not fall into this category. The more people get used to their tasks, the more they will 
perform them in their own personal way, which many times will represent an improvement 
over the way they first performed the task. But if one asks the performer how he/she carried 
out the task he/she wi ll possibly not be ab le to explain it, or will explain only part of it3. Such 
behaviour can be extended to teams of workers, who may find ways of integrating their 
individuals tasks in a manner which yields a better overall performance, without making such 
knowledge explicit.
4 
Furthermore, if one considers non-routine jobs, as it is usually the case 
of managerial functions, the implicit component of task performance wi ll be greater. This 
3 
There is the possibili ty that the performer knows how to explain her/his task, but is not willing to do so. In this 
case, the knowledge would not be intrinsica lly different from explicit knowledge, in the sense of being also 
ready to be communicated. However, considering a context in which the performer does not want to make it 
explicit , for whatever reason, the consequences of the use of this knowledge wi ll be different from explicit 
knowledge. 
4 
See the already mentioned study conducted by Hutchins ( I 99 I) for an example of implicit knowledge of a 
ship 's navigating team. 
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form of knowledge has been called tacit knowledge, a concept proposed by Michael Polanyi 
(1966). 
The increasing attention recently given to tacit knowledge stems not only from the perception 
of its presence within organizations, but also from its intrinsic characteristic of not being 
easily communicated. On the one hand, this can represent a problem for organizat ions. If an 
important part of organizational knowledge is held by one individual, or a small group of 
individuals, and it is difficult to communicate, the departure of this (these) individual(s) from 
the organization can represent the loss of that knowledge. On the other hand, the difficulties 
in communication can also represent that the knowledge is difficult to be imitated and, 
according to what has been discussed in section 2.1 , be a potential source of competitive 
advantage. Spender ( I 996) explores th is possibi lity, stressing the bond existent between tacit 
knowledge and the experience of the knower. Differently from explicit knowledge, which 
generally can be transmitted and understood independently of the knower, tacit knowledge is 
si tuational , dependent on the context experienced by the knower. 
Nonaka (199 1, 1994) and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) propose a theory of knowledge 
creation which has as its cornerstone the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge. 
According to the authors, their "dynamic model of knowledge creation is anchored to a 
critical assumption that human knowledge is created and expanded through social interaction 
between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge" (1995 p.6 I). They ca ll th is interaction 
' knowledge conversion', and suggest its existence in fo ur modes: I) taci t to tacit, called 
socialization; 2) tacit to explicit, called external ization; 3) explicit to explicit, called 









Four Modes of Knowledge Conversion 
Tacit Knowledge To Explicit Knowledge 
Socialization Externalization 
Internalization Combination 
Source: Nonaka and Takeuchi ( 1995) 
Socialization is defined as the creation of tac it knowledge, such as shared mental models and 
technical skill s. The authors judge essential that all parts involved in this process share the 
same experiences. Externalization is defined as the arti culation of tacit knowledge into 
explicit concepts. It is triggered by dialogue or collective reflection. The authors suggest that 
this conversion is frequently driven by the use of metaphors and/or analogies, as people may 
find it difficult to use analytical methods to express their tacit knowledge. Nonaka and 
Takeuchi regard externalization as holding the key to organizational knowledge creation, as it 
allows new knowledge to be made explicit. Combination is defined as a process of 
organizing concepts into a knowledge system. The sequence of externalization and 
combination converts individual knowledge into an organizational property. Internalization is 
defined as a process of embodying explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge, being similar to 
' learning by doing' . The four modes of knowledge creation would work as an spi ral, with 
each mode fo llowing the other. However, the organization needs to create conditions fo r the 
process of knowledge creation to occur. This will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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An interesting characteristic of Nonaka (1991, 1994) and Nonaka and Takeuchi's (1995) 
work is the constant use of examples, taken from research which they have conducted. On 
reading their work, it is possible to perceive that they have researched processes of 
organizational learning, and carefully analysed them in the light of the literatures on 
innovation, learning, and organizational theory. They were able to create a very well-thought 
theory, with powerful concepts based on an attractive combination of theoretical and 
empirical reflection. Their theory is already an almost obligatory reference for any work in 
organizational learning. 
Triggers of Learning 
What would trigger processes of organizational learning? According to Hedberg ( 198 1) 
learning is typically triggered by problems. Hedberg refe rs to March and Simon's (1958) 
proposition that dissati sfaction is a trigger for organizational problem solving. On identifying 
a problem, members of organizations would search for a solution, engaging in what Cyert 
and March (1963) called problemistic search. This search might well lead to the acqui sition 
of new knowledge for the organization, characterizing a process of organizational learning. 
Another possible trigger is the perception of opportunities in the enviromnent. Thompson 
(1967) defines the activ ity of monitoring the environment for opportunities as ' opportunistic 
surveillance' , and suggests that it could help an organization in anticipating institutional 
trends. But he acknowledges that, by the number of companies which fa il to anticipate 
institutional changes, there is a scarcity of opportunistic surveillance. Thompson indicates 
some possible causes fo r such scarcity, and one of the most interesting is what he describes 
as "a bias toward certainty, which shows up in various forms including preference for short-
term rather than long-term considerations, quantitative rather than qualitative data, and 
precedent rather than im10vation" (p .1 52). It is interesting to perceive the similarity between 
his point of view and Senge's ( 1990b) point on adaptive and generative learning. 
A third trigger for organizational learning is a drive for innovation which does not come from 
a direct search for envirom11ental opportunities. This possibili ty is almost neglected in the 
literature on organizational learning. Dodgson observes that "the ro le of human agency and 
individual goals such as the drive fo r self-actualization are almost completely ignored in 
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many accounts of organizational adaptability. Organizational learning is stimulated both by 
environmental changes and internal factors in a complex and iterative maimer" (p.387). An 
exainple of this type of trigger is given by Morita (1987), when he describes the objectives of 
Sony by saying that their p lan " is to lead the public with new products rather than ask them 
what kind of products they want. The public does not know what is possible, but we do. So 
instead of doing a lot of market research , we refine our thinking on a product and its use and 
try to create a market for it by educating and communicating with the public" (p.79). 
A fourth factor which can trigger organizational learning processes is the arrival of 
newcomers in an orgai1ization . Huber (1991) labels as grafting the process whereby 
orgat1izations hire new members who possess knowledge not previously available. Such 
knowledge will most probably be diffused across the orgai1ization, moving from individual to 
organizational level. Hedberg ( 1981) points out that changes in leadersl1ip can work as 
triggers for change actions within orgai1izat ions, leading to the occurrence of organizational 
learning. Hedberg also observes that new leaders come to replace old ones, ai1d the departure 
of the latter can represent removal of part of the past of the orgat1ization. This is another issue 
of the debate, riiscussed in the next topic . 
Unlearning 
It has been argued that for new knowledge to take place, old knowledge has to be discarded 
(Hedberg 1981 ). This act of discarding is known as unleai·ning. The amount of unlearning 
which needs to occur for new learning to take place seems to be directly proportional to the 
degree of conflict existent between the old and new knowledge. But it is not necessarily the 
case that a greater amount of unlearning represents a more difficu lt task. That seems to 
depend on the context. If the old knowledge has lost its legitimacy within a different context, 
people may be wi lling to discard it, in so fat· as they perceive the deficiency, and believe the 
new knowledge to be superior (Child and Smith 1987). 
But unleai·ning can also represent a very complex task. Biggart ( 1977) analyses a large 
process of chat1ge at the U.S. Post Office Department, where she gives particular attention to 
the destruction of the old structure and style of the organization. In that case, the changes 
were enormous in relation to the previous situation and, as many groups, both inside at1d 
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outside the organization, had strong interests in the previous status quo, the changes faced 
huge opposition. Destruction of past practices was the only way to implement the new. 
Biggart shows many examples of resistance to this destruction and how different interest 
groups acted in favour and against the process of change. Besides being a good example of 
unlearning, her work is also an excellent endeavour at describing a process of change 
considering its context. 
In this sense, Biggart's description of the old ideology, formal structure, operating 
procedures, and forms of control at the U.S. Post Office Depaiiment reveals a context of 
heavy institutional embeddedness (Granovetter 1985) of the old structures and practices5. It 
was, therefore, very difficult for unlearning to take place. It only occurred through the 
concerted actions of destroying " the most debilitating aspects of the former organization: the 
formal structure, the ideology, the leadership, ai1d opposing alliai1ces ai1d power bases", and 
engaging " in the constructive activities of creating new work methods, building new 
facilities, developing technological improvements, and creat ing alliances" (Biggart 1977 
p.424). Thus, the old knowledge only lost its legitimacy through the use of power which, 
simultaneously, destroyed the old and created the new source of legitimacy. Scott ( 1995 p.45) 
argues that legitimacy is a "condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or 
consonai1ce with relevant rules or laws". In the case of the U.S. Post Office Department, all 
three levels were acted upon, with human agency chai1ging structural and cultural conditions. 
Another difficulty related to unlearning is that success usually reinforces organizational 
hab its, making unlearning difficult. Organ izations which were once successful may take time 
to perceive the necessity for change. It is difficu lt for them to overcome the competencies 
they have developed with older routines (Whetten 1987). 
Organizational Memory 
Processes of organi zational lea rning must involve some form of organizational memory so as 
the knowledge being acquired or created can be latter used by the organization. Despite the 
5 I am adopting Scott's ( 1995 p.33) definition of institutions, which "consist of cognitive, normative, and 
regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to soc ial behavior. Institutions are 
transponed by various carriers - cultures, structures, and routines - and they operate at multiple levels of 
jurisdiction". 
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existence of a consensus about its importance, there is still a lack of research on 
organizational memory (Huber 199 1 ). Memory is basically related to the storing and retrieval 
of information. Walsh and Ungson (1991 ) define organizational memory as "stored 
info rmation from an organization 's history that can be brought to bear on present decisions" 
(p.6 1). Organizations deal with different types of information, which usually are stored in 
different ways. For instance, Nelson and Winter (1982 p.99) argue that organizational 
routines are the most important form of organizational memory. March and Simon (1958) 
already had postulated that standard operating routines embody organizational memory. 
Important means of storing ' hard ' information are company files and databases. 
Mintzberg (1975), on the other hand, has shown how managers acquire 'soft' information 
through verbal media and store it in their minds. One of the main difficu lti es in researching 
memory in organizations is exactly the fact that much of it lies in people 's brains. Two 
problems may arise from the attempt to retrieve this type of memory: a) the difficulty in 
expressing some of the knowledge kept in individual memory, which is connected to the 
already discussed issue of tacit knowledge; and b) the time necessary fo r the individual who 
holds this memory to dump it so as it can be of use to other people. Nevertheless, if 
individual memory is not made public or, in this case, organizational, such knowledge will be 
lost when the individual leaves the organization. That can al so happen, even with explicit 
knowledge, when organization' s members do not store this knowledge in organ izational files 
due to non-anticipation of its use in the future . 
To summarize this section, Table 2. 1 presents the six issues discussed in relation to 
organizational learning and its main features. The other two points to highlight are: a) 
learning entail s both cognitive and behavioural changes; and b) most of the research on the 
subject tend to concentrate on the outcomes of organizational learning; however, only by 




Key Issues in the Debate on Organizational Learning 
Issues Main features 
Agents and . Organizations learn through their members 
Levels of . Learning can be consolidated at individual , group and organizational levels 
Learning . Shared mental models help knowledge to flow between different levels . The content of learning may be object of disputes between groups. Politics 
influence learning 
. Organizational routines and cultures are embodiments of learn ing 
Types of . Questioning procedures and assumptions in order to correct a mismatch 
Learning between expectations and actual outcomes 
. Questioning norms and va lues which guide procedures and assumptions . Questioning the learning system 
Tacit and . Tacit: knowledge not codified, context and experience re lated , difficult to 
Explici t communicate 
Knowledge . Explicit: codified knowledge, readily transmissible 
Triggers . Prob lem solving 
of Learning . Environmental search looking for opportunities . Internal drive, self motivation for innovation . Newcomers 
Unlearning . Knowledge which is no longer des irable . Can be a matter of dispute, as different groups can have diffe rent views on 
which knowledge is desirable . Knowledge linked to past successes may be more di fficul t to discard 
Organizational . Hard and soft knowledge require different media for acquis ition, storage 
Memory and diffusion . Soft knowledge is frequently tacit and, therefore, difficult to be 
communicated. As a consequence, it is difficult to make it part of the 
organi zational memory 
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2.3 Learning and its Context 
In the previous section, I have pointed out that some authors exclusively apply individual 
learning models to the analysis of organizational learning, and that I regard that as 
w1satisfactory. I have also acknowledged the fact that organizations learn through their 
members, and, indeed, individual learning models can inform us on how human beings learn. 
However, organizational learning is, fundamentally, a social process, involving human 
agency within a social context. The analysis of the process must, therefore, take this aspect 
into consideration. Unfortunately, much of the literature on organizational learning does not 
seem to consider that. On the one hand, the already mentioned emphasis on individual 
learning models tends to neglect political aspects within organizations which bear upon 
processes of organizational learning. Factors which can hinder the occurrence of 
organizational learning are considered to be strictly psychological. Factors which can 
stimulate the occurrence of organizational learning are suggested as organizations were 
uniform entities, with no contradictory views within them. On the other hand, some 
perspectives on organizational learning, mainly from the economics literature, tend to adopt 
the firm as their W1it of analysis without any consideration to actors within it (Child 1997). 
Such standpoint simply does not allow the understanding of how organizations may learn. 
The perspective adopted in this dissertation seeks to consider, for the analysis of learning 
processes, both the external and internal contexts of the organizations studied . The external 
context relates to "the economic, business, political and societal formations in which firm s 
must operate" (Whipp, Rosenfeld and Pettigrew 1988 p.18). These formation s establi sh 
certain conditions for the operations of firms, which can both constrain and enable 
organizational action. On the other hand, organizational decision-makers can exerci se some 
choice regarding the immediate environment where the organization operates, like where to 
locate its operations, the clientele it shall serve and the employees it shall recruit (Child 
1972). This choice, in turn , will have an influence in shaping the environment. In this sense, 
there is a mutual relationship between the external context and the organization, whereby 
each one influence and are influenced by the other (Giddens 1984). 
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Another impact the external context has on firms is through organizationa l members, who are 
connected to other social structures outside the organization, like profess ional associations, 
family and nation. These connections represent that the identities of those members can not 
be seen as exclusively linked to their organizational role, but as fo rmed by several layers of 
social influences which can, in certain situations, be in conflict wi th each other. 
The internal context is here understood as " the structure, cul ture and poli tics of an 
organization" (Whipp et al. 1988 p 18). It is important to perceive that, although I am using 
this distinction between external and internal contexts, they are in reality parts of a single 
totali ty (Whittington 1992). The influence of social structures on organizational members 
mentioned in the previous paragraph are an evidence of that. However, for the purposes of 
analysis, it seems to me that the distinction is useful , fo r it allows clearer understanding of 
the relationship between an organization and the environment it operates. What then seems to 
be necessary when making this distinction is to keep awareness of analytical character of its 
formulation. 
Considering the issues discussed in the previous section and the organizational context, it is 
possible to identify several factors connected to the latter which may bear upon processes of 
organizational learning; hence the importance of taking them into consideration. Let us then 
examine some contributions in the literature which refer to these factors. 
Regard ing the external environn1ent, Hedberg ( 1981 ) suggests factors which influence an 
organization ' s learning, presenting some of them in the form of dichotomies. Hedberg argues 
that in three of these dichotomies - stability versus turbulence, simplicity versus complexity, 
and benevolence versus hostili ty - an intermediary situation would be most conducive to 
learni ng . In others, like richness versus scarcity of information, and fa ilure versus success in 
feedback, one option is clearly better than other. In these cases, richness of info rmation about 
the environment and successful feedback. This last one is particularly interesting, as Hedberg 
observes that whilst individuals who receive feedback indicating fa ilure have to split their 
attention between solving unsolved problems and coping with new situations, those who 
receive feedback indicating success can concentrate in integrating thei r knowledge and 
solving new problems. Thus, " learners' abili ty to learn is thus not only a function of the 
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nature of an environment but also of their aping capacity. and of the dynan1ics that develop 
during the learning process·· (Hedberg 198 I p.14). 
ln the case of the study discussed in this dissertation. aspects of the relationship between the 
organizations and their external em·ironments which may have influenced the processes of 
learning were examined during the data ollection and analysis. This will be further explored 
the next chapter. during the discussion of the research methodology adopted. 
Regarding the internal context. the literature on organizational learning. change and culture 
give some indication of aspect " ·hich may influence processes of learning. I wi ll discuss 
here the aspects I considered before undertaking the fieldwork. Some of these aspects have an 
extensive literature exclusively dedicated to them. For the sake of brevity, I will only discuss 
features I regard as directly related to organizational learning. 
Perhaps one of the most important these aspects is organizational culture. Following the 
definition by Schein (1985). I have mentioned in the previous section that the formation ofan 
organizational culture implies the occurrence of learning. But, in a reciprocal relationship, 
existent organizational culture or subcultures also impact on the processes of organizational 
learning. According to Wilson (1992), there are two main cultural approaches to 
organizations: structural and interpretive. The former emphasizes how roles are structured 
together to form particular organizational designs, meaning that organizational structure is an 
important aspect of its culture. Handy (1986) gives a well known example of the relationship 
between culture and structure, with four typologies of culture and their related structures. The 
interpretive approach emphasizes the cognitive and interpretive processes by which 
individuals either support or try to hinder organizational change. Interpretation. symbols and 
language are amongst the main features of this approach. Wilson argues that the two 
approaches "lead towards very different interpretations of the process of organizational 
change" (1992 p.72). 
In spite of Wilson 's point, I will argue that both approaches have important features for the 
interpretation of organizational learning processes. Before justifying my point of view, let me 
just make clear that I consider change as part of organizational learning processes; in fact, I 
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have previously discussed the point that learning involves cognitive and/or behavioural 
changes. There are many examples of how organizational structure may help the occurrence 
of learning. Aoki (1988) describes how information structures help learning within Japanese 
firms. Similarly, Takeuchi and Nonaka (1986) argue that Japanese companies overlap 
different stages of development of new products (R&D, manufacturing and marketing, for 
instance) in order to both expedite the process and allow redundancy of information which 
faci litates the flow of tacit knowledge. On the other hand, Burns and Stalker ( I 96 1) show 
how Scottish firms with bureaucratic structures, called by them as ' mechanistic ' , failed to 
absorb electronics R&D engineers and adapt to a changing environment. Their account of 
groups within those organizations fighting for control over resources and new functions 
shows that not only the structure but also the culture (although they did not give such 
denomination) hampered adaptat ion. 
The interpretive approach assumes that individual s inside organizations share meanings that 
are sustained through a common language and everyday social interactions. The idea of 
shared meanings and the importance of language seem to be closely connected to some 
perspectives on organizational learning. For instance, Senge and Sterman ( 1992) define 
organizational learning as " the process whereby shared understandings change" (p.138). 
Kofman and Senge (1993) argue that one of the principles of the learning organization is the 
practice of 'generative conversation' , whereby language function s as a device for connection, 
invention and coordination. Again, it is important to observe that the idea of shared meaning 
does not imply the existence of a single culture within an organization. 
Schein (1996) discusses the existence of three cultures within organizations in general: 
executives, engineers and operators . He suggests that these cultures are based in different 
assumptions. Executives and engineers are occupational communities with world views 
based on their education, shared technology and work experiences. Their reference groups are 
thei r peers outside the organization. Executives have a financial focus , trying to ensure return 
to shareholders. They see the organization as intrinsically hierarchical , and consider that it 
must be run by rules and control systems. They also think that the organization must be a 
team, but accow1tabi lity has to be individual. Engineers think that the ideal world is one of 
elegant machines and processes worki ng in perfect precision and harmony, without human 
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intervention. They prefer ' people free ' solutions to problems. Operators think that the success 
of the organization depends on people's knowledge and skill , which is local and based on the 
organization's core technology. They usually need to work in collaborative teams, which 
demands commw1ication, openness and trust. According to Schei n, each culture has its own 
history which justifies its viewpoint. However, because of their different assumptions, it is 
difficult fo r organizations to create an aligmnent among them, which can hinder 
organizational learning. It is worth noting that Schein 's model is perhaps more suitable to 
Western organizations. For instance, Morita (1987) affi rms that Japanese executives wi ll 
invariably list as one of their most important responsibilities the continued employment and 
improvement of the livelihood of workers. "In order to do that, the company must make a 
profit. Make a profit will never be at the top of the list" (p.179). 
Paul Adler's (1992) research at NUMMI, the Toyota-GM joint venture for car manufacturing 
in Cali fo rnia, is an example of attention to both structural and interpretive aspects of culture 
and how they affect learning. Seeking to understand the high levels of productivity, quality 
and work motivation achieved by NUMMI, despite the history of a previous GM plant in the 
same place being very problematic, Adler concludes fo r three main elements: a) 
implementation of Tayloristic principles in a democratic way, by involving workers in the 
development of work standards; b) although NUMMI is characterized by hi gh levels of 
standardization and formalization, its workfl ow procedures are designed to encourage 
learning on the part of a workfo rce assumed to share a common goal of production efficiency 
and quality; and c) the company's performance and mora le are sustained by the combination 
of these learning-oriented characteristics of the organization's ' fo rmal' systems with the 
distinctive characteristics of its ' informal' organization - its culture, the fabric of trust 
between workers and managers, and the balance of power between labour and management. 
Summing-up, organizational culture and organizational learning have a reciprocal 
relationship. Even considering different views on organizational culture, it is possible to 
indicate aspects of the concept which may directly influence the occu1Tence or not of 
organizational learning. 
35 
Another important aspect of the internal context which can have influence on organizational 
learning is tean1work and, within it, communication appears to be a variable of particular 
relevance. The importance of teamwork for organizations has increased as the environment 
where they operate becomes more complex. In order to deal with complexity, organizations 
need to mobilize an increasing quantity of knowledge. Such knowledge is produced at 
various levels within the organizations, and has to be integrated so it can be embodied in the 
products and services provided by them. In this sense, the performance of organizational 
functions demands both a wide range of skills from employees and the ability of exchanging 
knowledge wi th other organizat ional members, which is heavily dependent on 
communication. It is through teamwork that organizations attempt to coordinate employees 
and direct the knowledge they are capable of producing towards organizat ional objectives . A 
number of issues already discussed in this chapter are related to both teamwork and 
communication, like the transfer of knowledge between different organizational levels and 
the sharing of experiences and knowledge in the tacit-explicit knowledge cycle. Some of the 
teams involved in the research presented in this dissertation are bi-national. In this case, 
factors such as language and other cultural differences may surge as an add itional difficulty 
for effective teamwork and communication. These issues wi ll be further considered in the 
next section of this chapter, which discusses international business and organizational 
learning. 
The last internal variab le I want to consider in this section is leadership. A number authors 
have directed attention to this issue when discussing organizational learning. There is a 
particularl y interesting view regarding the ro le of managers as leaders in an organizational 
learning process, which is shared by few of these authors. The general idea is that managers 
should provide a shared context where organizational members could fee l sufficiently 
confident to put forward divergent views over a question. By doing that, they would 
stimulate debate and, arguably, reach a better informed decision than one coming out of an 
unilateral reasoning. Moreover, by ski lfully conducti ng this debate, managers could be ab le 
to reach a consensus out of the divergent views. Let us briefly see how different authors 
consider this point. 
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Fiol (1994) proposes that "(L)earning in organizations entai ls not only the acquisition of 
diverse infom1ation, but the ability to share a common understanding so as to exploit it. The 
apparent paradox is that collective learning, by definition, encompasses both divergence and 
convergence of the meanings that people assign to their surroundings.( ... ) "meaning" is not 
a w1idimensional construct, but rather encompasses multiple dimensions. If we unpack the 
construct, we may find that meanings can be simultaneously diverse and shared across 
individuals. Consensus may develop around one dimension of meaning and not around 
another. ( .. ) The important point is that meaning resides not only in the content of the 
pictures we convey in our communications, but also in the way we frame them" (p.404-405). 
After investigating how consensus evolved within a team of managers over the creation and 
management of a new venture in a financial services company, Fiol proposes that "to 
promote learning as a community, managers must actively encourage the development of 
different and conflicting views of what is thought to be true, while striving for a shared 
framework of the issues that is broad enough to encompass those differences" (p.418) 
This proposition is similar to Mary Parker Follett ' s notion of ' integration' as one possible 
way of dealinr; with conflict. According to Follett (1963 p.30-33), "as conflict - difference -
is here in the world, as we cannot avoid it, we should, I think, use it. Instead of condemning 
it, we should set it to work for us.( ... ) when two desires are integrated, that means that a 
solution has been found in which both desires have found a place, that neither side has had to 
sacrifice anything. ( ... ) Integration involves invention, and the clever thing is to recognize 
this, and not to let one ' s thinking stay within the boundaries of two alternatives which are 
mutually exclusive". Similarly, Harnpden-Turner (I 994) suggests that by the reconciliation 
of apparently opposing values one can get a superior result than from the usual either-or 
choice between these values. "The leader ' s task is to reconstruct the culture so that 
conflicts are first defused and eventually become complementary forces , mutually reinforcing 
the best aspects of culture rather then continually attacking them. What he or she needs to 
avoid are patterns of social conflict. These are invariably indicated by a contrast between a 
positive and a negative view of the same issue.( . .. ) There are important gai ns in this move 
from social conflicts to dilemmas. If the members of a culture are to own the new culture 
offered to them, then their own positive efforts and the justifications of their views must be 
part of the final picture" (Han1pden-Tumer 1990 p.1 93). 
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Nonaka (1 994) discusses the idea that front line employees and lower managers deal with a 
great amow1t of valuable info rmation about a company's business, but they find it difficul t to 
turn this info rmation into usefu l knowledge and, moreover, to communicate such knowledge 
to others. The difficulty in communication is due to the fact that people actively interpret new 
knowledge in order to fit it to their own situation and perspectives. Thus, according to 
Nonaka, "what makes sense in one context can change or even lose its meaning when 
communicated to people in different context" (p.30). He proposes a model of management 
called middle-up down, where the main job of top and middle managers " is to orient this 
chaotic situation toward purposeful knowledge creation. These managers do this by providing 
their subordinates with a conceptual framework that helps them make sense of their own 
experience" (p.31). This idea bears some similarity with the concept of the ' linking pin', 
advanced by Rensis Likert (1 961), who argues that group leaders need to be abl e to influence 
both her/his subordinates and her/his own boss. Through this li nking function, managers can 
establish the connections between di fferent groups within the organization. Likert (I 96 I 
p. 105) maintains that "an organization will function best when its personnel function not as 
individuals but as members of highly effecti ve work groups with high perfo rmance goals. 
Consequently, management should deliberately endeavor to build these effective groups, 
linking them into an over-all organization by means of people who hold overlapping group 
membership". 
Mintzberg and Westley ( I 992) analyse cycles of organizational change, considering that they 
always start with a learning process, during which "a plethora of ideas and initiati ves may in 
fact express a restlessness with the old order" (p.44). Mi ntzberg and Westley suggest that 
some processes of learning may start in specific parts of an organization and gradually 
pervade the behaviour of the organization at large. But whether "the learning is focused or 
scattered, it has to become the bas is fo r a new perspective, in effect, a new vision of some 
aspect of organizational life , however specific. ( ... )The change process may not necessarily 
be driven at this step by visionary leadership per se, but we believe most significant 
successful change has to be driven by a new vision, in other words, some kind of 
reconception, which serves as a conceptual umbrella by which to make conscious the 
emergent learning" (p.44). 
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A different view on leadership is proposed by Senge ( 1990b) and Kofman and Senge (1 993 ), 
who argue that in a learning organization managers have to act in a completely distinct way 
from a traditional organization. Whilst in the latter, leadership is associated to ' being in 
control', implying that those ' below' are not in control , in the fo rmer leadership is not a 
individualistic phenomena. In this sense, managers assume three main roles : des igner, teacher 
and steward. As designers, managers should design the governing ideas and values by which 
people will live, and also "the policies, strategies and structures that translate guiding ideas 
into business decisions" (Senge 1990b p. 10). Moreover, managers should create effective 
learning processes which sustains such policies, strategies and structures. As teachers, 
managers should help people within organizations to gain more insightful views of the 
reality . That would be done through bringing people's mental models to surface and helping 
them to see the systemic structure of reality. As stewards, managers should be guided by the 
willing to serve both the people they lead and the organization. This would be the best way of 
getti ng the commitment of organizational members. Senge also argue that such type of 
leadership requires new skills from managers, directed towards building a shared vision, 
surfacing and testing mental models, and being able to be ' systems thi nkers ' , focusing " less 
on day-to-day events and more on underlying trends and fo rces of change" (Senge 1990b 
p.15). 
Such view of leadership is strongly contested by Coopey (1995), who argues that the model 
of the learning organization lacks "specific features to fac ilitate changes in the framework 
and institutions of governance, and in the political processes constrained by them" which 
"detracts considerably from the model' s prescriptive value, especially as it affects the 
interests of rank-and-file employees" (p. l 97). He opposes the idea contained in the learning 
organization literature that power would be more evenly distributed within such 
organizations. Coopey goes on to suggest that managers at the top of the organization will be 
the main beneficiaries of possible changes in the structure and increments in collective 
knowledge associated with the distribution of power withi n a learning organization. He 
proposes that those managers, ma.king "use of their enhanced penetrative organizational 
knowledge at the nodal points where internal and external circuits of power intersect,( .. ) are 
likely to build up and safeguard their power" (p.211 ). 
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Although the purpose of th is dissertation is not to discuss the relationship between power and 
organizational learning, it is important to consider Coopey's point of view. It is assumed here 
that an investigation on the enabling conditions for organizational learning must take the 
context of the organization into consideration. This means that the objectives of the processes 
need to be clear, including who defines these obj ectives. Thus, despite not concentrating the 
discussion on possible changes in the balance of power, it seems impo11ant to be aware of 
those who are perceived to be the beneficiaries of the processes, and the resources used by 
those benefi ciaries to fac ili tate their development. 
To summarize this section, Table 2.2 presents the main issues discussed about the 
relationship between organizational learning and its context. 
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Table 2.2 
Learning and its Context 
Context Main Features in Relation to Organizational Learning 
External . Stability versus turbulence (intermediary point) 
(favourable . Simplicity versus complexity (in termediary point) 
condition to . Benevolence versus hostility (intermediary point) 
organizational . Richness versus scarcity of information 
learning in . Failure versus success in feedback 
italics) 
. Organizational culture and organizational learning have a reciprocal 
relationship . Organizational structure can both facilitate and hinder learning . Subcultures can both hinder and enrich organizational learning 
Internal . Involvement of workers in defining their tasks ' standards may result in a 
committed workforce • standardization of tasks does not necessarily 
hinder organizational learning . Effective teamwork and good communication are essential for 
organizational learning . Managers should provide a shared context where employees could feel 
stimulated to express diverse views on a problem 
. Development of processes of organizational learning can be better 
understood by the identification of: a) objectives of the processes; b) 
who sets these objectives; and c) which resources these setters use for 
fac ilitating the processes. 
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2.4 International Business Ventures and Organizational Learning 
Is there any difference between studying organizational learning processes in an IBV6 and a 
company which is owned and run exclusively by home country nationals (local companies)? 
I would say yes, there is a difference, and I would think of three issues as responsible for 
such difference: ownership, product and process adaptation to local conditions, and cross-
national tean1s. In the section I will discuss why these issues deserve particular attention for 
the analysis oflearning processes in IBVs. 
Ownership is relevant in the case of international joint ventures, where fo reign and host 
country companies are joint owners of the venture. Depending on the motivations of the 
partners for forming the alliance, their interest in the outcomes of learning processes 
occurring within the joint venture may be very different. If, on the one hand, the main 
objective of all partners is the profitability of the joint venture, then the impact of ownership 
on learning processes would be restricted to possible conflicts on how to manage the joint 
venture. In this case, what would differentiate the joint venture from an ordinary company 
would be the possible interference of the partners in the management of the business and, as a 
consequence, on learning processes. Killing (1983) points out that, in joint ventures where 
the partners share the management, this degree of interference is related to the performance 
of the venture. The better the performance, the greater the tendency of the partners of giving 
more autonomy to the joint venture 's managers to run the business. But if the performance is 
considered lll1Satisfactory by the partners, they will tend to interfere. Killing observes that 
such interference usually delays the decision-making processes at the joint venture, resulting 
in an even worse performance. Although Killing has not studied processes of organizational 
learning, it seems reasonable to draw comparisons between performance and learning. In this 
sense, bad performance and consequent interference by the parent companies may pose 
difficulties for learning processes, as managers at the parent companies and the joint venture 
may have different interpretations over which are the main causes for the bad performance 
6 ln order to avoid the reader searching back for the definition of international business ventures (IBYs), I will 
repeat it here. ll3Ys refer to the involvement by foreign investing companies in host countries. They can be new 
companies or already existent local companies in which foreign companies have acquired a stake. The process 
is assumed to entai l some degree of management that is shared between nationals of both local and foreign 
countries. 
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and, as a consequence, delay organizational action. This situation would characterize what 
March and Olsen ( 1976b) have defined as audience learning, when the individual no longer 
affects organizational action in an unambi guous way. 
On the other hand, parent companies can have different, and even competing, reasons fo r 
fo rming the alliance. They, or at least one of them, may decide to participate in a j oin t 
venture not primarily for obtaining financi al profi t, but fo r learning skill s they do not have 
but the partner does (Hamel 1990, 199 1, Inkpen 1992, 1995 , Pucik 1988). On examining a 
number of joint ventures involving large multi -national companies, Hamel concluded that the 
collaboration could "provide an opportunity fo r one partner to internalize the skill s of the 
other, and thus improve its position both within and without the alliance" (Hamel 199 1 p.83). 
After investigating how such reapportionment of skills between the partners occurred, Hamel 
proposes a model of inter-partner learning. In this model, three variables appear as the main 
determinants of learning: intent, transparency and receptivi ty . " Intent refers to a fi rm ' s initial 
propensity to view the collaboration as an opportunity to learn; transparency to the 
' knowability ' or openness of each partner, and thus the potential fo r learning; and receptivity 
to a pa11ner· s capacity fo r learning, or ' absorptiveness'" (Hamel 199 1 p.89-90). Thus, a 
partner which wants to learn from the other needs to have a clear intention to do that, which 
should be communicated to all employees worki ng at the joint venture. It also needs a hi gh 
degree of receptivity, which means a continuous commitment to learn , together with 
personnel skilled in observing, interpreting, applying and improving upon partner capabilities 
(Hamel 1990). This task would be fac ilitated if the other pai1ner shows transparency in 
relation to its skills. In other words, the less protecti ve a partner is in relati on to its 
knowledge, the easier it makes fo r the other partner to internalize them. 
It seems important to remember here that other authors adopt a completely different 
perspective for the analys is of joint ventures or alliances in genera l. For instance, Lorange 
and Roos propose the existence of a rationale fo r a " long-term, win-wi n emphas is regarding 
strategic alliances; ai1 emphasis on more lasting relationships where benefits and costs cai1 tip 
both ways in the short run but even out in the long run" ( 1992 p. 16). Thus, whether the 
parents companies will adopt a competiti ve or a collaborative perspective in relation to an 
alliance depends on the context of each parent and the obj ectives they have fo r fo rming the 
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alliance. Considering the objectives of the study discussed in this di ssertation, it is also 
relevant to remember that, for some types of IBVs, as wholly owned subsidiaries, the 
question of ownership does not seem to particularly affect the study of organizational 
learning processes. 
The second issue which would differentiate an IBV from an ordinary company for the study 
of organizational learn ing is that both the product or service provided by an IBV, and the 
production processes of these companies generally receive an input, whose degree will vary, 
from the foreign company. In the case of wholly owned subsidiaries or joint ventures where 
the foreign partner supplies the technology, the IBV ' s product generally is conceived by the 
fore ign company and adapted to the conditions of the local market. The same can be said in 
relation to production processes. This adaptation is, in itself, a learning process which 
normally involves both foreign and host country professionals. Conversely, a local company 
usually develops its own products or services which are already conceived for the local 
market. Production and managerial systems in these companies are also conceived according 
to local practices. I am not saying that the local products and processes are better than the 
IBV's, onl y that the latter generally have to be adapted to local conditions, and one must pay 
attention to that when studying processes of organizational learning within such 
organizations. 
The third issue which differentiates IBVs from local companies is that the former, by 
definition, implies the presence of personnel from both fo reign and host countries. The 
analysis of learning processes involving teams formed by these personnel will have to 
consider questions related to cross-cultural relationships. However, the degree in which 
cultural differences really matter for both teamwork and the effectiveness of alliances is 
subject of controversy amongst authors. 
Salk (1992a, 1992b) observes that much of the research on international joint ventures whi ch 
have multi-cultural management teams regards such teams as problem-prone and considers 
cultural differences as a prime culprit. But she points out that these studies are mainly "cross-
sectional and lacked the data to look explicitly at interpersonal or intergroup dynamics" (Salk 
1992a p.3). After doing longitudinal research in three joint ventures with multi-cultural 
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management teams, Salk proposes a model for team development with "four basic categories 
of explanatory variables: founding conditions (structural), emergent meanings and 
interpretations (behavioral precedents; basic psycho-social issues for the team, subgroups and 
individual members) , contextual factors (time, history, changing external conditions) and 
outcomes (reinforcement or change of development trajectories; quality of relations)" (Salk 
1992a p.10). 
Salk stresses the importance of the found ing conditions of the joint venture in establishing a 
framework for people to define their primary social identities and the initial division of power 
between the different national groups. At this initial stage of team development, people do 
use stereotypes to define members from other cultures, even if their behaviour contradict 
such stereotypes. However, the development of the team can represent either a reinforcement 
or a break of the initial dynan1ic. Contextual factors, like the perception of an external threat 
to the organization and consequent sense of shared fate among the team; the ro le of 
leadership and collective experiences through time may result in what Salk calls ' integrative 
convergence', with increasing cul tural hybridization. On the other hand, Salk observed in one 
team the occuITence of ' inertial divergence ', where the identities defined at the initial stages 
never changed. She then concludes that not always the path of team development points 
towards greater integration between different cu ltures. 
An important conclusion of Salk's work is that context plays a central ro le in the 
development of cross-cultural management teams. She also argues that these teams can 
function more effectively with the passing of time, even if they do not reduce the social 
distance between different national groups. Such conclusion was based in one of her case 
studies, where the social distance between groups of managers of two nationalities was not 
reduced during the four years of the study, although the performance of the team has 
improved. Salk, however, observes that, in thi s case, the company was facing a favourable 
market, which "made the costs of any inefficiencies or lack of coordination less apparent than 
they would have been in a resource-poor environment" (1992a p.1 5) . 
Kanter and Corn (1994) looked at eight acquisitions of U.S. firms by foreign companies to 
see whether cultural differences had an impact in the integration of the companies. They 
45 
acknowledge that their study was ' biased' towards finding cultural differences and tensions 
because of them, as they consistently asked managers to characterize typical U.S. and foreign 
managers behaviours in concrete situations. Even so, Kanter and Corn conclude that 
"nationality-based culture was one of the less significant variables affecting the integration of 
the companies and their organizational effectiveness" (p.9) . Similarly to Salk, they found that 
"contextual factors play the dominant role in determining the smoothness of the integration, 
the success of the relationship, and whether or not cultural differences become problemati c" 
(p. l 0). Consequently, they "conclude that the significance of cultural differences between 
employees or managers of different nationalities has been overstated" (Kanter and Corn 1994 
p.10). 
This last observation does not mean, however, that national cultures have no impact on the 
relationship of cross-cultural teams. Adler (199 1) gives several examples of 
misunderstandings in cross-cultural communications, resulting from the di ffe rent cultural 
backgrounds of participants. She reconunends a series of teclrniques fo r increasing the 
accuracy in cross-cultural conununications, based on the principle of presenting the message 
tlu·ough multiple charmels, like speaking and showing figures which sunrn1arize the point. 
Hayes and Allinson (1988) studied the learning styles of 195 mid-career managers from three 
different cultures and concluded that " there are important cultura l differences in the learning 
styles of managers" (p.79). They argue that it "may well be that the kind of learning 
enviro1rn1ents and activities which promotes effective learning in some cultures may not 
promote the same outcomes in other cultures where different learning styles predominate" 
(p.79). 
IBVs have cultural diversity inherently built into them. Ad ler (199 1) argues that cultural 
diversity can have both positive and negatives impacts on teams. If, on the one hand, 
heterogeneity increases the potential productivity, on the other it also increases the 
complexity of work. Hamel and Prahalad ( 1994) also agree that companies need to have 
greater variety as the competitive environment becomes more complex. They define such 
variety as "genetic variety - a broader range of managerial beliefs and a greater repertoire of 
managerial actions" (p.60) . In their view, cultura l diversity does not necessarily mean genetic 
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variety as in many international companies "much of the potential fo r creativity offered by 
cultural diversity is often su1Tendered to an a llegiance to very undiverse views about the 
industry and how to compete in it. ( ... ) There is a fine line between socialization and 
brainwashing. Companies that worship cultura l diversity yet enfo rce, by design or default, an 
orthodox set of industry perspectives and management precepts, are as competitively 
vulnerable as those that are myopically ethnocentric" (Hamel and Prahalad 1994 p.63). 
Hampden-Turner (1990 p .190) also observes that "many corporate cultures greatly reduce the 
pern1issible variety of individual expression". 
It is then possible to infe r that: a) environmental complex ity requires both diversity and 
learning from organizations; and b) diversity, including cul tural, can be a source of learning. 
Thus, management of diversity might be an important factor fo r fac ili tating both 
organizational learning and effectiveness. 
Barrett, Drummond and Sahay (1996) studied a software development project ca1Tied out by 
a tean1 comprising Indian and Jamaican professional s. They analysed how various work and 
non-work systems re lated to the Indian society have influenced the behaviour of an Indian 
manager who headed the project. Whilst his behaviour was viewed as natura l by the Indian 
team members, it was strongly rejected by the Jamaican ones. The authors argue that cross-
cultural diffe rences were the main responsible fo r such divergence. They have identi fied 
di fferences in work atti tudes related to deadlines, management styles, attitudes towards 
authority, and coordination mechani sms as the main triggers fo r cross-cul tural conflicts in 
this case. 
Child and Rodrigues (1996) di scuss the ro le of social identities in the international transfer of 
knowledge though joint ventures, observing that national culture is, together with 
organizational and occupational cultures, an important source of meaning for identity . 
Adopting the aforementioned class ification of types of learning between techn ical, systemic 
and strategic, they argue that the transfer of systemic and strategic knowledge have a greater 
impact on group social identity than teclrnical knowledge. The question of national culture is 
particularly important in the case of systemic knowledge, as procedures and systems impinge 
upon culturally-based norms of conduct. Child and Rodrigues also suggest that members of 
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international teams need to achieve a degree of shared identity in order that knowledge can be 
both created and transferred . Moreover, the development of such shared identity indicates 
that social identity is a dynamic concept, in the sense that it can be reshaped as members of 
the cross-national teams work together. 
To summarize this section, Table 2.3 presents the issues discussed concerning the 
relationship between international business ventures and organizational learning. 
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Table 2.3 
International Business Ventures and Organizational Learning 
Issues Main Features in Relation to Organizational Learning . Relevant for international joint ventures (IN ) . Parent companies strategies can be co llaborative and/or competitive 
Ownership . Collaborative strategies • joint creation of value, parent companies seek 
fo r IN ' s profitability or growth - i.e. economic success 
# successful IJV perfo rmance • parent companies allow more 
autonomy • learning fac ilitated 
# unsati sfactory perfo rmance • parent companies interfe re in IN • 
learning usuall y hindered (unless the interference removes a major block 
to learning such as a poor general manager) 
. Competitive strategies • at least one parent company seeks to learn 
from the other, internalizing skills it does not have 
# intent, transparency and receptivity as determinants of learning 
Product/Process . Leaming processes by themselves 
Adaptation . Context plays a significant role in the integration of cross-national teams . IBYs are culturally diverse organizations. Di versity may represent a 
source of learning, but it can also bring difficulties fo r management 
Cross-national . Conununication is a particularly important issue fo r the work of cross-
Teams national teams. It can be a source of misunderstandings . Socialization can greatly reduce the impact of cultural diversity 
. National culture is one source of identity. Some types of lmowledge may 
clash with culturally-based norms of conduct, becoming object of dispute . Organizational culture as another important source of identi ty . Some shared identi ty is necessary within an international team for the 
creation and transference of knowledge 
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2.5 Factors which Facilitate Organizational Learning 
In the previous discussion about leadership and organizational learning, l have pointed out 
that some authors argue that managers should provide a shared context where organizational 
members could feel secure enough to put forward divergent views over a question. The 
assumption behind this view is that the simultaneous presence of opposite categories within 
an organization may faci litate the occurrence of organizational learning. Its origins can 
perhaps be traced back to the concept advanced by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) that 
organizations need both differentiation and integration in order to perform effectively in the 
external environment. 
Fial (1994) argues for the presence of consensus over the context and diversity over the 
concepts as a way to promote collective learning. Weick and Westley (1996) consider 
occasions which juxtapose order and disorder as social spaces where learning is possible. 
This juxtaposition should be created not through the alternation between order and disorder, 
but through an intimate and continuous connection between the two. According to them, the 
" likelihood of learning drops quickly when invention and disorder overwhelm capacities for 
retention and identity, or when systems, routines, and order overwhelm capacities for 
unjustified variation" (p.456) . 
Discussing the relationship between a system and its environment, Hedberg (1981) concludes 
that both too much environmental turbulence and stabi lity are dysfunctional for learning to 
occur. The former makes mapping the environment an impossible task for learners. The latter 
produces little information and few opportunities for learning. So, again, learning seems to be 
linked to opposite categories; both turbulence and stabi li ty are necessary, in a certain degree, 
for learning to occur. 
Amongst the authors who take a more pragmatic perspective in relation to factors which can 
faci litate organizational learning, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argue that, in their model of 
organizational knowledge creation, the role of the organization is to provide a proper context 
for faci li tating group activities and the creation and accumulation of knowledge at the 
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individual level. In this sense, they indicate five conditions at the organizational level to 
promote knowledge creation. 
The first is intention, which is defined as an organization's aspiration to its goals, and 
assumes the form of a strategy for developing the organizational capabi lity to acquire, create, 
accumulate and exploit knowledge. "Organizational intention provides the most important 
criterion for judging the truthfulness of a given piece of knowledge. If not for intention, it 
would be impossible to judge the value of information or knowledge perceived or created" 
(p.74). 
The second condition is autonomy, at both individual and group level. Autonomous 
individuals are more creative and motivated, autonomous cross-functional groups are more 
flexible. They should have freedom to set their own task boundaries, but pursuing the 
objectives expressed in the organizational intention. 
The third condition is named by Nonaka and Takeuchi as fluctuation and creative chaos, and 
refers to the interaction between the organization and its external environment. The authors 
argue for the necessity of a continuous questioning of existing premises by individual 
members, and also the role of managers in creating an intentional sense of chaos within the 
organization, so as members feel constantly challenged to reflect upon their actions (Schon 
1983). 
The fourth condition is redundancy, defined as "the existence of information that goes 
beyond the immediate operational requirements of organizational members. In business 
organizations, redundancy refers to intentional overlapping of information about business 
activities, management responsibilities, and the company as a whole. ( ... )Sharing redundant 
information promotes the sharing of tacit knowledge, because individuals can sense what 
others are trying to articulate." (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995 p.80-81) . They observe that for 
Western managers the term redundancy is associated with waste or information overload. 
Acknowledging that the latter can indeed be a problem, they indicate that one "way to deal 
wi th the possible downside of redundancy is to make clear where information can be located 
and where knowledge is stored within the organization" (p.82). However, that does not seem 
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to be always possible. One of the problems of tacit knowledge is that, usually, only the 
knower and those who work directly with her/him will know who holds it. Again 
communication seems to be important, here in the sense discussed by Brown and Duguid 
(199 1), where ' communities of practice' diffuse knowledge through storytelling. 
The fifth condition proposed by Nonaka and Takeuchi is requisite variety, meaning the 
existence of diversity within an organizati on. Internal diversity helps the organization to 
match environmental diversity, and can be fostered through providing equal access to 
information throughout the organization. This can be fac ili tated by the adoption of a flat and 
flexible organizational structure. 
Finally, DiBella, Nevis and Gould (I 996) propose a model of organizations as learning 
systems based on their research on a small group of fim1s where they tried to identify 
learning capabilities. Their model is divided in two parts. One " is composed of learning 
orientations, the values and attih1des that determine where learning will take place and the 
nature of what is learned. These orientations form a pattern that defines a given 
organization's ' learning style"' (p.42). The other "is composed of facilitating factors , the 
structures and processes that affect how easy or hard is for learning to occur and the amount 
of effective learning that takes place. These are normative fac tors based on the best practices 
in dealing with generic issues" (p.4 1-42). 
This first part of their model basically agrees with the point made in thi s chapter that learning 
is closely linked to organi zational culh1re and, as the latter varies, the fo rmer also does, which 
generates different styles of learning systems. The second part of the model has similar 
objectives to my study. It is therefore worth presenting it with more detail. DiBella, Nevis 
and Gould suggest ten faci litat ing facto rs in the companies they researched. 
1. Scanning imperative, the interest in external happenings and in the nature of one's 
environment. 
2. Performance gap, the shared perception of a gap between actual and desired state of 
performance. 
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3. Con em for measuremenL the deplo~mem of considerable effort in defining and 
neasuring key fa tars when wnturing into ne\Y areas: strive for specific. quantifiable 
neasure . 
-1. E:s--perimemal min eL the upport for trying ne\\. things. and not punishing of small 
ailur s. 
5. Climate of opennes . the a e ibiliry of information. the haring of errors and problems . 
.he a eptan e of on.flier. 
5. Continuous edu ation. the support for gr0\\1h and deYelopmem of member . 
7• Operational vari ry. the dfr rsiry in personnel and plurali tic definition of valued internal 
:apabilitie . 
l. ).1ultiple adYo ates. where top-<lO\\TI and bonom-up initiatives are po sible. 
r ln\·oh·ed leadership. which articulates \; ion and i \·ery actiYely engaged in it 
1ctualization. 
0. Systems per pective. a strong focus on how pans of the organization are interdependent. 
t is not cliffi ult to per ei\·e that many of the facilitating factors are similar to those 
uggested by :\'onaka and Takeu hi (I 99 -). and also to other is ue previously discussed in 
his chapter. uch imilariry make them stronger. in the ense of being supported by other 
e ear hers. 
fo summarize this section. Table _A pre ems some of the factors which can facilitate the 
iccurrence of organizational learning. 
?.6 S ummary 
n this chapter I haYe presemed and di ussed the key points in the literarure related to 
irganizational learning and the factor which can facilitate its occurrence, specially 
onsidering the case ofIB . Throughout the whole chapter, I have tried to draw the reader·s 
mention to the importance of considering both the internal and the external comext of the 
irganization when trying to understand processes of organizational learning. Other relevant 
sues considered were the pos ible influence of organizational politics in the development of 
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these processes, including the identification of who sets the obj ectives fo r learning and which 
resources are deployed in order to facilitate its occunence. Tables 2. 1 to 2.4 summarize the 
main points considered in each section of the chapter, which can have direct influence in the 
occurrence of organizational learning within IBVs. 
Table 2.4 
Factors which Facilitate Organizational Learning 
. Simultaneous presence of opposite categories, such as differentiation and 
integration, environmental turbulence and stability, consensus and diversity, order 
and disorder. . Organizational intention of learning . Individual and team autonomy 
. Creative chaos provoking continuous individual refl ection while in action 
. Redundancy of info rmation 
. Requisite variety 
. Scanning imperative . Performance gap . Concern for measurement 
. Experimental mindset . Climate of openness 
. Continuous education . Operational variety 
. Multiple advocates . Involved leadership 




This chapter presents the methodology adopted fo r the present research. It is divided in four 
sections. The first section discusses the characteristics of the study and its methodological 
requirements. The second section explains how the companies participating in the study were 
chosen and how access to them was negotiated. The third section covers the fi eldwork des ign 
and execution. In this section, I also present the interview schedules and the main issues 
addressed in the interviews. The fourth and last section presents the method adopted fo r data 
analysis and discusses some of the limitations of the methodo logy. 
3.1 Methodological Requirements 
The obj ecti ve of the research is to identify factors which can fac ilitate the occurrence 
organizational learning in IBVs. As I have argued in the previous chapters, two issues are 
deemed as essential fo r the accompl ishment of such objective; the analysis of processes of 
organizational learning, and the consideration, in th is analysis, of the context where these 
processes have developed. Before discussing the methodological requirements fo r 
undertaking the study, let me first define process within the scope of this research. 
I will use the definiti on given by Van de Ven ( 1992 p.170), for whom "process is a sequence 
of events or activities that describes how things change over time, or that represents an 
underlying pattern of cognitive transitions by an entity in dealing with an issue" . However, 
by adopting thi s defini tion I am not assuming that a 'sequence of events ' occurs in a li near 
way. Conversely, it is here recognized that processes of learning may occur in a haphazard 
way, being characterized by a multilevel structure, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
where episodes at different levels influence each other. 
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The prime research question of this study - which are the key enabling factors for the 
occurrence of organizational learning in IBVs - does not have a simple answer, in the sense 
that these factors are not going to 'jump out' of the organizations upon superficial 
examination. The researcher needs to understand the development of organizational processes 
and the attitudes of people involved, in order to be able to build an interpretation which can 
account for the factors which have strong influence on the processes. This demands the 
involvement of the researcher with the phenomenon being studied in its field of action, that 
is, the researcher needs to have a close contact with the IBVs and its members, which 
characterizes the research as a qualitative one (Kirk and Miller 1986). 
Qualitative data, here understood as data in the form of words, seems to be appropriate for 
the objectives of the study. Miles and Huberman (1994) present some of the strengths of 
well-collected qualitative data, highlighting its local groundedness, as the data is "collected 
in close proximity to a specific situation, rather than through the mail or over the phone. The 
emphasis is on a specific case, a focused and bounded phenomenon embedded in its context. 
The influences of the local context are not stripped away, but are taken into account. The 
possibility for understanding latent, underlying, or nonobvious issues is strong" (p.1 0). These 
characteristics indeed support the use of qualitative data for the study. 
The method which appears to be more suitable is the case study. Yin (1989 p.20) argues that 
the case study method has a distinct advantage when a '" how' or 'why' question is being 
asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no 
control". Although the main research question of this study is a 'which' one, the proposed 
investigation requires the understanding of how the processes of organizational learning 
develop and how some factors may faci litate its occu1Tence. In this sense, it is difficult to 
adopt anything other than a case-type, qualitative methodology. The case studies in this 
research can then be qualified as both exploratory, as there is sti ll li ttle understanding about 
the issue to be researched, and explanatory, as the main research question deals with 
"operational links needing to be traced over time, rather mere frequencies or incidence" (Yin 
1989 p.18). 
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The requirement of researching organizational processes within their contexts, would 
certainly mean a large amount of data for each process examined. This, together with the 
constraints of time and resources available for a PhD project, led me to choose a small 
number of cases for the study. When deciding on the nun1ber of cases to study, I thought that, 
in view the requirements of the study, I would rather have a small nun1ber from which I could 
get detailed information, than a larger nwnber with superficial data. 
3.2 Choosing the Organizations 
I then faced the question of choosing the organizations to contact. The first factor considered 
was the countries in which the IBVs would be located, as these would be the countries where 
I would do the fieldwork. In this case, the choice for Brazil and the UK was relatively 
straightforward. The main reasons for this choice were threefold. Firstly, these two cow1t.ries 
are part of a broader research program at the Centre for International Business and 
Management at the Judge Institute, which this study is affiliated. Secondly, this study is 
funded by CNPq, a research agency attached to the Brazilian government, and, although I 
had no obligation to do that, I considered it important to w1dertake at least part of the 
research in Brazil. Thirdly, as I also wanted to investigate a company in a country different 
than Brazil, the UK was an obvious choice, for it is a major recipient of FDI in Europe, and it 
is the country were I am currently living. 
Another important consideration was that I wanted to be able to compare the findings in the 
organizations researched and, therefore, it would be interesting if I could have some 
characteristics in common between the companies. As the IBVs would be operating in 
different countries, the idea of having the same company as the foreign investor appeared 
reasonable to me. This way, besides having the same company, I would also have the same 
national culture for the foreign investor. A third common factor that I considered was that the 
IBVs should be operating in the same sector in both countries, and the product technology 
should also be similar. 
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The final consideration before choosing the companies was that I would like to have a good 
level of access, meaning both access to top level managers and that these managers should 
not be concerned about myself having contacts with competitors, so they could feel more 
comfortable in talking to me. As a consequence, I decided to approach one IBV in Brazil and 
one in the UK, both with the same foreign investor. I also reasoned that the proposal of a 
comparative research between IBVs which were operating in the same sector, and attached to 
the same foreign company, could sound appealing to the IBV 's managers and, therefore, 
facilitate access. 
For selecting the companies, the initial consideration was the country of origin of the foreign 
investing company. Japan was the first choice for the following reasons: a) Japan is a major 
player in FDI worldwide, and Japanese companies have invested considerably both in Brazil 
and the UK; b) the Japanese culture is quite different from both Brazilian and British 
cultures; c) it is a well recognized fact that the distinctive manufacturing practices adopted by 
Japanese companies have changed some industries in the world (Womack, Jones and Roos 
1990). Thus, it would be very probable that Japanese companies would try to introduce these 
practices in both their subsidiaries and joint ventures they have abroad, and that could mean 
learning processes; and d) during the research I undertook for my master's degree 
(Drummond 1992), I studied, amongst other organizations, four joint ventures in Brazil with 
Japanese companies as foreign partners, and I had a good rapport with all Japanese managers 
I interviewed. 
The third reason just mentioned (item c) led me to focus on companies in the manufacturing 
sector. One industry which I thought could be appropriated for the study was consumer 
electronics, because of both the relevance of Japanese companies in this industry, and the fact 
that, for some products, the technology would be very similar between companies installed in 
Brazil and the UK. I then wrote to the offices of the Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) in both London and Sao Paulo, and asked for a list of companies with Japanese 
investment in the UK and Brazi l. 
After examining the two li sts, a few companies appeared to be suitable for the research. My 
first choice was Toshiba, which had a joint venture in Brazil (Semp Toshiba) and a 
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subsidiary in the UK (Toshiba Consumer Products - TCP), both producing TV sets and some 
other consumer electronics. I made contact with the vice-president of Semp Toshiba and the 
managing director of TCP, briefly explaining the objectives of the study and emphasizing the 
fact that their companies would be the only ones to take part. Both managers showed interest 
in the proposal, with the condition that the other company also agreed . I then sent a written 
proposal to Semp Toshiba and arranged a meeting with the managing director of TCP to 
explain the study in more detail. In exchange for the access, I offered to send reports with the 
main findings in each company and a comparison between the two. Both companies then 
agreed to take part. 
3.3 Fieldwork Design and Execution 
I considered two options for studying the processes of organizational learning. The first 
would be to follow such processes during their evolution, via a longitudinal research design. 
There were two major issues constraining this option. First, I had a limited amount of time 
for the fieldwork. Following processes in real time carried the risk that their learning content 
would not have developed sufficiently during the time I could stay in the companies. 
Moreover, according to the terms of my scholarship, I would only have funds to spend a 
maxirnw11 of three months on fieldwork in Brazil. Second, I thought it would be much more 
difficult to get access to the companies if I proposed a long period of research. 
The second option was to reconstruct processes of organizational learning that had occurred 
in the recent past of the companies, or that were still developing at the time of the fieldwork, 
but with an already accumulated stock of knowledge. This option appeared to be more 
feasib le and was, therefore, chosen. The critical point then was how to select the processes to 
be studied, or, in other words, how I could be sure that the processes selected really exhibited 
organizational learning. 
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3.3.1 Assessing the Occurrence of Learning 
The first requirement for any type of assessment is to have a parameter in relation to which 
one can compare the obj ect of the assessment. In this case, this was a requirement to have an 
operational definition of organizational learning. Despite all the debate existing in relation to 
this issue, discussed in the previous chapter, I considered necessary to have an operational 
definition, so I could be more confident in selecting the processes. I have already alluded to 
this definiti on in the first chapter, but I shall make it explicit here. In this study, 
organizational learning is understood as the process ( I) by which members of an organization 
create and/or acquire knowledge about the organization ' s internal affairs and its interaction 
with the external environment, and (2) by which this knowledge is subsequently used in the 
organization' s operations. 
The previous chapter discussed the question of what diffe rent authors look at when analysing 
organizational learning, that is, processes and outcomes. I have also made clear that, although 
I intend to analyse processes of organizational learning, in order to be able to identify some 
of their enabling conditions, it is through the analysis of their outcomes that it is possible to 
assess the occurrence of learning. Indeed, thi s is the way most writers on organizational 
learning have assessed its occurrence. Before examining how they have done that, I would 
j ust like to note that I do not regard outcome as separate from process, but as an integral part 
of it. In this sense, I agree with Follett (1924), who pointed out that "(S)ome writers, whi le 
speaking otherwise accurately of the behaviour process, yet use the word result - the result of 
the process - whereas there is no resul t of process but only a moment in process ... (O)n the 
social level, cause and effect are ways of describing certain moments in the situation when 
we look at those moments apart fro m the total process" (p.60-61). Thus, although some times 
using the expression 'outcomes of processes' , I wish to stress their conceptual integration. 
This is a point to which I shall return to when concluding this dissertation. 
Almost all previous research has assessed the occurrence of learning by reference to the 
outcome of the process. Inkpen (1992) examined fo rty joint ventures looking at the 
organizational conditions which play a ro le in their learning processes. He was interested in 
observing how the joint ventures could represent a learning opportunity for the parent 
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companies, particularly the internalization of partner's ski ll s. Inkpen proposes that learning 
occurs at three levels, individual, group and organization, and that, in each level, different 
learning processes are at work. "At the individual level, the critical process is interpreting; at 
the group level, integrating; and at the organizational level, internalizing. The product of the 
individual process of interpreting is a change in individual beliefs and individual behaviours. 
The product of the group process is shared beliefs and concerted actions. The product of the 
organization process is internalization of knowledge as reflected in organizational capabilities 
and routines" (p.217). Thus, at the organizational level, Inkpen considers that the 
internalization of a partner's ski lls, embodied in the building of new organizational 
capabilities and routines are the product of the occurrence of organizational learning. 
Building on the same research, Inkpen and Crossan (1995) propose almost the same 
fran1ework. The only change is at the organizational level, where the product of the learning 
process now "is the institutionalization of an organization schema reflected in the 
organizational systems and routines. The manifestation of institutionalization outcomes is 
organizational strategy as reflected by a coherent pattern of actions" (p.598). 
Hamel ( I 990) also sees the processes of organizational learning in international joint ventures 
in the internalization of partner's skills. Similarly to Inkpen, Hamel thus sees their 
manifestation in the creation of organizational capabilities. 
DiBella, Nevis and Gould (1996) examined four companies, trying to identify learning 
capabilities and develop a typology of organizational learning styles. They associate the 
occurrence of learning with the existence of core competencies within these organizations, 
which, in the ir view, would be consequences of ' learni ng investments ' made by the 
companies. 
From the discussion in the previous chapter and the examples given above, there are strong 
precedents for assess ing organizational learning not by any quantitative measurement of the 
amount of learning occurred, but by reference to the impacts the processes of learni ng have 
had on the organization in question. Thus, looking at the processes ' outcomes appears to be a 
sensible way of assessing whether learning has actually occurred or not. 
61 
3.3.2 Eliciting Events 
The fi eldwork followed the same lines in both companies. It was fi rst conducted at TCP and 
then at Semp Toshiba. What I will describe in this sub-section happened similarly in both 
companies. In order to choose the processes to be studied, I had interviews with five senior 
managers at the company, all members of the company board . Appendix A. l exhibits the 
questions asked in these initial interviews. Basically, I asked the managers to identi fy the 
events they considered organizationally critical in the last fi ve years, to give me a brief 
description of each event, and to name the people who were closely involved in the processes 
around the events. 
I had few assumptions behind these initial interviews. First, was that, although I 
acknowledged that processes of organizational learning could occur at any organizational 
level, the perceptions of senior managers would be more appropriate fo r identi fy ing 
processes which had broad impact in the organization. Second, I fo llowed Schein 's (1985) 
notion that events are critical when they are perceived as such by organizational members. 
Third, Senge (1990a) observes that managers usually pay more attention to events than to 
processes. Although Senge makes this remark in a critical tone regarding manager' s 
perception of reality, it suggested that it could be fruitful to ask them to recollect events, and 
then try to reconstruct the processes around these events. The reason for establishing a limit 
of the past five years was that this was a reasonable time span fo r people to still have an 
accurate memory of what had happened. 
During these initial interviews, when giving the description of what the events were about, 
the managers actually started to describe the processes around the events. All interviews were 
tape recorded. I then analysed each interview and selected a few processes, based on the 
number of times they were mentioned by different managers, and the changes or innovation 
they had brought or were bringing to the organization. The fo rmer would indicate the 
criticali ty of the process fo r the company, and the latter its learning potential. I then contacted 
the manager I had initially agreed the study in the company and discussed the processes I had 
chosen. In this discussion we selected two processes to be studied. The choice of two 
processes in each company appeared right fo r the managers because of the number of 
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interviews I would have to make co1rnected to each process. For myself, I considered fow-
processes in total a reasonable number, based on the amount of data I was calculating I would 
gather, and also fo llowing a suggestion by Eisenhardt (1989), who notes that a number of 
cases between fow- and ten usually works well for theoretical development from case studies. 
The processes finally selected were: at TCP, the establ ishment of the Air Conditioner 
Division, and the establ ishment of local design centres at both divisions of the company; and 
at Semp Toshiba, the productivity improvement in the last few years, and the adoption of a 
new conrn1erciali sation policy. 
Besides these interviews to elicit the events and processes, I also asked in each company to 
have one interview with a manager who had been at the company for a long time. I asked this 
manager to tell me the history of the company. At TCP I interviewed the persormel director, 
who has been in the company since the start of operations. At Semp Toshiba I interviewed 
the Brazilian vice-president, who has been in the company for more than twenty five years . 
The objectives of these two interviews were to better understand the history and context of 
each company. 
3.3.3 Reconstructing the Processes 
In order to reconstruct each process, I went back to the companies and interviewed the people 
who where identified in the initial interviews as their central participants. With few 
exceptions, these people were managers at the first (d irectors) or second level (head of 
divisions) in the companies. The interviews were divided in two parts. The first part, 
exhibited in Appendix A.2, relates to the personal career of the interviewee and his 1 
impressions about the company. The objectives of this part were: a) trying to create a relaxed 
enviro1rn1ent for the interview, by starting with managers talking about their career 
background (Johnson 1987); b) to have an idea of the professional standpoint of each 
interviewee, which could help in the interpretations of the interviews; and c) to have a picture 
of the organizational cultw-e, mainly through the questions under the third section2 
(perceptions of the significant va lues and beliefs of the company) . 
1 
All interviewees were males. 
2 The questions in this first part are based on Isabella ( I 990). 
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The second part of the interview, exhibited in Appendix A.3, aims at the reconstruction of the 
process. The interview schedule is divided in eight blocks. They relate to the three 
constituents parts for a research on process suggested by Pettigrew (I 985): context, content 
and process. Thus, sections one (objectives of the process), seven (learning) and eight 
(consequences) relate to content3; sections two (external enviromnent) and tlu·ee (internal 
environment) to the external and internal contexts, respectively; and sections four 
(constitution of the team), five (teamwork) and six (memory) to process. Within the sections, 
the questions relate to some of the issues debated in the literature, which were discussed in 
the previous chapter. Table 3.1 presents each section of the interview schedule for 
reconstructing the processes, and the issues in the literature they are related to. 
At the stai1 of each interview I would explain the objectives of the study to the interviewee, 
and assure him about the confidentiality of the interview. I would then give him a copy of the 
interview schedule and ask whether he would prefer to answer each question or to read each 
block of questions and answer them as a whole. Some interviewees preferred a third option, 
to have a quick look at the whole schedule and just describe the process in question. I let each 
interviewee to choose the form he would consider more comfortable. In any case, I would try 
to make sure that the most important points in the schedule were addressed by the 
interviewee. The general tone of the interviews was open and I would usuall y ask many more 
questions than those in the schedule, trying to get further details about any point I deemed 
interesting. The more interviews I had about a process, the more knowledgeable I became 
about it, which meant that I could increasingly ask more detailed questions. 
Besides interviewing the people who were indicated in the initial stages, J also had a few 
interviews with people who, during the interviews for reconstructing the processes, were 
consistently mentioned by other interviewees, but were not present in the initial list. 
Eisenhardt (1989) argues that such adj ustments to data collection are an advantage of case 
studies, when the researcher is trying to understand each case individuality, and in as much 
depth as feasible. 
3 The brief descriptions of processes in the interviews of the initial stage (for selecting the events), were also 
related to the content of the processes. 
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Table 3.1 
Issues in the Interview and in the Literature 
Section of the interview Issues in the Literature 
1. Objectives of the process . Triggers of learning . Setting of objectives 
2. External environment . Triggers of learning . Learning and the external context 
3. Internal environment . Triggers of learning . Learning and the internal context 
4. Consti tution of the team . Agents of learning . Organizational poli tics . Setters of obj ectives . Unlearning 
5. Teamwork . Teamwork . Communication . Tacit and explicit knowledge . Innovation . Diversity . Unlearning 
6. Memory . Organizational memory 
7. Learning . Self refl ection 
8. Consequences . Outcomes of learning . Self reflection . Cross-cul tural relationship 
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The fieldwork at TCP was conducted from the mid August to the end of October 1994, and at 
Semp Toshiba from December 1994 to mid February 1995. In May 1996, after having 
transcribed all interviews and done part of the analysis, I went to Brazil for few weeks for 
personal reasons and took the opportunity to go back to Semp Toshiba, where I did some 
more interviews, when I sought to follow up the most recent developments of the processes I 
had studied in the previous year. 
In total , I carried out thirty eight interviews. At TCP, I had eleven interviews with British 
staff and eight with Japanese. At Semp Toshiba, I had fourteen interviews with Brazilian staff 
and five with Japanese. Some managers were interviewed more than once. The interviews' 
length ranged from one and a half to three hours. All interviews were tape recorded, totalling 
fifty eight hours. I also had many informal conversations with the staff at both companies, 
usually during lunch time. 
With respect to secondary information, at TCP the managing director gave me access to his 
personal archive. There I found information mainly related to one of the processes, the 
establishment of the Air Conditioner Divi sion. There were minutes of many meetings, and 
press cuttings from regional newspapers about the opening of the new division. The company 
also provided me with detailed organizational charts, some data on production volumes, and 
company brochures with annual reports. I also searched for information in an electronic 
financial database. 
At Semp Toshiba, the only written information I could get from Brazilian managers was an 
organizational chart. Nevertheless, I managed to collect some production information from a 
Japanese director. I also found information on the Brazilian production of conswner 
electronics in a manufactmer's association, and several repo11s about Semp Toshiba in the 
business press. 
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3.4 Data Analysis 
The primary focus of analys is is each individual process of organizational learning. This 
dissertation presents four processes and, therefore, four cases. However, the study is 
concerned with organizational learning, and each process is analysed considering the 
organizational context. Thus, the organization is the unit of analysis. 
3.4.1 Preparing the Data 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim by myself. It was a long and, some times, boring 
task, but besides the advantage of having the fu ll transcription fo r data ru1alysis afterwards, 
the very task of transcribing allowed me to further internalize the development of the 
processes. After doing all transcri ptions I ended up with five hundred and fifty pages of 
interviews, typed in one ru1d a half space. 
W ith the whole set of interviews printed, I fo und it impossible to ana lyse them by taking one 
by one and reading. The strategy I adopted was to cut each interview into a number of broad 
issues, and reassemble all interviews together according to these issues. The selection of 
issues again relate to the three constituents parts for a research on process suggested by 
Pettigrew (1985); context, content and process, with the add itional info rmation on each 
interviewee's personal data, and their impressions on the organizational culture. Table 3.2 
disp lays how the interviews were reassembled, with the main issue fo r grouping (column 
one), the interview where the data was extracted (column two), and the sect ion in the 
interview containing the information related to the issue (column three). 
Issues one and two relate to general info rmation about the interviewees and the companies 
and, therefore, occur only once in each company. Issues three to six re late to each process 
analysed, occurring twice in each company. 
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Table 3.2 
Initial Cuts for Data Analysis 
Issue Interview Section 
I. Personal Data . Personal career . Current job . Personal career . Career history . Personal career . Personal perceptions 
2. Organizational . Personal career . Perception of the significant 
Values and Culture values and beliefs of the 
company 
3. External Context . Process Reconstruction . External Environment 
4. Internal Context . Process Reconstruction . Internal Environment 
5. Content . Event selection . Brief description of the process . Process Reconstruction . Objectives of the process . Process Reconstruction . Learning . Process Reconstruction . Consequences 
6. Process . Process Reconstruction . Constitution of the tean1 . Process Reconstruction . Teamwork . Process Reconstruction . Memory 
After reassembling the interviews according to the issues described above, I continued with 
the same an10unt of data to analyse, just rearranged. In order to have a broader (literally) 
view of the data, I stuck the interviews in the walls of my office at home. The data for each 
company was suffic ient to cover all the space available in the walls4 . I found it a very 
effective way of grappling with the data, for I could easily read the different interviews and 
make connections between them5• It was much easier to find where a certain passage was, 
4 This idea came from my previous ex perience as a data analyst in a software company. When we had a very 
large system to develop, we wou ld draw chans representing data flows and stick them in walls, so we cou ld 
have a better visual comprehension of the system. 
5 Such effectiveness, however, did not spare me the comments of fri ends who would visit me and joke about 
my strange ' wallpaper'. 
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that it would have been with the interviews piled over my desk. It also helped to avoid losing 
the unity of each interview. By cutting them and reassembling, I was concerned that I could 
lose the context of each individual interview. But, even having them cut, the fact that I had 
all interviews in front of me in the walls, made it was easy, when necessary, to read one 
interview as a whole. 
3.4.2 Analysing 
For the data analysis, the basic approach adopted was that of grounded theory (Glaser and 
Strauss 1968). There is only a small number of studies on factors which can fac ilitate the 
occurrence of organizational learning, and even fewer in the case of IBVs. Thus, the 
approach is appropriate for the objectives of the research, as the intention is to "bui ld rather 
than only test theory" (Strauss and Corbin 1990 p.57). By saying that the purpose is to build 
theory I do not mean any grand theory on organizational learning. The objective is, through 
careful data collection and analysis, to propose some factors which can fac ilitate the 
occurrence of learning. These factors should then be generalizable to theoretical propositions, 
as it should be possible with any research based on case studies. The aim is to expand and 
generalize theories, and not to enumerate frequencies (Yin 1989). 
The initial step in the data analysis was to read the interviews repeatedly, so I could make 
better sense of the processes. The second step was to qualitatively code the interviews 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990), trying to identify the main themes and categories related to the 
objective of the study. Some of the codes came directly from the interview schedule, like 
objectives, agents, communication and memory. Others emerged from the continuous reading 
of the interviews; the making of comparisons between different interviews; and the 
establishment of connections between these interviews, and also between passages of the 
same interview. Examples of these codes are control, resistance, faci litator, trigger (actions 
which triggered the processes), and continuity (actions which allowed the processes to 
continue). 
I also examined the secondary data collected during the fieldwork, and kept an eye on the 
business press for any reports on the companies researched. This material was then used for 
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helping the writing up of the case studies, and also for the data analysis. The use of several 
sources of information was seen as a way of enhancing the richness of interpretation . 
After considering that I had a satisfactory level of knowledge about each process in the 
companies, I wrote the case studies in the form that they are presented in chapters four and 
six of this dissertation . When writing up the cases, I have tried as much as possible to not let 
my opinion interfere, although I acknowledge that, having been researched and written by 
me, they are partly an expression of my view. I have tried to do that through the extensive use 
of quotations, and through building the descriptions scrupulously following the general 
impressions described by the interviewees. The idea behind this attempt of ' lett ing the 
interviewees tell the case' was to allow the reader, as much as possible, to have a similar 
contact with the data to my own, and to develop her/his own chain of evidence. 
With the cases studies ready, I then returned to the interviews. A new long period of reading 
the interviews and written cases, and also a recheck of the coding led me finally to propose 
the enabling conditions for organizational learning, which are discussed in chapters five , 
seven and eight. 
During the whole period of data analysis, and even after finishing it, I kept searching the 
literature related to the study. Examples of that are the several texts discussed in the previous 
chapter publi shed after my field work period. According to Strauss and Corbin (1990), this 
continuous contact with the literature can "stimulate theoretical sensitivity by providing 
concepts and relationships that are checked out against actual data" (p.50) . l also wanted to 
build on existing work connected to my research. It would be silly to not consider 
contributions made by other researchers. In thi s sense, I did not ignore the terminology used 
by other authors when I found something in the cases which was reflected in the work of 
others. On the contrary, I saw that as a confirmation of the findings . 
Finally, I would like to comment on the main limitations of the method. The first limitation 
relates to the fact that, as the research deals with processes which had already occurred in the 
organizations, or which were sti ll occurring but had started some time before the fieldwork, 
there is the risk that the interviewees may have over rationalized their description of the 
processes. It is a well known tendency of the human being to tidy up happenings of the past, 
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so the actors can appear in more control over the situation than they actually were. I have 
tried to minimize this risk by interviewing several people about each process. Conflicting 
information was always rechecked, frequently with a third informant. 
The second limitation relates to the fact that the large majority of the interviewees were 
senior managers in both companies. In this sense, I do not have the interpretation of workers 
in relation to the processes, despite the fact that they have participated in most of them. Such 
limitation is a consequence of the method adopted for choosing the interviewees, whereby the 
initial interviewees, all at the most senior level in both companies, pointed out who were the 
key participants in each process. It was, therefore a conscious methodological option of mine. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter presented the methodology adopted for the research discussed in this 
dissertation. In endeavouring to propose some factors which can facilitate the occurrence of 
organizational learning in IBVs, I opted for in-depth case studies in two companies. 
Processes of organizational learning which had occurred in these companies in the last few 
years were selected through interviews with their most senior managers. The criteria for 
selecting the processes was the assessment of the outcomes in these processes. Their 
criticality for the companies, assessed by the number of times a process was mentioned by 
different managers, and their learning potential, assessed by changes and innovations they 
have brought, were the main parameters for selection. Extensive information about the 
development of the processes was collected through interviews with the key participants, and 
also through secondary sources. Data analysis was based on the grounded theory approach. A 
long period examining the data collected, coupled with a process of coding, and a continuing 
search in the literature related to the study, led to the emergence of themes and categories. 





IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES 
Chapter 4 
INTRODUCING NEW ACTIVITIES 
IN A CROSS-CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT 
This chapter describes two processes occtuTed during the last few years when new activities 
were introduced at Toshiba Consumer Products (TCP). The first section presents a brief 
history of the company. The second section gives an account of the main values and 
characteristics of the company, as viewed by its managers. The third section describes the 
establishment of a new division at TCP dedicated to produce air conditioning equipment. The 
fourth section describes the establishment and development of local design at TCP's Audio 
Visual and Air Conditioner divisions. All the fo llowing description is based on the 
interpretation of the interviewed managers about these developments. 
4.1 History of the Company 
TCP began its operations on May Bank Holiday 1981 in Plymouth, United Kingdom (UK), 
aiming at producing television sets (TVs) for the UK market. It followed a joint venture 
between Rank Radio International and Toshiba which was established in November 1978 and 
which closed in March 1981. Rank Radio had established a fac ility in Plymouth in 1947, 
following a direction from the British government for creating jobs in the region after the 
Second World War. It started by producing radios, moving after to TVs. In 1978, Rank 
formed the joint venture with Toshiba, aiming at increasing its production volume in order to 
sell into the European market. The original concept was that Toshiba would provide technical 
input through its modern design and specifications, and the faci lity in Plymouth would 
manufacture the TVs. However, Rank kept producing its own model s, which were based on 
Philips technology, and the joint venture ended up having two distinct product lines, which 
made its production costs higher than when Rank was operating as a single company. One of 
the strongest stimuli for Rank-Toshiba to export into Europe was the then low value of the 
pound. With the new Tory government, the value of the pound soared to a new strength and it 
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became difficult for the company to sell into Europe. Rank decided to finish the joint venture, 
where it had a majority stake, and completely closed the site in March 1981. 
In April 1981 , Toshiba announced that it would start a new company on its own to 
manufacture TVs at the previous joint venture site and would re-employ some of the 
personnel. From the two thousand people who used to worked at Rank-Toshiba, the new 
company would start operations with around three hundred. Managers could, therefore, be 
very selective in choosing employees for the new company and, according to the Persormel 
Director, only those with an 'impeccable record' were chosen. By that expression he meant 
people who had high attendance records at Rank-Toshiba and no extreme political opinion. 
TCP was a new company which was starting with the san1e personnel , on the same site and 
with the same product as Rank-Toshiba. The top management team had also previously 
worked at the joint ventme and they were conscious of the necessity of making clear that 
TCP was a different company. Several actions were taken to this end, the more evident being: 
1. the creation ofa Company Advisory Board (COAB), which is a forum which represents all 
sections in the company and can be used to review the company's financial performance and 
its future plans, and to discuss employee conditions. Although the final responsibility for 
decisions is laid on the shoulders of management, members ofCOAB receive all information 
before any decision is taken and can discuss and advise the company; 2 . the introduction of 
'pendultll11' arbitration, whereby any dispute between the company and its employees which is 
not solved in the COAB is then taken to an independent arbitrator who has to decide for one 
of the two proposals, without recommending a compromise for 'splitting the difference down 
the middle'. Such measure aimed at making the parties more open to negotiation and willing 
to formulate feasible proposals to solve differences; 3. single union, strike free agreement, 
whereby TCP employees are represented by a single union, as opposed to seven unions 
which used to represent Rank-Toshiba employees. With the existence of COAB and 
'pendulum' arbitration, the union agreed to sign a deal with TCP where no industrial action 
would be taken. Such agreement was later adopted by other Japanese companies in the UK; 
4. conunon restaurant and overalls. Again in a different way from Rartk-Toshiba and many 
other British companies, TCP has a single restaurant for all its members. They also have to 
wear a common blue overall while within the company. A series of other measures were 
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taken at the outset of the company which give the basis for people within TCP calling it a 
single-status company 1• Although some of these measures were normally adopted by 
Japanese companies in the UK, like single restaurants and the use of uniforms, others were 
exclusive to TCP, like the COAB. 
All TCP supervisors went to Japan in order to learn Japanese methods in areas like quality, 
productivity and supervision. Even the first members elected for COAB went to a one week 
tour through Toshiba's plants in Japan in order to understand the company culture better. 
Also, a large number of Japanese team leaders and specialists came to Plymouth in order to 
show TCP employees how to run the factory their way. There was some resentment by the 
British workers towards what a manager called the 'over enthusiasm' about the company from 
the Japanese who came to Plymouth. He defined their style as 'go go go, push push push'. 
Even though, British managers tried to emulate the Japanese spirit during the first years, TCP 
started with a very tough style where employees should account for every second in the 
factory. If a worker did not show up at the company, TCP would send someone to his/her 
home to check what was happening. The first Manager Director used to define the company 
as 'lean and hungry' , with no 'spare people'. 
The company grew quickly in the first six years. It started with a daily output of 300 sets, 
distributed across eight models sold in the UK market. In 1983 it began to export to the 
Continent. By 1986, it was producing 2,000 sets a day with fifty models. Between 1984 and 
1986, TCP's share of the UK TV market doubled from 3.5 per cent to 7 per cent. In May 
1984, the company started to assemble VCRs. In April 1985, a new division was added to the 
company, in order to assemble microwave ovens for the UK market. The number of 
employees also grew steadily. From the original 300 work force in 1981 , there were nearly 
1,100 in 1987. However, at the end of the l980's Toshiba adopted a new approach to the 
European market for consumer electronics and decided to concentrate its European 
production ofVCRs in Germany. 
1 Trevor ( 1988) in chapter 4 gives a detai led description of all measures taken . 
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At the same time, sales of microwave ovens in the UK market dropped dramatically fo r 
Toshiba, the reasons being twofo ld. First, there was a health scare linked both to a belief that 
microwave oven cooking was not sufficiently intense to destroy some food bacteria and also 
to a discussion about the possibility that heating baby bottles in a microwave oven could 
modify the mi lk and actually be a carcinogenic risk. Second, some major retailers in the UK 
were able to import and se ll microwave ovens with their own label cheaper than TCP could 
sell its products. The consequence fo r TCP was that in a interval of fifteen months sales 
dropped to one third of which they used to be. In 1990, Toshiba decided to close its 
microwave oven assembly line in the UK and move all European production to France. 
With the closure of the Microwave Oven Division (MWOD), there was fear within the 
company that the work fo rce would be made redundant. However, another division of 
Toshiba in Japan was considering opening a facility in Europe to produce air conditioning 
equipment and the two countries which were fi nally competing fo r the location of the plant 
were Spain and the UK. Toshiba was then keen in avoiding any negative propaganda related 
the closure of the microwave oven operation in Plymouth and the possible redundancy of 
workers. The solution fo tmd was to establish the air conditioner operation at TCP and use 
those workers. 
During the few months between the closure of the MWOD and the start of operati ons of the 
Air Conditioner Division, direct workers were moved to the Audio Visual Division, which is 
situated in a different site in Plymouth, and undertook all sort of activities in order to avoid 
being idle. Indirect workers were left at the Air Conditioner Division to help with the setting 
up of the division. As soon as it became operational, the large majority of direct workers of 
the previous MWOD were transferred back to their original site to be tra ined in the 
production of air conditioning equipment. 
The Manager Director of TCP has always been a British executive, with the current one, Mr 
George Williams, holding the position fo r the last eight years. In relation to the presence of 
Japanese staff at TCP, there is a remarkable difference between the two divisions of the 
company, Audio Visual Division (A VD) and Air Conditioner Division (ACD). The A VD has 
existed since the start of TCP's operations and, as was mentioned above, it was initially 
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staffed mainly with British managers who used to work at Rank-Toshiba. When some of 
those managers retired or moved to other companies, they were replaced by other British 
managers, which kept the A VD under mainly British management. The head of the A VD has 
always been a Japanese manager who comes from Toshiba Japan and stays at TCP for five 
years, on average. That executive holds the title of Assistant Managing Director AVD. Other 
top executives at A VD are British, as is the case with line managers. With only a few 
exceptions, Japanese tend to stay in specialist fi.mctions. 
On the other hand, at the ACD most of the top executives are Japanese. The main reason for 
this seems to be that the activ ity is sti ll relatively recent at TCP and it is completely different 
in technical terms from assembling TVs. As there was no previous knowledge about it at the 
company, Toshiba deemed it important to have experienced managers to start operations and 
those initially appointed are still heading the division. However, as it will be described later 
in the chapter, managers at ACD consider localization of management, that is to say, having 
British nationals occupying managerial positions, as one of the short to medium term 
objectives of the division . 
In terms of revenue, TV assembling is still the main business for TCP but, since the early 
l 990's, the combination of economic recession in Europe and the an-ival of new producers in 
the market have made competition fiercer, and profitability in that business became one of 
the main issues for the company. On the other hand, although the turnover of the ACD is 
much smal ler than the A YD, the profitability of the air conditioner business is higher. 
To conclude this section, Figure 4.1 presents the organizational chart of TCP. The company 
has a main board and two divisional boards. The Managing Director, the Finance and 
Information Systems Director and the Personnel Director take part in all three boards. The 
other members of the A VD Board are the Assistant Managing Director A VD and the four 
divisional directors. The other members of the ACD Board are the Assistant Managing 
Director ACD and the four senior managers. The difference in title between a director at the 
A VD and a senior manager at the ACD is due to the difference in size of both divisions. 
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4.2 Values and Characteristics of the Company 
Before describing the processes of change, an acco unt of how the interviewees defined the 
ma in values and characteristics of the company w ill be given . As it was explained in Chapter 
3, the obj ective of such account is to help to situate the interviewees' descriptions of the 
processes. 
For some top managers, profit making and the priority that employees should give to the 
company over the ir private li fe are important values of the company: 
"I believe that Toshiba is genuinely committed to the future of mankind, "Committed to 
People, Committed to the Future" is a very genuine statement, but I believe it is equally 
committed to a level of profit that enables the company to survive and to grow. ( .. . ) No 
doubt at a ll that there is a very signifi cant work ethic and the company must come first 
even to the extent of personal and family life, though it does recognize that personal and 
fa mily li fe is important to the employee. " (Manag ing Director - British) 
"Anyway, the final purpose of the operation, each business, is to get a profi t and to make 
some capital share to each capital shareholder, we have to give them some pro fit, thi s is 
our purpose." (Ass istant Managing Director A VD - Japanese) 
"You must put company at first, which I think it's the unique rule rather than typical 
Briti sh company." (Ass istant Managing Director ACD- Japanese), 
"Toshiba is a company, so get the profit, it is the most important." (Des ign and 
Development Department Senior Manager ACD - Japanese) 
The interviewees also mentio ned excellence in manufacturing and the company care for both 
its em ployees and the communi ty around it as significant va lues: 
" ... everyone we recruit should be here to see the manufactu ring process is perfected as 
fa r as poss ible ( ... ) this very important high perfo rmance manu factu ring unit is what 
we're a ll about ( ... ) So effi ciency in manu facturing is our strength. ( ... ) We in fact had a 
very lean year in 82, we'd started it out well but in 82 the market went flat and we were 
able to demonstrate other aspects of the culture, that nobody would be laid off, lose their 
j ob, even though we were short of work." (Personnel Director - Briti sh) 
" ... quite clearly our aim is to make TV sets in a simple and consistent manner ( ... ) the 
va lues that Toshiba has brought is the sort of world wide experience, selling product in 
different parts of the world, using style from also all over the world, when you have a 
global view, I think is much eas ier to dec ide what is successful , and what will work. ( ... ) 
I suppose the most cri tica l point was manu facturing on time." (Engineering Director 
A VD - British) 
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"Get a profit means also high quality, to get the customer's satisfaction. And fo r 
employees, safety is the first. " (Des ign and Development Department Senior Manager 
ACD - Japanese) 
"It' s important to this company that they are well regarded, both within the industry and 
within the di strict and throughout the world . Both from a point of view of being a good 
company that produces good products and from a company that is responsible by the 
way they operate, the way they treat people, the way they respect the environment." 
(Manufacturing Department Senior Manager ACD - British) 
"I think, fi nally if local people are fee ling much sati sfaction, which is fi na l goa l why 
establish a Japanese company here. That' s the final goa l, much dreamed, I think . Profit 
or technology, those are processes, but final goa l, I think, many loca l people here, if they 
are fee ling 'We are happy to work fo r Toshiba', that's the final goa l. " (Ass istant 
Managing Director ACD - Japanese) 
" ... we have to keep a healthy li fe of our employees and so that we have to rea li ze to the 
commitment and the prom ise with each employee." (Ass istant Manag ing Director A YD 
- Japanese) 
"They like to make sure that they've got prod uction effi ciency. There is a big thing on 
cost. ( ... ) They like to make sure that the production line is kept running, that you don't 
stop production. ( ... ) I think they try to keep everybody happy, but it' s difficult, but I 
think they do pretty we ll ." (Engineer at Des ign and Development Department ACD -
Bri tish) 
"I suppose I've been quite pleased to belong to an organization where they ... they don't 
guarantee jobs but what they say is that to the best of their ability they would avo id, as I 
see in thi s country, making people redundant unnecessari ly and ruining people's job 
expectations and things. "(Manager at Manu facturing Engineering Department ACD -
British) 
Another value mentioned was the importance that Toshiba g ives to its image as a company: 
"I think equally the company is very sensitive about its name, that fo r Toshi ba to get its 
name in a newspaper in an adverse way is a serious sin as far as the company is 
concerned . ( ... ) My concern was how to handle the closure of MWO pos itive ly. And in 
actual fact, the concern in Japan of course was "Toshiba closes plant, Toshiba makes 
redundancies", those were the headlines they would be reading. In actual fact Toshiba 
came out of thi s with pos itive publicity, because we managed to handle it without a 
s ingle redundancy. We were actually praised as a model of how these things should be 
done. So Japan were very grateful to the local management fo r the way it was handled in 
the sense of public relations." (Manag ing Director - British) 
"As an engineer and a manager I have to buy plant and equipment and get services from 
people, it' s a big va lue because we always pay our bi ll s, OK, that's one of the big strict 
ru les of the company, we will always settle quickly with people, so they know that the 
money is gonna come in and the rest of it, you get good serv ice at Toshiba, because they 
know our name is good. " (Manager at Manufacturing Engineering Department ACD -
Briti sh) 
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"From my point of view, sometimes I have to do with suppliers as we ll , because you 
work for Tosh iba you seem to deal with Eng li sh companies but with Japanese majority 
shareho lder sort of thing, and if there is ever a problem, because you Toshiba they will 
blow a ll the stops to make sure you get these parts on time. ( ... ) there is a good image of 
the company." (Engineer at Design and Development Department AC D - British) 
According to the interviewees, the main characteristics of the company are re lated to 
communication, teamwork and flexi bili ty req uired from the employees. 
" .. . there was a lot of team working, a lot of attempts in the early stages to show that the 
barri ers were down, there was no deviousness, the open plan office, no offices fo r 
anybody at senior level, hardly any symbols of status around, we a ll started at the same 
time, fini shed at the same time, ate in the same place and so on. ( ... ) that was the scene, 
the wearing of coats, you know, believing in a company, showing that you were part of 
the team was what was important" (Personnel Director - British) 
"I think there is, everyday, a huge commitment to good communicat ion. It's amazing 
how much time is taken in di scuss ing, briefing, whatever, the people. More so than 
probably we give it credit. If you sit back and think 'Goodness, how long do we spend 
doing thi s and that during the year?', the number of product ive hours spent in 
communicating is a huge propo11ion of tota l ava ilable hours. ( ... ) You're required to 
participate. We require you somet imes maybe to stand up in front of other people and 
say what you th ink or present something. ( ... ) I think if yo u are here to look at the 
manner in which the members in the shop fl oor operate, they are very hard worki ng, 
very conrm itted, very fl ex ible, fl ex ibility is very important to us. We are very small in 
numbers, the ab ility for people to switch from one j ob to another is extremely important 
to us. We do a lot of deve lopmental training in that rega rd . ( ... ) we need flexibility, we 
need people to work as teams, work within teams, they have to be able to communicate, 
they have to be ab le to support another, they have to understand the full process, so part 
of the training is to understand the full process, in order we can operate, because if we 
had sort of 150 people a ll working in iso lation it just would not work." (Manufacturing 
Department Senior Manager ACD - British) 
"I think probably info rmation transmitted to the company is good. So that is one of the 
very necessary parts I think of making everybody go ing in the same direction and go fast 
and respond to difficulties ( ... ) when I tried to recruit people of my age or a little bit 
younger, from other companies, it wasn't poss ible fo r them eas il y to accept the Japanese 
way of working, maybe the open sty le of working, in many instances the style is open 
because there is no ownership of informa tion." (Engi neering Director A VD - British) 
" ... they want you to be a team player, they want you to openl y contribute to the debate in 
the com pany, but once a decis ion is taken, even though you may di sagree with it, they 
want your commitment to carry out the decision that is made." (Manag ing Director -
British) 
"Every day in our department, my British manager organ izes morning meeting just to 
give genera l information, to exchange opinions, just short whi le, I O to 15 minutes, the 
longest I 5 minutes. What happened yesterday mainly, not all the detail, just highlight. 
He explains also when visitors are coming, that sort of com mun ication he tries to make 
every morning, and appointing one by one, somebody wants to say something towards 
all the members they can say that. Just we, I myself and my British manager try to create 
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certain teamwork or team spirit by the every morning meeting, otherwise they could be 
quite independent. Working only together, not knowing what the other is doing. They 
are working in one room, but could be quite indifferent from each other. That is bad, 
from our Japanese style point. They should be aware of the others doing, and when 
necessary they should be ready immediately "Ah, 1 know what's go ing on the other 
member, OK, 1 can help". That is our expectation then, otherwise if they are info rmed, 
required, all of sudden to help, they don't know what to do. That's why by having every 
morning meeting I'm trying to create certain team spirit, expected by Japan. Still 
individuality, culture, is a bit company problem, not problem, cannot meet our 
expectations. But that's is culture, isn't it? We cannot change their cu lture, 1 don't want 
to change their culture, but simply by understanding their cu lture, or your culture, 
important thing is understanding their culture and respecting their culture. Also existing 
(?) my own culture, our Japanese culture, and then to consider how we can mix, 
respecting each other how we can create good group spirit, power. ( ... ) You (any 
employee) should do anything, because independence, individuality by saying this is not 
my responsibility, 1 do not take care, this is not our policy, you should try to cover that, 
within the group. So I require do anything. Shou ld be ready to do anyth ing. 
Responsibility is clear but also try to do anything." (Manufacturing Engineering 
Department Senior Manager ACD - Japanese) 
" ... l do not like to make high fences between departments. Open." (Assistant Managing 
Director ACD - Japanese) 
"They seem to involve us, I mean, they have this COAB meeting and it' s quite good 
because we know what they do at the TV facto ry, what sort of major ideas they've got. " 
(Engineer at Design and Development Depai1ment ACD - British) 
4.3 Establishment of the Air Conditioner Division 
After deciding for the closure of the MWOD at TCP, Toshiba decided to bring a new 
business into the company, the production of air conditioning equipment. In terms of the 
world wide structure of Toshiba, air conditioner is a different division from consumer 
e lectronics and executives from one division do not have frequent contact wi th executives 
from the other. Also, the production process is very different. While the production of TVs, 
like microwave ovens, is basically an assembling operation, a ir conditioner productio n 
involves manufacturing, the transformation of plain sheets of meta l into equipment, and there 
is also a specific piping and refrigeration technology. For TCP, the new business was very 
welcome, but there was no knowledge with in the company about either the product 
technology or the Toshiba perso1rnel who can1e from Japan to set up the operation. 
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4.3.1 The Immediate Context 
At the end of the l 980's, Toshiba in Japan had decided that it would set up facilities abroad 
for producing air conditioners. The main reasons for that decision were the overload situation 
of the Fuji factory in Japan, the only one the company had at that moment; the soaring value 
of the yen, which was making exports from Japan progressively more expensive; the concern 
about the establishment of protective barriers against imports in some local markets, like 
Europe; and, finally, the company's policy of globalization, whereby products should be 
made in the markets where they were to be sold, aiming at making them both cheaper and 
more suitable to those markets. 
Two major locations were chosen for installing the facilities. One was Asia, and that went to 
Thailand, and the other one was Europe. At that time. Toshiba was exporting well into the 
European market and it made sense to have a factory in the region. A number of Japanese 
specialists were appointed to undertake a feasibility study about the location and 
specifications of the plant in Europe. Regarding its location, the Assistant Managing Director 
ACD explained that: 
" .. . there were four countries (France, Ita ly, Spain and the UK) and we studied level of 
quality po int of view, including efficiency and also cost point of view. Not on ly weak 
wage. Weak wage multiplied by efficiency. In terms of wage, Spain or Italy are cheaper 
than the UK. Level of quality and also weak wage, it's most effective thi s country. And 
also Toshiba brand for countries. Spain and Ita ly were handled not by a subsidiary of 
Toshiba. UK were handled by a subsidiary of Toshiba in the TV business. The market 
share was very good. That is another reason. Also other reason is communication. Italy 
and Spain, people cannot understand Engli sh, specially shop floor worker. But a lso 
Japanese, even high qualified people, very occasionally they can speak Spanish, Ita lian 
or French. But many people can understand English because of the education." 
In August 1990 the ACD office opened at TCP. Toshiba decided that the air conditioner 
factory would be installed at the previous microwave oven factory building, but it had to be 
extended and also undergo a series of modifications in order to accommodate the new 
machine-tools. 
There was a team of British personnel who were, jointly with the Japanese, responsible fo r 
setting up the operation. However, due to their lack of knowledge about the new product, 
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they acted more in a liaison role with local contractors, making sure that specifications laid 
down by the Japanese were correctly fo llowed . According to a British manager, 
" ... the strategy fo r that business (AC) was largely set in Japan. There was a very strong 
Japanese presence, there was a feeling that we didn't know this product and everything 
had to be communicated through the Japanese, from Japan, and it was true." 
In relation to competitors, there was no other Japanese producers of air conditioners in the 
UK, but there were already two companies establi shed in the Continent, besides local 
producers. After the ACD was set up at TCP, other Japanese companies started similar 
operations both in the UK and in the Continent. According to a Japanese manager at ACD, 
"Japan is very isolated country, by the island, not so open I think. They want to 
internationalize, Japan. But not opening the door, by go ing out, abroad, establishing 
manufacturing activity, creating employment, transferring technology, so we fo llowed. 
And also because of competition. If we hadn't come out here, we would loose also 
exporting bus iness, because the other Japanese companies supply their product cheaply 
than that from Japan . For example, the company B will supply AC here quite cheaply, if 
we continue exporting products from Japan because of exchange rate, our product cou ld 
be higher than that price, so we loose business. So that's why whether or not we li ke we 
have to establish overseas factory to compete the product's price. That is also a quite 
high priority. So we are doing the same competition, not only in Japan but also outside, 
abroad. " 
4.3.2 Setting up the Air Conditioner Division 
In order to set up the air conditioner facto ry in Plymouth there were two project teams, one in 
Japan and one in the UK, headed by Mr Gunishi Tanaka and Mr George Williams, 
respectively . Due to the lack of air conditioner skills in Plymouth, the British team was very 
dependent on the approval by the Japanese and the main difficulty they faced at that stage of 
the process was in gaining trust from the Japanese that they were not only capable but also 
willing to undertake the tasks allocated to them. Contrary to the consumer electroni cs 
division, people at the air conditioner division in Toshiba Japan had no experience of 
operating overseas, apart from the Thailand factory, and that was reflected in a wary 
approach to the European operation. Every 3 months members of the British and Japanese 
teams would meet in order to review the progress of the project. The interval between the 
meetings was reduced as the project deadline approached, reaching 2 weeks in the end . 
According to a British member, with such meetings they could practically demonstrate to the 
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Japanese that they knew what they were doing and when they did not know they would tell 
that straightway. Such honesty was fundamental for the growth of trust. 
With the development of the project, some key members of the Japanese team moved to 
Plymouth in order to closely fo llow the expansion of the old microwave oven fac tory and the 
installation of new equipment. The leader of the Japanese team, who also moved to 
Plymouth, was very important in setting the specifications for the factory . He was very 
knowledgeable about the Fuji factory in Japan and had an exact idea of how the British 
fac ili ty should be. However, as soon as the plant began operation, he went back to Japan. On 
the other hand, some Japanese managers who came to Plymouth to set up the factory stayed 
after the start of operations. According to one of those managers , in the Toshiba operation in 
Thailand some managers did the feas ibili ty study and the project of the factory, and different 
ones were appointed to run the operation. As a consequence, the latter had difficulties in 
understanding what he called the 'total operation' . From that experience the company decided 
to ass ign the top managerial posts at the ACD to the san1e personnel who did both the 
feasib ili ty study and the factory project. Thus, four Japanese managers stayed in Pl ymouth : 
one became the Assistant Managing Director ACD, being responsible fo r the general 
management of the division, the other three had strong technical skill s, each one being 
responsible for a department within the division . One became the head of the Manufacturing 
Engineering Department, the second became the head of the Design and Development 
Department and the third became the head of the Quality Assurance Department. After three 
years of operations, the latter went back to Japan and the second took over his position, 
becoming head of both departments. 
The rest of the managerial team was made up of British managers coming from the previous 
MWOD. One of those managers was appointed head of the Manufacturing Department and 
was initially responsible for recruiting people to work at the ACD. The first people recruited 
were the workers from the MWOD, who were distributed across the ACD according to 
assessments made by managers on the basis of their attri butes, qualifications and 
backgrounds. For some departments within the ACD, like Design and Development, TCP 
recruited recent graduates in engineering from local universities. For other departments, like 
Manufacturing Engineering, the company decided to start with a nucleus of experienced 
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engineers coming from the MWOD and gradually recruit young engineers to supplement the 
ski lls that were missing. Around 50 people came from the MWOD to the ACD and many 
more were recruited . In September 1994, the ACD had around 180 personnel. 
Whilst the construction of the air conditioner factory was taking place, 46 personnel from the 
ACD went to Japan for training periods, ranging from one to six weeks. These people were 
supervisors, superintendents, engineers and specialist shop floor workers. That training 
period created a certain tension between the Japanese and British, mainly rel ated to the 
experience of shop floor workers. These people had generally served five years 
apprenticeships in the UK and also had worked at the MWOD. In spite of that, they were 
trained in Japan as though they knew nothing, starting from scratch. Some of them got really 
angry, considering that their past experience was not being respected. They would frequently 
telephone their managers in Pl ymouth to complain about the training. One of those managers 
recalls the situation: 
"So when we sent the first group over fo r so called training, that guys had been sort of in 
industry for maybe 8, I O years. When they got at Japan they say "This is rule, this is a 
screwdriver". And a lot of trouble wi th people going from here to Japan feeling very 
insulted . But to be fair to them , fo r their perspective it was necessary to take it from 
basis, in reali ty they could have come in much higher upper chain . But, OK, that was 
one of the initial problems." (Manufacturing Department Senior Manager ACD -
British) 
However, the complains did not make any difference and the training just went on as planned 
by the Japanese, who wanted to make sure that workers would fully internalize their tasks, 
step by step. Indeed, Bri tish managers acknowledged afterwards that, despite the difficulties 
during the training period, some of the very specialized skill s, like brazing, were well 
transmitted to and learned by workers. 
After that initial period of training, some of the recentl y graduated engineers went back to 
Japan for a in-depth training in their tasks during six months. That wi ll be described wi th 
more detail later in this chapter, when I describe the establishment of local design at TCP. 
There was no special training regarding management procedures. According to a Japanese 
senior manager, most British managers already knew the Japanese style from the microwave 
oven days. On the other hand, the operational style coming from the air conditioner factory in 
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better this way, why don't we do it?" Probably it was after 12, 18 months of operating 
that you sort of reflect on where you came from , you suddenly realize that "Hey, they 
were being pedantic, and they were being ... not intentionally but they were being in 
some ways insulting", but the benefit 18 months down the stream was that you routinely 
did things to avoid the pitfalls that you'd experienced the first 3, 6 months. And you're 
doing that as a routine, there's no think twice about it. So, they almost programmed you 
into a way of operating which, if they haven't adopted the approach they did, and taken 
probably a lot of the sort of passive abuse, we wou ldn 't have actually got through one 
the other day (?). But it took time to come to that reali zation, the period of evolution 
leading up to that rea li zat ion is quite difficult and fi nd (?) all sorts of traumas and 
pitfalls. I think really putting into perspective whether it would be Japanese, whatever 
the nationality would be in a fore ign country, you are go ing through that loop to a 
degree. It certa inly led to some interesting confrontations at times." (Manufacturing 
Department Senior Manager ACD) 
Those Japanese stayed at TCP until Christmas 1991. Their main objective in Plymouth was 
to make sure that the factory would be up and rurming according to their standards. A lthough 
they were instructing the local operators on their tasks, the schedule of activ ities during that 
period was very tight and there was no time left for d iscussions. They would generally say 
how things should be done without any detailed explanation about why they should be done 
that way. Moreover, many of those Japanese were shop floor workers who could not speak 
English and, therefore, had to use interpreters for communicating with local workers . The 
interpreters were not knowledgeable about technical issues, whi ch made communications 
even more difficult. A British manager commented that that was the ideal time to discuss 
with the Japanese about the shortcomings of the training period in Japan but such opportunity 
was lost due to the lack of time. Also, the Assistant Managing Director ACD explained that 
during that period factors like the knowledge gap between the Japanese and British, the 
language problems, and the tight schedule, made discussions between workers from both 
nationalities impossible. However, after most Japanese went back to Japan, things changed : 
"After Christmas holidays there were few Japanese here, so British people had to stand 
up by themselves, together with few permanent Japanese workers here. Therefore it was 
abso lutely necessary to discuss many things. But speed was very slow, even though I 
had become much lower tempered at that time." 
4.3.4 Difficulties with Communication 
After the ACD started operating, the work relationship between Japanese managers and 
British teams became an important issue. The initial set up of the division was over and it had 
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now moved to the stage of running an established business. The structure of the ACD had 
been basically designed by a Japanese member of the feasibility study team. British managers 
came from the MWOD and the rest of the personnel were selected by the Manufacturing 
Department Senior Manager, who is British. Therefore, when the Japanese senior managers 
came to head the ACD and its departments, their subordinates had already been chosen. 
The first problem faced by managers and teams in their relationship was language. It was 
quite difficult fo r both sides to understand each other in their everyday work. Although it has 
significantly improved over time, communication is still considered by Japanese managers as 
the main difficulty: 
"I think, as I've sa id, language, communication was the difficulty. If we could talk 
perfectly we could understand more. So, just communication . Although culture is 
different, education system is different, co lour of hair is different, shape of the face is 
different, muscles lengths are different, that is indifferent. I think, finally, if we can talk 
free ly everything could be understand as expected . Simply because of language 
difference or difficulty . I believe I can communicate if we could speak Engli sh or they 
could Japanese language, or we could speak English more freely. Regarding not only 
technical matters but a lso human li fe etc . If we exchange opinion freely, I believe we 
could understand mutually in the same way as we are in Japan. Because of language 
difficulty to understand , sometimes unnecessary conflict is generated. Just as a result I 
can say. Even in Japan there are s imilar problems, sometimes we might misunderstand, 
that is because of culture difference. Now I don't think it is because of cultural 
difference, simply lack ing of communication, because of difficulty of language 
communication . If we communicate fully we could e liminate any kind of difficul ty 
operat ion, I believe. So teamwork or etc., everything can be, finally , conducted in the 
same as that of Japan, I believe. But to let them understand what is required exactl y by 
Japanese people is not easy. We believe we explained perfectly to them, but they don't. 
That's why they do not fo llow and then we misunderstand "They do not follow our 
requirement" , but actually simply they haven't understood correctly why they have to do 
that. They might understand how to do, but they may not understand why they have to 
do that, like that. That's why they make mistakes, and we say they are not capable, they 
do not follow our guidance, they such and such. That is misunderstanding, I think . 
Simply we haven't let them understand correctly. They haven't understood correctly 
what is required simply because language difficulty, fina ll y, I think. The difficulty I fee l, 
I think is forever language. If we conquer that, I think, I believe we can create the same 
working condition, atmosphere, wherever we go. But because lacking of language 
ability, Japanese people believe UK people are quite self defensive, quite argumentative, 
or quite conflict, they might think so, but simply lacking of communication." 
(Manufacturing Engineering Department Senior Manager ACD - Japanese) 
"(At the beginning) For the three Japanese members it was very difficult to understand, 
specially di scerning they speaking in English. Very high speed and also sometime slang 
and pronunciation. Also for British people here, I think it was very difficult to 
understand our pronunciation. But nowadays, also because of culture and character, I 
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think anybody understands my character, and Tats' character, and Joe's character2. So if 
Joe says something, many people imagine eas ier (sic) "What is he saying?". So, not only 
friendship. Each other get used, already, I think. ( ... )At the beginning Briti sh people 
were much keen to introduce AC business here, therefore not so different pos itions. 
Culture itse lf is a much different position between Japanese and British members, but 
through business there are not big difference. But sometimes the most difficult thing is 
language." (Assistant Managing Director ACD - Japanese) 
"(Talking about the main difficulties he face) Basically they have not enough experience 
and knowledge about AC. And converzation between Japanese and British people. 
When I don't understand I would ask again , aga in , again, that's the best way. But there 
are little differences, nuances, in the English language, like "should do and must do" that 
are very difficult to understand. So what they say and I feel is a little bit different. It's 
very difficult to understand. " (Design and Development Department Senior Manager 
ACD - Japanese) 
An interesting feature of the structure of the A.CD was that in two departments headed by 
Japanese, Manufacturing Eng ineering and Design and Development, there was a British 
manager positioned between the Japanese senior manager and the team. However, soon after 
the start of operations, the manager at Des ign and Development was moved to work as an 
engineer at M anufacturing Engineering due to the load of work there, leaving the Japanese 
senior manage,· with direct contact with his team. 
A t Manufacturing Engineering, Mike Cockerill , the British manager, has acted as both a 
sounding-board for the ideas of the Japanese manager and a buffer avoiding conflicts 
between the head of the department and the team. The Japanese seni or manager 
acknowledges the impo1tance of hi s role : 
"Also, my British manager is quite capable. He is good, very good, he understands 
almost everything I expect, that' s why fo r me he is quite helpful. By letting him 
understand, first of all , he tries to let our people understand correctl y, in hi s language. 
( ... ) Majority key managers already had been decided when we came here. That means it 
was very fortunate to me. I was given a good manager. He is very capable manager. But 
to utilize that it depends on myself. How I commun icate with them, it depends on how I 
communicate with him .( ... ) (talking about new ideas for the wo rk of his team) ... mainly 
I've discussed with Mike Cockerill about strategy or policy required or target. And then 
he explains by his own words to the other members. Again the language, I don't think I 
can fully explain about requirements directly to my people. If we discuss with my 
people I would have difficulty. So, first of all , by letting Mike Cockerill understand what 
is required, what we should do or how we should do, etc., then he exp lains to individual 
member detail. So, important thing is, anyhow, I believe manager, British manager like 
2 The three Japanese managers at the ACD were given English nicknames by the British. The Assistant 
Managing Director is Tom, the Manufacturing Engineering Department Senior Manager is Joe and the Design 
and Development Department Senior Manager is Tats. 
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him, how he understands correctly, how he accepts our requirement, if he refuses that of 
course I cannot push fo r him to explain to the people. First of all I have to discuss with 
Mike Cockerill , about schedule, plan or strategy. 
Q. But if he refuses, would you try to discuss with him again? 
A. He should have his own idea. If that is acceptable I apply that. He cannot only refuse. 
He should have his own opinion.( ... ) 
(talking about conflicts within his department) As fa r as my department is concerned we 
never had big conflict internally, because he (Mike Cockerill) is capable through 
discuss ion, they find always a solution, not solution but a way of tackling the point. 
Normally Mike Cockerill is coping with any kind of internal conflict, British engineers, 
he is coping, I think, with that, without my knowing that, he is manag ing, I think. Quite 
much I'm aware of the problem or the solution. But as far as I know, don't think there is 
such a problem in our department. But without my knowing that he might have (laughs) 
been dealing with that successfully, not sure of that. If he has diffi culty in sorting out 
such aspect he definitely comes to me, but he hasn't come to me, that means we didn't 
have such a big problem in the past, I believe." 
And the same sort of behaviour happens in relation to manufacturi ng issues, where the 
Ass istant M anaging Director di scusses w ith the head of the Manufacturing Department, who 
is British, about the implementation of some of hi s ideas : 
"So, I think that in that sense Tom and his team are the ones bringing the new ideas, but 
it does use the senior manager up there, Neil Lancaster, quite a lot to sound off ideas and 
Ne il can steer him towards what he thinks would be an acceptable compromise fo r the 
manufacturing method ." (Personnel Director - British) 
On the other hand, at the Design and Development Department the absence of such British 
manager has made the re lationship between the Japanese senior manager and the team much 
more di ffi cult. That will be discussed later in this chapter during the description of the 
establishment of local design at TCP. But it is relevant to say here that, after three and a half 
years, the ACD decided to hi re a British manager to occupy that position at the Design and 
Developing Department. 
4.3.5 Cultural Differences and Teamwork 
Although communication is regarded by the Japanese managers as the main difficulty they 
face, some cul tural differences in re lation to the relationship between the individual and the 
group were also mentioned as problematic when considering their impact on team work: 
"Also there are di ffi culties ... their individuality. We Japanese understand automatically 
in such a company group, or inside group, fo r example Manufacturing Engineering 
Department is a group, so automatica lly we identify the ro le of the manager, ro le of sub 
manager, ro le of senior engineer, etc. Automatica lly we are ready to co-operate, to 
contribute to the group, but British people might acknowledge the group as the place 
where they work together. Also they belong to the group, but their recognition is to work 
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together, not to contribute to the group to create more power than individual effort. Just 
recognition is different. My manager understands quite well. But although they work 
together but still they are independent. In Japan if someone can not perform well they 
try to help internally, automatica lly, or so of course team leader requires that or try to 
manage that. They are ready to do that, mutually help . But here, in a sense, they are 
working in the group but independently. So that's why even manager understands their 
ro le simple as a manager, they accept their position. That's why our expectation to the 
manager is sometimes different from their understanding. To co-ordinate total 
organization is our, Japanese, expectation to the manager. But their recognition is simple 
the ro le of manager, not tota l organizer. That pos ition, only senior manager, that pos ition 
manager pos ition, not a kind of tota l organizer. That is sometimes different." 
(Manufacturing Engineering Department Senior Manager ACD - Japanese) 
And the same on cultural differences in re lation to school education and hierarchy: 
"When I came here firstl y British people made excuses many times . Sometimes that is 
correct, but sometimes not. Because they are to ld in school to present their opinion. 
Always making a presentation. They are required in schoo l. They are a lso requ ired to 
make presentations at school, so they get used to it. That's why if they are requested to 
give an opinion they keep talking, but Japanese people are not good at keep talking. 
They consider in their minds and without mak ing presentation they do, normally. But 
here they make presentation first of a ll , whatever they do, normall y. Many times they 
make their own presentation, for example, by presenting thi s single thing (showing a 
small cup of milk) they make their presentation "This is made of such and such ... ". Quite 
many presentations they get used to do. But we Japanese "Th is is only milk cup, that's 
it", and they consider in their minds many things but they are not good at presenting 
their thoughts verba lly and they try to take action without making presentation so much, 
normally. That's why in the meeting we Japanese people are normally quite ca lm and 
think in our minds and try to take action without making a full presentation . "OK, I 
understood what is required " and take action, but British people make d iscuss ions quite 
long, if we don't stop them, they will continue discussion. That sounds a kind of excuse 
or negative sometimes. "Why do they give such opinion to us, do that first" sometimes 
we want to say. That is a difference. 
Q. How do you think is possib le to have teamwork if you don't present your ideas 
verbal ly? 
A. That is a difference from Japan. In Japan senior manager or top management, senior 
manager, manager and sub manager their structure is quite ... in a sense not fe udali sm, 
but the structure is quite strong, that's why, for example I'm manager and you are my 
people "Please do that" and you do that without complaining, without moaning, you 
might ask slight things but from experi ence you understand what I want and then , 
without making presentat ion you take action, extremely speaking, if the boss requires 
"Do that". Even if internall y, in yo ur main (?) if you are aga inst that, still superficiall y 
you fo llow that quickly. Here in the UK you say "Why is that?", evenly you ask to me. 
Recognition of senior manager, managers are different in Japan, their word is quite 
strong, but here, you a lways try to make presentation whoever towards MD, AMO, 
sen ior managers. Does not matter a lways you are in a even position. But in Japan is like 
that (showing different leve ls wi th hi s hands), so they (upper position) require that, they 
(lower position) do that. But here is always li ke that (same leve ls), the ro le is d iffe rent, 
manager, senior manager, but position, in a sense, is the same. That's why they try to say 
something always "Why do you requ ire that? Why that?". "Shut up, you do that" I want 
to say so, but in Japan they don't ask that "Oh, he is requesting me, I fee l very strange 
but the boss is requesting that, so that's why I'll take action" that is a normal Japanese 
style. As I said, wherever you go you belong to a certa in group, soc iety, automatically 
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there is a leader. Leader requires something and they fo llow. In the school teacher and 
student, sports club captain and team member or director and member, company boss 
and subordinate, wherever you go there is this relation. So they are not given to give 
their own opin ion, presentation, so frequent ly, they are required and fo llow." 
(Manufacturing Engineering Department Senior Manager ACD - Japanese) 
Such perception of cultural differences is, as with any perception, dependent on each 
individual. In this case, the Japanese manager who gave a ll comments above was 
spontaneously mentioned by the large maj ority of the interviewees as som eone w ho is 
particularly aware of such differences and a lso very capable of handling them, being 
specially well regarded by the Briti sh members of TCP. But, independently of nationality or 
awareness of cultural differences, a facto r w hich was widely mentioned as essential for 
smoothing difficulties related to cultural differences was time: 
"I think time creates a situation where you better understand each others personalities 
and likes and disli kes, a ll those things I think help. Something is go ing and sa id (?), 
some of the irritations l suspect still remain. Other th ings, a necessity, you have to work 
together, hopefu lly by demonstration you can see from both sides the level of 
commitment, a level of experti se so, by that ... (?) you really effect (?), earn, and get 
respect. I suppose progress ively there is a bond of allegiance, if you like, born out of 
working with, supporting each other. And by that means you make progress. We are a 
more cohesive management team now that we were 3 years ago, it was rather 
fragmented particularly fragmented into I used to call Mafia group which is the Japanese 
and then the British group, there tended to be 2 fact ions and it was almost like a running 
battle. Where it got the end was an ... (?) sort of thing. If you put them into a room you 
guarantee, the British would line off a ll one side, the Japanese in the other. Nowadays 
they tend to integrate, wh ich is a good sign. So, in that respect, progress ive ly, this so rt of 
mutual respect, understanding, whatever, has deve loped, and is more sort of a fee ling of 
integration, a fee ling of being part of a team , rather than being part of 2 teams, some 
aspects of which were in confli ct." (Manu facturing Department Senior Manager ACD -
British) 
"I'm a very happy man, I don't have any serious problem since the establishment. There 
are a lot of minor problems, cross cultural, misunderstandings of each other. But they 
are not so serious problems. Time solves them." (Ass istant Managing Director ACD -
Japanese) 
Neverthe less, it seem s important to note that although time can make cultural differences 
easier to cope with, they continue to exist and be perceived by those who deal w ith them 
daily. An issue particularly emphasized by British managers was the attitude taken by the 
Japanese towards meetings: 
"I think the Japanese sty le of decision making is quite often that the meeting is only to 
rubber stamp a dec ision. We have some ev idence of that; Tom , as I've said strong, he' ll 
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come to the meeting with a ll very clear on his own mind about what he wants to do." 
(Personnel Director - British) 
"Q. When you have a meeting, would you discuss the issues open ly in the meeting or 
wou ld you try to reach an agreement before the meeting? 
A. Obviously and any good manager if something is li ke ly to be contentious at a 
meeting you try and head it off. Any good manager will try and pre discuss. But the 
Japanese take it to a different stage. For me it's almost as if the Japanese use meetings 
differently. We as Europeans tend to di scuss a meeting to discuss alternatives and to 
make a decision. I a lmost find the Japanese use a meeting to confirm a decision that' s 
been made before you get to the meeting. 
Q. So the alternatives are discussed beforehand? 
A. The alternatives are di scussed beforehand and they wil l come to the meeting with a 
common position. They'd prepare more and we come to a meeting to say "Well, let's 
brain storm, what are the alternatives?" and if someone else's alternative is selected you 
haven't loss face. But I think the Japanese think if someone else's alternat ive is se lected 
publicly the person who is not been selected has lost face. So I still genuinely fee l there 
are some truth that Europeans and Japanese use meetings differently. We use meetings 
to di scuss and evolve a decision, they evolve a decision outside the meeting and the 
meeting confirms the dec ision. It's a generali zation but there's a lot of truth in it." 
(Managing Director - British) 
"That's you're going to a meeting, if you're going to a meeting fresh with a group of 
Japanese, one wi ll speak the rest wi ll keep quiet and you think well, what's going on. If 
you've got a group of Japanese and you've got a group of English, the Eng lish wi ll . 
(sounds of everybody talking a lot) arguing a hell among themselves, the English 
perspective for that is "There is on ly one guy speaking, that's the senior one the others 
aren't saying about a word". The Japanese interpretation is "The Engl ish have bad 
manners, attitude is all wrong. Instead of com ing in and discussing in a meeting they're 
actua lly arguing and disagreeing, that's not constructive", that's their perspective. When 
in fact, what is happening is the English are conducting a sort of the meeting fo rum as 
they normally do, as the sort of cu ltural links dictate, the Japanese actua lly have had a 
pre meeting and they've decided their po licy before they come into the meeting. They've 
decided their approach as quite in order for one person to speak, because they're al l on 
one accord. When the English are a ll sort of individuals. And quite often that happens, 
and certainly when there is a non Japanese that seats there and li sten , and they obviously 
have to li sten very carefully sometimes, quite often you go away and you watch the face 
and you think "They've misunderstood" , they got away and thought this "These group of 
Eng li sh, they aren't very good managers or they aren't very good members, because their 
attitude, their sort of commitment is all wrong" , when in fact it's just Engli sh being 
English and Japanese being Japanese." (Manufacturing Department Senior Manager 
ACD - British) 
4.3.6 Work Routines 
Even with in teams made up of British workers, the working style at the ACD is very 
influenced by the Japanese, as managers have tried to emulate the Fuji sty le. The British 
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Senior Manager of Manufacturing Department describes the work routine within his 
department: 
"A typica l day. We stait at 7:45 am, the supervisory team come in, not paid, they come 
in around 7: 15 am. They have a meeting with the superintendents before 7:45 , which is 
start time, they have a meeting with their respective sections, briefing on say why you 
are here, why a Japanese visitor, how we did yesterday, what we've got to do today, 
whatever it might be. And that can last 5 minutes, can last longer. And we got through 
the day, get to the end of the day, the same team leaders and the senior members actually 
will stay behind, to make sure it's clean, tidy, judge each other's areas, paperwork 
whatever they want doing in their own time. That is the sort team togetherness and 
commitment and we require they understand their areas and the individuals within it. So 
if someone has got a problem, maybe the wife upset them today, or the husband upset 
them today, or it' s the day of month for the lad ies, they need to understand that, because 
unless they understand it, they can't see if this person is fau lt (?), guidance, maybe this 
person made a mistake, it's not good go ing in that sort of bricks knocking round the ears, 
understand why they've made a mistake and try to put it right. So, they have to have a 
good working relationship, a mutual trust between them and the members in the section. 
They have to develop the confidence of those members and in that way we develop a 
team . We also use small group activities, so we ask for vo lunteers to join the sma ll 
groups. They're given the opportunity of each week meeting whatever their small group 
is and discussing anything they want to regarding how do we improve productivity or 
safety or whatever they want to promote, basically.( ... ) From our side we stop half day a 
month, we actually stop producing, but everyone participating in cleaning, and tiding 
and maintaining, that's ... (?) the company commitment aga inst what we were saying 
"You must do as part of you job on an everyday basis" , but that's why I'm saying about 
everywhere is this need to draw wherever you can, anyway, a balance between what 
you're demanding and what you're prepared to give. If it's all demand then it won't 
happen, so it's a very difficult path, one you can fall off quite easi ly, but wherever 
possible we try to draw that balance of give and take. And in doing so, hopefully get 
everyone marching in the same direction. And what we have to do also is keep, 
maintain ing interest in their work, you have to keep altering things and directions, to 
keep people's interests, otherwise what you're doing this week fa ll by the way side (?). 
Having sa id a ll that, quite honestly if we sat back and supervision, just let it running so, 
management by the run itself, it wou ld revert very quickly to a traditional so ca lled 
British company, it wou ldn't get clean up and the rules would be flouted , and other 
th ings wou ld go with it, so there is a lot of hard work that goes into maintaining the 
disciplines. And if where else (?) to be honest what I'd love to say to you everyone in 
here participates as a team member, but the reality is that there are a number of people 
who doing what we do won't ever participate as a team member. Although during the 
interv iewing process we've been appendage(?) to try to select people who we think have 
a so1t of the background and personality that will become a good team member, a good 
comm unicator. We try to sort of ... (?) at the interview stage. But as ever you're not 
always successfu l, sometimes you pick a wrong. But, in genera l terms they are an 
extremely good rated people. Probably we think more of them that they think we think 
of them, actually." 
The small group activities mentioned above is a Japanese practice adopted in both divisions 
and is responsible for a number of productivity improvements during the years. According to 
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the Managing Director, most of the technical and production problems faced by the company 
have been solved by the small groups. 
The Japanese managers emphasized other routines they would like to see the locals adopting. 
That was particularly the case of planning, w here two top Japanese managers at the ACD 
mentioned the same cycle: 
"Manager also, for instance, engineering staff manager have to make their master 
schedule at first. For instance I always say half year target or someth ing, and then any 
manager or staff have to make much more break down by their own way, to make 
master schedule, monthly schedule, weekly schedule. But I think British people are very 
difficult to make so correct master schedule. This is one of the management style ... in 
Japan. But I think it is much effective than any other country. When l came here, 
nobody made their plan, nobody had their plan. So, only top down, top down, much 
different organization here . The organization have to be like a pyramid. And also plan-
do-see and recycle plan . Do means act, see means review. And back to plan, as a cycle. I 
think people here are improving but is very difficult their achievement compared to my 
expected delivery. That's a challenge point." (Assistant Managing Director ACD) 
"Also, I said, practical target I establish, but more put in practice how they (members of 
his division) should do, when they should achieve, such practical details, they consider 
themselves. Plan-do-see cycle. Plan-do-see, practical they have to estab li sh themselves. 
Still I give them the basic practical target. The purely practical schedule plan items, they 
have to establish themselves and also l verify that, whether or not to meet the 
establ ished target schedu le, whether or not it meets my requirement. So top management 
give us just idea of target." (Manufacturing Engineering Department Senior Manager 
ACD) 
Also for documentation of technical issues, the Japanese have tried to establish routines for 
recording and retrieving information . The rationale of such attempt is that by recording 
experiences related to technical problem solving it should be possible both to avoid incurring 
in the same problem in the future and to let other people within the company know about 
those problems. As in other issues, they see a difference between their behaviour and that 
from the British. An example: 
"At the moment, fo r example, we had various problems on pin press tooling. l always 
keep the daily diary regarding to .. . (?) matters. I always keep diary about what ... (he 
showed me his folder with many of hand written notes, including drawings of 
equipment. It looked extremely tidy, but everyth ing was written in Japanese, therefore I 
couldn't read.) . I don't mind keep the record of discussion, interview with you, I O of 
October I had the interview with you, such , such, such, not many deta il s, just what 
happened. Sometimes in detail , for example, a picture also fo r me to remember myself 
of what happened, how we dealt with the problem later. I'm always trying to keep the 
record or a remainder. I don't think they do. 
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Q. ls thi s an individual characteristic of yourself? You do this because you like to do 
thi s, you think is important... 
A. I can't remember everything. Simple, it' s simple. For me to remind myse lf, "Ah, in 
the past we had a similar problem, we dealt with that", but they think they remember. I 
don't think they can remember everything. So, 1 want them to keep similar record and 
not always they do. So, that is a bit di sappointment for me. But anyhow, they are dealing 
with any repeated prob lem (laughs). Maintenance side yes, they have got records, 
maintenance of machinery. But I don't think they keep record in the same leve l as me. 
Q. Which type of issues or questions you keep record of, only technical? 
A. On ly technica l, management side normally I remember, he remembers (the Assistant 
Managing Director ACD). Management side I do not keep the record. Should be here (in 
the head) all the time. But technical matter many many details there are, 1 can't 
remember. So I try to keep the key points, how we dealt with that." (Manufacturing 
Engineering Department Senior Manager ACD - Japanese) 
4.3.7 Localizing Management 
After few years of the establishment of the ACD, one of the main concerns of its managers is 
the localization of management. There are several reasons which justify such localization, the 
most prominent being: a) the financial cost of having Japanese managers, due to their high 
salaries, which is aggravated by the continuous appreciation of the yen in the last few years; 
b) the fact that a local manager will probably have an easier relationship with hi s 
subordinates; and c) as the Japanese managers are regularly substituted every few years, there 
is a risk of loosing continuity in the management of the division. 
Localization does not mean that there will be no Japanese at the ACD, but a fewer number of 
them. The localization of management is a pattern already fo llowed at the A VD where, even 
with a majority presence of British managers since its outset, the number of Japanese 
members have been reduced during the years. They now usually work as advisors in the 
technical functions. However, the positions of head of each of the two divisions of TCP (the 
Assistant Managing Directors) tend to be occupied by Japanese managers. 
A British manager at the ACD who has previously worked at the A VD confirmed the 
changes in the style after most Japanese pulled out: 
" I've worked at the AV site, I think, when there was more Japanese influence than there 
is now, because when we worked at the AV site there was a greater Japanese presence, 
because it was j ust going from Rank Television set to Toshiba television manufacture. 
So they obviously wanted to set their own standards all , clear all the old British ... (?) 
"This is gonna be Japanese" , so it' s a bit more presence there then. To be honest with 
you, I believe that the AV organization from the Japanese influence is been diluted now, 
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and it's more influenced by British members. The Japanese support, OK? So in fact 
we've got now Kobayashi (the Ass istant Managing Director A VD) in the ... (?) rea lly, 
but there is in parallel a strong British management, therefore their po int of view 
emerges, I think, perhaps a bit more strongly. Here, we're tied more to the Japanese line 
here, I would say, than the AV at the moment." 
The Japanese seem keen to promote localization of management and are aware that that 
means a stronger British style of operation. However, they also seem to want the ACD 
keeping its foundation on a Japanese style. The Assistant Managing Director ACD explains 
how he thinks it would be possible to achieve such blend : 
"Organization bas is, important thing fo r thi s company is to have strong leadership 
person. Abso lutely necessary. Not myse lf, local people. Not so many, key pos itions. 
Such sort of person is much important, to have a strong team leadership . And a lso such 
sort of people should better understand, sometimes, not only Briti sh culture, they have to 
study cross culture. They might have an opportunity to study Japanese culture and 
Toshiba organization in Japan. Because Toshiba itself has training course, 2 people here 
a lready went to Japan fo r that sort of tra ining. One is senior manager Ne il Lancaster, 
probably you will interview him, other one is Mr Mike Cockerill , he is manager of 
Manufacturing Engineering department. Because many methods of techno logy 
philosophy are based on Japanese culture, sometimes are very difficult to understand by 
British people. So therefore I thi nk it' s better to understand , not only submit to Japanese 
methods, so background , it's better to understand the background and it's eas ier to 
mod ify by British brain . At first they have to understand the background of the method, 
sometimes it's a much stri ct procedure but people here can not understand, but some key 
person have to understand the background, it's eas ier to transfer to give through to a ll 
members. That' s important. Not only technology wide, everything." 
Also the Personnel Director of TCP is concerned about preparing the local managers to 
assun1e a broader role at the ACD: 
"But what I was trying to lead to in the team issue, I think we've been Japan led and I 
thin k now increas ingly there is a des ire from the Japanese who are here to say, look in 
the long run it's got to be more of a blended operation than it's been. So I thin k the 
Japanese are trying to pull back. But I thin k in that respect a lso I've recognized it and 
I' ve set up a course on understanding the Japanese which is about to run in November 
fo r a ll of the UK people there. Seems to be late in the day almost, it's something I should 
have done years ago. 
Q. Would thi s be fo r a ll the people? 
A. No, it will be for a ll the managers. The UK managers in team will spend a couple of 
days rea lly to try to understand what makes the Japanese ti c, so that in future dea lings 
we can get the best result poss ible from any meetings or team acti v ities. 
Q. Why did you decide to set up the course? 
A. It came out of a survey, we've been doing an Investors in People awa rd, which in the 
UK is a quality standard fo r the way people are handled. One of the things that came out 
of that was the fee ling, thi s was picked up by the consultant perhaps more v is ibly than 
we've noticed it, that rea lly there is a need to get a better understanding of how the 
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Japanese work. People don't really seem to appreciate how the Japanese so lve problems, 
what meetings are about, what it is that motivates and drives the Japanese when they're 
abroad and so on. And so I've set these two day sessions up, to try and say right, let's 
just explore a ll aspects of that. And to me it's a lead ing also to a team building exerci se, 
it' s a sort of a first step of a two or three stage process where ultimately everyone w ill 
work together and be ab le to communicate more clearly what they' re thinking, what 
they're intending, so that the UK managers can take a bigger ro le in running that site . 
Because I think in cost terms we will have to, the cost of employi ng a Japanese is 
mass ive. Every Japanese we have here costs as much as sort of half a dozen local 
people, so it's important to try to get that cost down as much as poss ible." 
One of the worries of the Japanese in relation to localizing of management is the existence of 
an age gap between the current Briti sh managers of the ACD and the young engineers. Most 
of the managers have been with TCP since it started operations and, before that, used to work 
at Rank-Toshiba. Their average age is now fifty years old. On the other hand, there are quite 
a few recently graduated engineers at the division, and almost no middle managers between 
the two groups. Hence the concern of the Japanese about the difficulty in replacing the 
current managers when they retire , as the engineers are not experienced enough to take those 
positions. One response to the problem has been to hire some managers to fill positions 
where there is a clear necessity, but the preferred path is to develop the yo w1g engineers until 
they are ready to take up managerial positions. That can require a longer stay of Japanese 
people in line management positions and, as a consequence, the substituti on of the current 
Japanese by colleagues coming from Japan. The Manufacturing Engineering Department 
Senior Manager ACD anticipates some of the possible difficulties: 
"Q. Returning to the question of cu lture, do you think if a Japanese manager comes in 
your place or in other place, as you sa id, do you think he would have the same problem s 
about culture or, with your experi ence here could you try to transmit to him part of your 
experience? 
A. Of course I would hand over my experi ence in technology side, management side, 
everything. I would try to hand over to him through certain period, 2 months, 3 months, 
4 months, I'm not sure, depending on Japan arrangement. But I don't think he can 
understand fully all of them because, I sa id, after 3 years I came here I rea li zed exact 
meaning of cultural difference. I don't think I can do that, to let him understand for such 
a short period. Bas ically, I can give certain pre-knowledge to him, but still he has to 
learn himself. I year, 2 years, still it may take time. That means we loose continuity, 
definitely we loose continui ty between me and next person. That's is my concern , also 
his concern (po inting to Tom's office). But sometime we have to accept that. That's why 
other than expecting the same level of management by Japanese people, we better expect 
British people to be strong enough to carry on the same development management, even 
we change Japanese people frequently. So that's why loca lization is important, not only 
practical aspect but also management side. The same poli cy should be kept, the same 
technology level should be kept, the same level of various manufacturing acti vity should 
be kept, the same level of management, fina ll y, should be kept even we change Japanese 
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people frequently. That is ideal situation isn't it? And then one after another, new fresh 
air Japanese member can bring, new fresh air or further expectation or further challenge, 
but bas ic management, or practi cal management should be kept by British people. But it 
may take long, more 10 years, 20 years, not by only 3 - 4 years, I think." 
The Managing Director also sees difficulties with the substitution of Japanese managers : 
"I find the first year of the Japanese here, we are educating them. They can obviously 
bring a specific contribution, because they're very skilled and capable people, but they're 
not really performing until their second year in the sense of an English management 
team." 
Such feeling is further strengthened by the perception that, w ith time, expatriate managers 
tend to assume m ore of a local view of the business, as opposed to a headquarters view . 
Again the Managing Director: 
" What is evolving now, I find , is that the Japanese are more on our side against the 
parent company in Japan than they were originally. Because at the early stages of the 
project, whatever came out from Japan was the Bible. But now they are prepared to say 
"Well , this is not needed in Plymouth ". Whether that' s because they've become more 
used to the UK or whether they've altered their mental outlook or what, I don't know. 
But they don't automatica lly support what comes out from Japan whereas before they 
used to, always. If Japan said "This has to be done by July 95", it had to be done by July 
95. Now they will say "They're saying in Japan this has to be done by July 95 but it isn't 
really necessary. What's best fo r the business here?". So, there has been a subtle 
evolution, I think, in looking at things. It's not becoming English - Japanese, it's 
becoming the team in Plymouth aga inst Toshiba in Japan." . 
That perception seems to be supported when we read what the Assistant M anaging Director 
ACD says in regard to his concerns about T CP : 
"The company itself seems to be independent. But we are one part of the family, 
Toshiba group. So many decisions from outside this company, that is a concerning point. 
Difficult to say more detail s fo r you but, please, imagine. Because Toshiba total group 
company is very huge. Many demands from Tokyo. Personally I'm a much independent 
person compared to the average Japanese. So sometimes there are di scuss ion but 
sometimes I have to submit to their demand . Between Tokyo Toshiba in Japan, they are 
a very huge organization. But here it is a very small organization, as a family basis. So 
must adapt, not only cross culture. Head office people are 99.99999% Japanese 
nationality. They are thinking by Japanese only. Sometimes demand. Even if their brain 
were English, I think it' s very difficult to submit, fo r us. Many demands. It creates many 
problems fo r myself because I'm a representative in this factory." 
Each substitution of a Japanese by another Japanese could then represent that this sort of 
local v iew would go back to a headquarters view, until the new manager gets used with the 
local operation , but by then it would be his time to be replaced . 
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4.3.8 Inter-site Conflicts 
An issue repeatedly mentioned during the interviews was the existence of conflicts in the 
ACD Board meetings. The main reason for that is the fact that three of the board members 
are based at the A VD site and do not frequently go to the ACD site. Such behaviour has 
caused some resentment in the members of the ACD Board who are based at the ACD site. 
Whilst some the members based at the A VD acknowledge the necessity for them to be more 
frequently present at the ACD site, which coincides with the perception of the members 
based at the ACD, their rationale for such necessity is different: 
"There occasionally are crunch issues over, is very easy for us all not go to the AC, be 
down here, all my work comes to me across the desk and the feeling from AC people is, 
we ll I'm not working for them if I'm not up there. The fact that I might be working on 
the pension scheme or environmental matters or hea lth and safety matters company wide 
is irrelevant for them if I'm not physically seen up there then I'm not really on the team. 
So, it' s important for all of us, Finance Director, me, MD, to spend time at the AC. We're 
measured more on the fact that we're seen around the factory than what actua ll y we're 
doing. And so, those issues are the team ones. Trying to get close to the AC management 
isn't that easy because in the end we have still got a job to do, we've all got to so lve 
company wide problems that aren't just the AC problem s. And l do a lot of other things, 
PR things and aspects that seem to link c lose to the other s ite, but do need to be done by 
somebody. It's very difficult to maintain a presence in the AC. 
Q. But, are you actua ll y planning ... 
A. Yes, my commitment certainly is to spend at least half a day at AC every week, just 
being seen, doing things, even if I just sit there working. I want to do that. 
Q. But do you think that people there wou ld see thi s in which way? 
A. They do need that. My experience at large has always been that small sites do feel 
threatened by larger s ites, and then unless you can keep demonstrating a ll the time as 
they close(?), you don't pick up the underlining, sort of state of play. You don't know 
what people are really thinking and it is easy for that s ite to sta rt to get very negative 
towards this s ite and feel it's being ignored, not li sten to . ( ... ) 
But the Board meetings aren ' t that open, they are I guess more Japanese, in that I think 
my understanding of Japanese meetings is the time you get to the meeting you don ' t 
raise all SOit of new issues and embarrass people. You 've genera ll y trashed out the issue 
before the meeting and the meeting is only rea lly to sign it up ." (Personnel Director -
British - A VD based) 
" ... I've got to spend time up there, I don't spend as much time as I should, quite frankly , 
but I like to wa lk to someone 's desk and sit down and get an update." (Managing 
Director - British - A VD based) 
"And we (the ACD Board) meet twice a month, one for operational purposes, the other 
for financial results purposes, or more frequently whenever necessary. We di scuss a ll 
aspects of the company. Past, current, the future, planning. Interesting, sometimes, 
because three of the members are basically AV based, so their converzation tends to be 
very AV oriented, which obviously causes irritation to the AC members, who see the 
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board as being AC, of course. So, quite often there is short interchange because when 
you've got the AV people, or the joint board members who were supposed to be better 
acqua inted with what's happening here and clearly aren't, coming up with si lly 
suggestions. Yeah, it leads for a large meeting sometimes (?) (laughs). ( ... ) We 
(members of the ACD Board based at the ACD) also actually, outs ide of that have a 
senior manager meeting. So, my Japanese colleagues, and the accountant actua ll y, we 
meet once a week usually we work four to five days a week, this week four days, this 
week five days. The last day of any particular week, 8:00 in the morning, we' ll meet as a 
senior management group, and discuss what's going on . Actua lly is the problems, 
because quite a few of the th ings wou ld otherwise be discussed at the board, get 
discussed and decided at this meeting, you see, so when you go to the board meeting 
everything is pre orda ined . These other three guys haven't been pa,1 of that, you see.( .. . ) 
Q. So when there is this AC Board meeting, it's interesting because it looks like that 
there is more differences between one site and the other than between Japanese and 
British. 
A. I think that is true, actua lly. There is more difference between the representatives that 
come across from the other division, that there are between the representatives who 
come from the same division, a lbeit they are different nationalities. There is a more of a 
common accord between those (AC) than within the other three (AV - AC). But most of 
that is born out of the fact that in theory the other three should spend time here every 
week, operating. For whatever reason it doesn't happen . So, therefore there are th ings 
naturally they are exc luded from , there are things where naturally they wou ld have 
understanding they clearly don't have it, because they don't spend enough time here to . 
you know, we start our meeting at eight o'clock and they arrive at five to eight. In fact 
we start a quarter to eight. And then they expect to go ... (?) at the meeting without any 
preparation, or if you like, the personnel person might go to our personnel person side 
here and say, we ll you know "What are the issues, what shou ld I be briefed on", five 
minutes briefing and then comes to the board meeting talk about personnel matters, and 
there is a lot of "Come on, you are not really partic ipating, you're joining us but you're 
not really participating". That often gives rise to a sort of petulance, depending on the 
subjects that are covered." (Manufacturing Department Sen ior Manager ACD - British) 
4.3.9 Performance of the ACD and Consequences for People 
Since the start of operations at the ACD, there have been changes in the environment caused 
mainly by three factors . Firstly, the continuous appreciation of the yen in relation to the 
pound has made the importance of increasing local content in the products much higher. 
Secondly, the economic recession in Europe in the early 1990' s had as a consequence a lower 
demand for air conditioners than was initially envisaged by Toshiba when it decided to set up 
the manufacturing unit in Plymouth. In order to keep the factory busy, Toshiba Japan 
diverted to TCP some production volume from its Fuji factory which was destined to the 
Middle East market. As the models produced for that market are different from the ones that 
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TCP produces for Europe, the company has had to expand its model range much earlier than 
it was previously planned, from 25 to 34 models. That has represented a teclmical challenge 
for the members of TCP, but the results have been considered good. A characteristic 
particularly praised by managers at TCP has been the flexibility shown by the workforce on 
adapting to the new production requirements. 
Thirdly, the environmental situation has got harder than it was anticipated by the company. 
The production of air conditioners involves the use of non environmental friendly solvents. 
Since the Montreal Protocol the world wide environmental legislation is getting tougher and 
Toshiba Japan wants its subsidiaries to meet the environmental targets well before the 
legislation deadlines. That has also represented teclmical and financial challenges for TCP, as 
it needs to adopt new and more expensive methods of production. 
However, with regard to the performance of the ACD during its first three and a half years, it 
was considered satisfactory by managers at TCP. According to one of the Japanese managers 
at the ACD, by the end of 1994 the division was already two years ahead in terms of general 
development of what had been planned before starting operations. 
To conclude the description of this process, managers were asked about what they think they 
have learned from and also what were the consequences of the establishment of the ACD. In 
general , the consequences were related to the performance of the division and that was 
assessed as good. Although the business did not grow as it was initially expected, volumes 
were growing and the profit margin was better than the TV business. As the technical 
development was being regarded as sound and the division is still very young, all 
interviewees were optimistic in relation to the future of the ACD. A particularly interesting 
comment was made by the Managing Director about the fact that the microwave oven and the 
TV business were much closer than the air conditioner and the TV. Thus, although the 
success of the ACD was putting TCP in a much stronger position, his personal task of 
managing the two divisions as a single company had been made more difficult. 
In relation to what people think they have learned from the experience, the Japanese 
managers usually drew comparisons with their previous experience in Japan. In this sense, 
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their role in Plymouth is much wider than what it used to be in Japan mainly because in a 
smaller unit people are responsible for a broader range of tasks . They also emphasized the 
importance of communication for overcoming cross cultural difficulties. The Assistant 
Managing Director ACD expressed disappointment with the relationship with suppliers in the 
UK. He compared this with the situation in Japan where big companies like Toshiba can 
make demands which are attended by its suppliers, whereas in the UK the relationship is 
more equal, with suppliers sometimes refusing to accept TCP' s demands in relation to quality 
and delivery time. The following comment illustrates this problem: 
"Very difficu lt. Internally we can manage, but outside is very difficult to understand 
their meaning." 
On the other hand, British managers consistently emphasized the impo1iance given to people 
as something they have learned during their experience in the process: 
" ... I've learned it' s a lesson that is so very very true is that you can only achieve results 
through people and even though at times still the Japanese AC team have been difficu lt, 
yo u have to go out of your way to work as a team and they come part way to you and 
you come part way to them. I do find myself having to adopt a different approach, and a 
different realism to dealing with the AC division comparing to dealing with the TV 
division." (Managing Director) 
" So, I think the analysis, the way in which you look at something which is going wrong 
and you put it right, the forward planning, not making changes without full y 
invest igating the whys and wheres forcing making that change. Valuing people. ( ... ) 
before then, so tended to get more tied up in what' s going on, but not standing back, 
thinking about who is actually doing it and, you know, what are their needs and 
aspirations. ( ... ) l don ' t think the exposure within another British company would have 
give me some of the attributes that I hope I have now. ( .. . ) (ta lking about cross cultural 
relationships) The willingness to li sten , to examine your own motives as well as theirs, 
to understand there are two sides to every discussion , every argument, and to try to be 
sympathetic to the other person' s point of view as your own .... And understanding that 
you're dealing with not only individuals of different nationalities but personalities as 
well , that personalities can make nationality substantially more difficult to get the 
relationship going in an effective manner. It' s down to individuals to be committed to 
work together. So, primarily on this site, the prerequisite for every individual is to be 
willing to work as part of and contribute to the team." (Manufacturing Department 
Senior Manager ACD) 
"I suppose, in a sense, I've learned to be more, perhaps ... cost conscious and conscious 
of the fact that everybody's got to contribute, got to get people to contribute as much as 
possible during the day and be available for as many hours as is possible. That type of 
thing. Some of the other organi zations, Rank and perhaps BAC to some extent, there 
were always what l call surplus people. People who do half a job. Because you've grown 
up in those organizations you tend to neglect the fact that they' re like that, tolerate them, 
in a sense. So, ... (?) not think I'm intolerant to such situations but you've been working 
with the Japanese for a long time you begin to learn that if the organization is gonna to 
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survive and protect everybody, those people have rather got to be filled with work or 
whatever, so I like to think that everybody is fully employed . So I've learned, I suppose, 
in a way to make sure that people's day is a full up with work." (Manager at 
Manufacturing Engineering Department ACD) 
4.4 Establishing the Local Design Centres 
In the early l 990 ' s Toshiba decided that in some regions of the world it should set up entire 
business operations, reducing their dependence from the headquarters in Japan. For TCP, one 
of the consequences of this decision was the establishment of des ign centres in its two 
divisions. At the A VD, there was already a group of experienced engineers working with 
design for four years but it only became an official design department in 1991. At the ACD, 
there was an Engineering department which was headed by a Japanese manager who used to 
work with design in Japan before going to Plymouth. In 1992, the name of the department 
was changed to Design and Development and its engineers started to work with design. That 
work, like the one at the AVD, is mainly related to the internal design of products. This 
section describes the processes of setting up the design departments and the consequences for 
TCP. 
4.4.1 The Immediate Context - Reasons for Localizing Design 
When Toshiba decided to establish the design centres in Plymouth, the Japanese economy 
was going through a very prosperous period and the company was fac ing difficulties in 
finding enough design engineers to attend its demand . The large majority of recent graduates 
could easily find jobs and many engineers were opting fo r working in sectors which were 
paying higher salaries like banks and insurance companies. The design engineers at Toshiba 
Japan were being stretched to the limit in order to attend the demands comi ng from different 
markets around the world. 
In the case of TV, there was another fact added to the lack of engineering resources for 
making stronger the point for decentralizing the design activity. In some advanced markets, 
there was a growing demand for more sophisticated TV models which represent a larger 
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profit margin for producers. As the market for TVs is very competitive everywhere, Toshiba 
needed to have its more experienced design engineers in Japan dedicated to such models. 
However, at that moment, those engineers were frequently busy with different activities like 
designing simpler models to developing markets or making small modifications in some 
models to suit specific markets. With the difficulties in hiring new design engineers in Japan, 
the option of shifting some of the simpler tasks to subsidiaries became very attractive. 
The already mentioned appreciation of the Japanese yen also reinforced that option as the 
salaries of Japanese engineers were becoming unrelentingly higher than those of local 
engineers working in subsidiaries of Toshiba. Another consequence of currency fluctuations 
was that everything exported from Japan was becoming more expensive. Hence, the 
substitution of Japanese components by local parts was another way of reducing local 
production costs. However, any change of components represented a series of quality tests 
and, frequently, some small changes in the design of the product which, again, overburdened 
the design engineers in Japan. This was one more reason for localizing such design tasks. 
At the local level, having design engineers would also bring a series of benefits for 
subsidiaries. In first place, as design engineers have to have a thorough knowledge of the sets 
produced, their presence at the company makes it easier for solving some manufacturing 
problems. Secondly, as it was mentioned above, their presence also makes localization of 
parts an easier and faster task, as they can visit local suppliers, discuss technical 
specifications and, if necessary, make at least some of the design changes in the sets 
produced. Thirdly, subsidiaries frequently face the situation where the market requires 
products more suitable to local conditions which demand small design changes. As the local 
design teams develop technically, they become gradually more capable to undertake such 
changes, both faster and cheaper that if they were sent abroad to be made at the headquarters. 
In the case of TV in Europe, another development which has justified the start of design 
activities at TCP is the development of new broadcasting standards. There are committees in 
Europe which are di scussing a possible common standard for digital television, and the main 
European TV manufacturers take part in such conunittees. Thus, if a standard is agreed, those 
companies will have an advantage over their competitors as they will know all technical 
107 
information beforehand and will be able to develop equipment for such standard in advance. 
Toshiba, as a Japanese manufacturer, has no seat in those committees, but it has business 
relationships with many of the European manufacturers who supply components for TCP. 
The design engineers who work locally can, through contacts with those manufacturers, get 
some information about the new standards and feed such information back to Japan, leaving 
Toshiba in a better competitive position than it would be without any information. The 
Engineering Director A VD explains: 
" it's easy to imagine that you can first of all localize the manufacturing because 
logistically that makes sense, but after a while you have to localize the design also, l 
think, because the market is developing and you have to understand the market and 
respond to the market, and you can only do that with the technical people who can do 
the design . It's all very well , you can take a liaison man for a wh ile and he can feed back 
information, but you only really learn when you start to interact, just listening isn't good 
enough." 
Specifically in the UK, TCP was facing some difficulties with the Income Tax Authority in 
relation to the amount of money sent to Japan as payment for royalties and technical support. 
According to the Tax Authority the company was sending more money to Japan than it was 
getting back in terms of engineering design and support. A way out of that contention was to 
have at least part of the design made locally. Thus, a series of global and local reasons were 
added to justify the establishment of the design centres in Plymouth. 
4.4.2 Forming the Design Teams 
The choice of engineers to work with design was similar in both divisions of TCP. At the 
A VD, there were already some experienced design engineers but when the Design 
Department was officially set up they were moved to different functions within the company. 
According to the Engineering Director, he opted to have recent graduated engineers working 
with design because they would be more keen to follow instructions coming from Japan. At 
the ACD, there were also two experienced engineers working at the then named Engineering 
Department. However, as soon as two recent graduated engineers came back from a period of 
training in Japan, the other two were moved to the Manufacturing Engineering Department. 
The previous Engineering Department was renamed Design and Development Department, 
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comprising only a Japanese senior manager, the two recent graduated engineers and one 
student. 
In both divisions the design departments are headed by Japanese managers. One of the main 
reasons for that is the importance of communication with Japan during that initial stage of 
design at TCP. Such communication is mainly made by the Japanese managers. Also, all 
drawings coming from Japan to TCP are written in Japanese and the company needs people 
who can read them. Another important reason is that, with tean1s formed by young engineers, 
their formation is considered essential for the success of the localization process. The two 
Japanese managers are very experienced design engineers and can co-ordi nate and train the 
local engineers in their jobs. 
In re lation to the structure of the design departments, at the A VD there is one experienced 
engineer at the design team who has worked as a middle manager between the Japanese 
manager and the team, in the san1e line as described in section 4.3.4 above. At the ACD, the 
company was in the process of recruiting an engineer who would take a similar role. This 
will be described with more detail later in this section. 
When selecting engineers to work with design, besides requiring a good academic record the 
company has given preference to people who live locally. The training for design is both long 
and costly and TCP is afraid of loosing people after they get some experience with design. 
Thus, there is a expectation that people who have always lived locally wi ll be more keen to 
stay with the company, even if they can find other jobs which pay better salaries. For the 
Japanese managers that is not only a serious concern but also a certain surpri se for in Japan it 
is more difficult for people to change jobs than in the UK. Those managers however consider 
that salaries for engineers are low in the UK in general and particularly in the West Country. 
That issue makes the risk of loosing well trained personnel even higher. 
4.4.3 Training 
Some of the design engineers had their initial training in Japan. According to an engineer at 
the ACD, his training was divided in stages, the first being a view of all departments in the 
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factory where he was working at. Next, he started to work in a department with eight 
Japanese engineers who helped him to understand all the control systems in a air conditioner. 
They also took him to different suppliers who explained which were the important 
characteristics of components he should look for when choosing a supplier in the UK. 
Another stage was for him to assemble an entire simulated air conditioner set in order to 
understand each step of the process. When he came back to TCP, the company was starting to 
manufacture the first air conditioners, under the supervision from people who came from 
Japan. That was a sort of continuity of training as the Japanese would carefully disassemble 
each unit looking for mistakes and, in the event of finding them, would explain which were 
the problems. 
After that initial period, training for the design engineers has been mostly on the job. The role 
of the Japanese managers at both departments has been fundamental for such training. At the 
ACD, the Design and Development manager emphasized the importance for engineers to 
understand the processes involved in their jobs and not only which the desired outcomes are: 
"Q. How is the day by day work? How do the young engineers learn to design? 
A. Basically on the job training, do you understand?, OJT. If a young engineer has some 
problem he would ask to me. But I never give them the quick answer, I always ask them 
"Please, consider by yourself at first and make some answer by yourself, and after that 
ask me". I never gave them the quick answer, no good. 
Q. Why do you think it's not good? 
A. That is a training. If they know that result, only result, that's not the experience. They 
have to get the procedure, how to solve the problem. That's very impo1tant, result is not 
so important. 
Q. Do you think they could take too much time trying to learn the procedures? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What would happen with the result if they spend too much time? 
A. No problem. This is how to grow up a young engineer." 
Although the engineers in the beginning did not like such approach from the manager, they 
tend to appreciate it as they get more experience: 
"So if you come up with something he'll (the manager) just say, "Please try" , even if he 
thinks it will not work, he is still saying "Please, try it" and you can see the work for 
yourself, why it won't work or whatever. So it's encouraged to if you've got an idea to try 
that and see if it ' s gonna be any good." (Engineer at Design and Development 
Department ACD) 
At the A VD the procedure is similar, with some engineers being sent to Japan for long 
periods of training. For instance, few months before the interviews one engineer had spent six 
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months in Japan following the development of a new TV model. The Engineering Director 
was expecting that he could do a similar job back at TCP, although his work would have to 
be sent to Japan for a final approval. The Director also expected that within some years they 
could develop a model at TCP without it having to be checked in Japan. 
4.4.4 Teamwork and Communication 
The design activity is related to many other activi ties within and outside the company. Inside, 
design engineers are in close contact with colleagues from both manufacturing and quality 
departments, aiming at developing products which are easy and cheap to assemble, and 
which also meet required quality standards. Outside, they are in contact with suppliers for 
specifying and choosing components, and with the sales company in order to attend 
requirements from the market. Moreover, within the design departments themselves, 
engineers frequently work in groups when designing a new product or a modification in a 
current product. Therefore, the ability to work in teams is important for those professionals. 
The introduction of a new model is an example of teamwork, where a project leader is 
appointed by the design manager and is responsible fo r co-ordinating the whole project. Such 
activity includes assigning tasks for members of different departments, determining the 
components which will be bought locally and, consequently, which suppliers need to be 
contacted, agreeing with the sales company dates for launching the product, and, chiefly, 
checking whether each participant of the project team is doing his task according to the 
schedule. At the ACD the Japanese manager usually assign that position of project leader to a 
different engineer each time. 
According to one engineer they try to do their jobs without asking the manager for help. That 
would occur only when they see that the deadline is under the risk of being mi ssed. That 
behaviour, where each member of the tean1 knows hi s responsibility, is considered important 
for successful teamwork. Even so, the Engineering Director A VD considers that there still is 
a difference between the British and Japanese concerning that issue : 
" .. . a design group although it will try to work as a whole team and although I try to keep 
everything, to some extent, some team identity in terms of the group, recognition of 
everybody's individual responsibility is quite difficult and the Japanese people are much 
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better at this than the Engli sh people, anyway. They will recognize "Thi s is my 
responsibility, I can do this or I must do this" and they will not steal time from other 
people. Engli sh people will do that, an European will also do that. For example, 
somebody from another area, somebody from here say "Excuse me, can you help do 
this" and goes on and may be half a day. That type of thing wouldn't happen in Japan, 
because "I can't afford" , the question often wouldn 't be asked because they would know 
"Hi s job is impo1tan t, don't interrupt him ", it's quite difficult to recognize, I must admit I 
think myself!... I have a good memory for example for numbers, but a poor memory for 
add resses, so if I'm writing a ... in the past I can easi ly imagine I would ask my co lleague 
"What's the address of Phillips Company in London?", and OK as he te ll s me I write it 
down. Now, I wouldn't think of doing that, I wou ld make sure I had it written, I changed 
my disciplines to make sure I don't take anybody else's time if I don't need it. And I 
think that's a Japanese way of working. So they have respect for each other's time, wh ich 
I don't think is so well developed in Europe, and people are quite happy to take time 
from somebody else, to ask unfair questions sometimes of other people because it means 
they can't carry out their full job. This is a problem to some extent, because design 
people are always working 2 or 3 months or even a year in advance, maybe they have 
nothing that's essential today. So it's quite easy for somebody here (in another section) to 
ask for a so lution from somebody there, knowing this man knows the answer, it's quite 
easy to ask. At sometimes there is no choice, but another times it's better for him to look 
longer because he has the time to do it, and he doesn't. " 
At the same time, members of the design departments also consider it important to be aware 
of what other members of the team are working at. In case of any problem occurring or a 
decision that need to be made and the person responsible for the area is not present, it is 
sometimes necessary for others to act. That can only happen if everybody is well informed 
about other' s work. Communication then becomes an important issue. An engineer at the 
Design and Development Department ACD comments : 
" So, one thing which we have to try to guarantee is that if you know what each other is 
doing then if one of them is away, somebody comes to you with a problem you say "Oh, 
yeah, that ' s because ... ( ... ) ... it ' s very important to try to work as a team and the biggest 
problem is actua ll y try to ensure that everybody knows what' s happening at the same 
time. So we normally discuss every day or two between us where we are, any problems 
we ' ve got. Because obviously there are so many things that your task 's got no problems 
and it turns out that it cou Id be another two weeks for getting it and they are expecting it 
today." 
Communication within the teams is also fostered by the requirements from both Japanese 
managers for engineers to write reports on any major technical issue they have been involved 
with. Such reports can be later used by other people for finding solutions for problems 
already dealt with by the team in the past or as part of a checklist of problems that should be 
avoided when developing a new model. An engineer observed that his manager had been 
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pushing strongly for the team to write such reports. The manager expresses his view on the 
discussion of technical issues with his team: 
"Q. Is the communication more formal or informal? 
A. Basically informal. So I ask them to become formal basis. They always discuss with 
no data, just the brain or some guess. So, I ask them to make the report. 
Q. Do you prefer to discuss in a fo rmal way? 
A. If I hold that meeting, I already made some report. Not only talk." 
Conmrnnication between the Japanese managers and the teams is also an important issue. 
Although there are not too many problems in relation to technical matters, where the 
vocabulary is well known by everyone involved, there has been some problems in other 
areas. In one case, the manager is widely considered to have language difficulties and that has 
caused some friction with both hi s team and people from other departments. Within the team, 
time and the daily contact has smoothed out the interaction. An engineer commented that 
members of the team usually double check any information coming from the manager that 
they think may be not very clear. But he also observed that every new member who joins the 
team has to go through a difficult period of adaptation to the manager, usually with the help 
of other memters. The solution found by TCP has been to hire a British manager to work 
between the manager and the team, in the same line as described in section 4 .3.4 above. It is 
considered that the Japanese manager would find it easier to communicate to thi s local 
manager and let him to interact with the team and other people. 
4.4.5 Development of Local Design 
The development of local design has been steady at TCP in its initial years. Within the 
company, engineers are eager to assum e responsibility for more tasks but managers have to 
remember that the pace of development has to be always synchronized with Japan. The 
undertaking of a wider number of functions, like testing local components for TVs, demands 
considerable investments in equipment and also an accumulation of design knowledge within 
the company. It is a lengthy process where long term employment of design engineers is 
considered essential. The presence of a Japanese specialist is expected to last for the 
foreseeable future. With such small and young design teams, four engineers and a student at 
the ACD and six engineers at the A VD, it is difficult to accumulate a large amount of 
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experience. A Japanese manager draws a comparison between TCP and Fukaya when a 
mi stake occurs: 
" Usually we have meetings every week (at TCP), on Monday, so we review last week's 
results. I never chase individual , but program we must have, we must so lve. If that is 
human mi stake maybe just fo rget, but even if it is a human mistake, of that was a man 
that made the mistake 3 times, that's something wrong. That's is a mistake. 
Q . If thi s happens now and suppose that in half an year you hire another graduate, would 
thi s person know about thi s thing, that there is a way, do you store the decision? 
A. You mean the transference of the experience? 
Q. Yes. 
A. That' s a problem. Because usually in Japan, the engineer tends to work fo r so long 
time, so that's the experience or knowledge of the problem, it can be transferred 
verbally, or face to face, so without documentation ... but here without documentation it 
can not be transferred to the new man. That' s the problem. So all such sort of example, 
data, reports, that must be recorded as a report . If not, everything is gone, if that man 
leave. 
Q . In Japan would you also record as a report or not? 
A. Yes. Someone knows that, anyway. If someone meets a similar problem, they can 
contact the man related to that. We can not record every problem, but if we have the 
problem in the market that must be recorded, and we create a new model, we must 
review, anyway, prev ious problems in the market. Of course, only serious pro blems are 
recorded. But when we des ign the chass is, we must review previous problems that we 
met in the fi e ld . Check, check, "That' s OK, that's OK". So this is quite important. 
Q. And how this process of decoding would be done, people would write? 
A. Usuallv in the document. That is recorded fo r the, fo r example, "Prob lems recorded 
in the market". When of the design review, usually we' ll do, but .. . here is not quite often 
but in Japan usually when they design a new chassis, as a step of the checking des ign 
section must review all related problems they met in the past in the market. They check 
that. They must confirm that new chassis should not have such sort of problem. 
So, and also because there are lot of such sort of error, hidden know how or hidden 
experience or such sort of things, it's now in the individual memory, that sort of thing 
can be transferred verbally, face to face in Japan, because engineer can work fo r a long 
time. If some engineer have some difficul ty to so lve the problem he can consul t the 
experi enced engineer, who had the same experi ence before. But here, thi s is quite 
di fficult. Maybe we are working individually, bas ica lly, here. Engineer, engineer, 
engineer, engineer (pointing to separate places). This is my area. How to leave with such 
sort of worry, is qu ite important. But generally speaking, we can not prevent someone to 
leave the company, we can not stop. So we must keep records, as much as poss ible, of 
serious problems." 
The same manager considers that before any expansion of the design department at the A VD 
he needs to establish what he calls "core engineers", people who have in-depth knowledge of 
their jobs, and estimates that that would take some fi ve years more. 
The influence of the Japanese managers on the engineers can be exemplified by an engineer 
at the ACD mentioning the same planning cycle (plan-do-see) referred to by Japanese 
managers on section 4.3 .6 above: 
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" I think [' ve learned to tackle problem s, a sort of procedures, you go and do all the test, 
you don' t do sort of half the test and come with ha lf the information and try to base the 
decision just on part of the information, sort of sit down and then try to see what 
happens. So it's plan-do-see, you fo llow that sort of procedure, which is a good thing." 
A lso, the incentive given by managers fo r peop le to try their own ideas have helped the build 
up of self-confidence by the eng ineers . The same engineer tells about his manager: 
" Initially he would make decisions and we wou ld have to go along with him , but now . 
initia lly when you start working you're not too sure your level of competence or 
whatever so you tend to ... (?) until you judge they're doing OK, I think now they sort of 
say "It's up to you", but initially they sort of say "I think we' re gonna do it this way", and 
after "It's OK" or "You need to change this". Now they say "You're an engineer, you 
decide". So, it's got better, sort of get more of an equal , the same as he is. Probab ly we 
sti ll ... (?) to have a prob lem or not too certa in . But we' re get in more and more left to 
our own decisions. And you ... if you make a wrong decision he'll sti ll back yourself, if 
you go to him he sort of say "Oh yeah, you did that, that's normal , isn't it", so you 
"Yeah, OK", and he "You didn't have these facts at the time when you based your 
decision" or "You made the right decision". So he will stand you as long as the reasons 
fo r making that decision were right in the first place. I mean, that's a good thing to 
know, because you can sort of go and say "OK, I made a mistake but it was because of 
thi s" . It does help to have someone else alongside as we ll. It' s good for that point." 
Such accwm1lation of experience by local eng ineers has a llowed them to take responsibil ity 
for an increasing number of activities, although not as fast as they would like . Even though, 
they acknowledge the changes, as when an engineer at the ACD says: 
" I've sa id, with the fan motor, initia lly was Japan go ing to France and then fl ying back 
and they would di scuss with France. So initiall y we had no idea of what was happening 
with a ll these changes, but now we discuss directly. It' s good that way. So it's improving 
a ll the time. It can improve more. We haven't to stop there. Get into the circuit design 
and decide that for sa les, obviously I need to know a lot more about it. ( ... ) ... because 
we adopt the CAD system which initially a ll drawings were done in Japan and shipped 
over here but now we've actually got an exact replica of the CAD system they have in 
Japan. I think it costs about fo1ty thousands pounds. So we now can understand the 
CA.Ds much easier and try different things . I mean, there is an ongoing investment then, 
in this sort of equipment, capital. It benefits us rea lly. I can see more things coming over 
here. But I sa id , we need the equipment but we also need the knowledge as well , I mean, 
Tats is very helpful , he can give us hi s knowledge, but sometimes we may need to go 
after the information in Japan ... 
Q. When you have to make contacts with Japan, do you have to make them through 
Tats? 
A. Sometimes we go through Tats because it has to go purely Japanese. So if you write a 
fax they can not understand, sometimes I know the person and I could fax them, but it 
still has to go through a li aison person to ease, he reads the faxes and then passes on to 
other people or come back with a reply. Sometimes, because of the time difference, we 
can send on at five o'clock today and tomorrow morning we can have the answer, other 
t imes it takes a bit longer, sometimes they' ll ask us to carry out a test and send a report. 
But there is no real complains, a ll work is OK, there is no problem. If we need any help 
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they are there fo r us, but I see it much better than it was in the early days, we can make 
decisions here, a lot more now." 
Thus, although being a slow process whose benefits are not immediately clear, the 
establishment of the design centres has put TCP in a stronger position as a manufacturing 
company. In the words of the Managing Director: 
" It' s bas ically engineering strength, not just in des igning the product but in supporting 
manu facture and in supporting the market." 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has described two processes occurred at TCP in the last few years: the 
establishment of the Air Conditioner Division, and the estab lishment of local des ign at both 
divisions of the company. The description has also covered the most prominent values and 
characteristics of the company, as defined by its senior managers , and some strategic 
objectives of Toshiba in relation to its TV and air condi tioner businesses. The main 
obj ectives of the company at the outset of each process were highlighted. Particular attention 
was given to the context in which the processes have developed, to the interaction between 
members of the teams involved in the processes, and to fac tors whi ch have either fac ilitated 
or made the development of the processes difficul t. 
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Chapter 5 
LEARNING IN A 
CROSS-CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT 
This chapter presents the analysis of the two processes described in the previous chapter: 1) 
the establishment of the ACD, and 2) the establishment of local design at TCP. The analysis 
seeks to identify and discuss the main conditions which have enabled the occurrence of 
organizational learning at TCP. The first section discusses whether TCP has accumulated any 
knowledge with the development of the processes. The second section discusses the 
establishment of the ACD by: a) identifying the main triggers and objectives of the process; 
b) identifying what has been learned by TCP, and c) proposing and discussing the main 
enabl ing conditions fo r organizational learning. The third section discusses the establishment 
of local design at TCP, fo llowing the same steps as the previous section. The fourth section 
presents a general view of all enabling conditions proposed and their relationship with the 
evolution of the processes. The fifth and final section briefly discusses the inter-divisional 
confli cts identified within TCP and the necessity for managers to overcome them, as they 
represent obstacles for the occurrence of learning at the company level. 
5.1 Has TCP Accumulated any Knowledge? 
Before discussing the enabling conditions fo r organizational learning, it seems necessary to 
question whether TCP has actuall y accumulated any knowledge or, in other words, learned 
anything with the development of the processes studied. 
Regarding the establi shment of the ACD, the company has learned not only to produce air 
conditioning sets according to specifications coming from Japan, but also to make 
adaptations in these sets in order to make them more suited to the markets TCP serves. In 
relation to the local design activity in both divisions of the company, it is also possible to 
conclude that TCP has gone through a learning process, this time about how to make changes 
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in the design of its products, which, among other things, render possible the adaptations 
mentioned above. In the case of the A VD, the company is also capable of designing and 
developing an entire TV set. 
In order to enable TCP to carry out those technical activities, its members have had to learn a 
number of ski lls which involve both technical content and social relationships. Examples of 
these skills are the tasks workers perform when producing air conditioners, the design of a 
modification in a air conditioner or TV set, and also the everyday social interaction between 
British and Japanese while at undertaking these tasks, which has been particularly important 
at the ACD. 
A company can only learn through its members (Simon 1991), both through their daily 
processes of work and through the experiences they bring into the company from their 
outside lives. Looking at the products of a company we can readily perceive the presence of 
teclm ical knowledge; however, it is difficult to be aware of the presence of any sort of social 
knowledge; the social processes occurring during the development and manufacture of the 
products. Nevertheless, these social processes are the basis of the achievement of any 
teclmical knowledge, and can be very challenging by themselves. This seems to be the case 
with the processes studied, due to the fact that both involved the introduction of a new 
activity, with the participation of professionals from different nationalities. Thus, innovation 
and cross-cultural issues were important traits in the evolution of the processes. In order to 
identify and discuss the enabling conditions for organizational learning in these processes, 
attention will be given to both their teclmical and social aspects. 
A number of characteristics of TCP should be highlighted in order to better understand the 
main triggers, objectives and development of the processes studied . First is its status as a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Toshiba. Despite the presence of many British managers in the 
company Board, including the Managing Director, TCP 's main strategic decisions are either 
made in or sanctioned by Japan . Second is the fact that TCP is exclusively a manufacturing 
company, all commercialization of products is done by other companies which either belong 
to Toshiba or act as its representatives in other countries. As a consequence, TCP has no 
direct contact with the markets it serves, being dependent on the sales companies for that. 
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Third is the narrow international experience in terms of manufacturing abroad that people 
from the Air Conditioner Division in Toshiba Japan had before starting the operation in 
P lymouth . Fourth and finally, the reader should bear in mind the hi story of the company as it 
was described in the previous chapter, particularly its start fo llowing the fa ilure of the joint 
venture between Rank and Toshiba, and the start of the ACD fo llowing the closure of the 
MWOD. 
Before discussing each of the processes, let me recall the main values and characteristics of 
TCP, as expressed by its managers. Values: profit making, company before private life, 
excellence in manufacturing, care for employees and the local community, preserving 
Toshiba 's image. Characteristics: good commw1ication, teamwork and flexibility required 
from employees. It is with those values and characteristics in mind that the processes will be 
discussed. 
5.2 Establishment of the Air Conditioner Division 
5.2.1 Triggers and Objectives 
The main triggers fo r the establislunent of the ACD were the decision taken by Toshiba 
Japan to open a manufacturing plant in Europe and the closure of the MWOD in Plymouth. 
From the description given in the last chapter it is possible to conclude that the closure of the 
MWOD had great influence in the fina l decision for locating the plant in Plymouth. Some of 
the values of the company were made evident for both employees and local communi ty. 
Examining the personal files of the Managing Director I could see how the local press 
praised the company for opening the air conditioner business and, not only keeping the jobs 
of workers from the MWOD, but actually creating new jobs locall y. Mr Williams also told 
me that executives at the company's headquarters in Japan were very pleased with the 
positive image the company got from its handling of a delicate situation . Within the 
company, the decision was received with great relief. Although nobody had any experience 
with air conditioner manufacturing, the circumstances in which the site was chosen for the 
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operation meant that staff were grateful for having their jobs secured and, as a consequence, 
were willing to collaborate with the company. 
The broad obj ective set fo r the ACD at its outset was to produce air conditioners with the 
quali ty standards set by Toshiba Japan, at competitive costs, and according to the schedule 
set by the sales company. This obj ective can be broken down into a number of intermediary 
objectives which were steps fo r achieving the main goal. For instance, the first step was 
learning to produce air conditioners. The implications of these steps fo r workers and 
engineers were that they had to acquire a series of technical skills, specifica lly linked to each 
step to be accomplished. Training has played an important role in this acquisition of technical 
skill s. 
The division has been led by Japanese managers since its outset and their management style 
is somewhat di fferent from that of the managers who used to run the MWOD. Thus, people 
who work at the division had to unlearn certain behaviours and learn different ones which are 
in line with the Fuj iworks (the air conditioner factory in Japan) style of operation. In the 
same way, Japanese managers have had to adapt themselves to workers and engineers who 
are culturally di fferent from Japanese ones, as was extensively described in the previous 
chapter. The point to be highlighted here is that this mutual individual adaptation has been 
fundamental in allowing the company to achieve its production objecti ves. Moreover, it is 
possible to infer from the interviews that it has been a more complex undertaking than the 
technical side of the job. 
S.2.2 Content of Learning and Enabling Conditions 
The process of establi shment of the ACD can be divided in two stages: a) the set up of the 
operation until the first uni ts were produced and approved by the Japanese, around Christmas 
1991 ; and b) the normal running of the division. During the first stage, people within the 
company basically learned to produce ai r conditioners. The content of learning was very 
different fo r Bri tish and Japanese perso1mel involved . The Briti sh were mainly dealing with 
technical learning, how to manufac ture products according to the specifications set by the 
Japanese. On the other hand, the Japanese who would stay after the start of normal 
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production were mainly developing their knowledge of the English language, while 
fo llowing the plan for setting up the factory. There were not too many opportw1ities for 
interaction between Japanese and Briti sh managers at this stage. As the Assistant Managing 
Director ACD explained, the schedule was too tight to allow fo r discussions and explanations 
to the locals about what was being done. There was also the presence of a large number of 
Japanese at that moment, which probably made them fee l more ' at home' . 
The conditions I see as being centra l fo r enabling organizational learning during the first 
stage are di scussed below. 
Codified knowledge refers to the fac t that Toshiba Japan already had knowledge about the 
production of air conditioners which could be immediately transmitted to members of TCP. 
This codified knowledge constituted the basic content of the training period in Japan fo r TCP 
members. 
f nlenlion relates to the willingness and commitment from Bri tish workers to fo llow the 
instructions laid down by the Japanese. It seems that the context was influential in relation to 
the intensity of such commitment, as even when the Bri tish did not agree with the content of 
their training period in Japan, they complied with what was being asked from them. Intention 
also relates to the commitment of managers who worked at the set up of the operation, both 
British and Japanese, as the schedule was precisely met. It is not uncommon that, when a new 
operation starts, people invo lved are enthusiastic about collaborating, but in this case the 
enthusiasm seems to have been even higher, due the circwnstances in which the division was 
set up. The eagerness showed by Bri tish managers to learn about the air conditioner operation 
can also be captured by the concept of intention. 
Training in Japan was important for introducing the workers to the routines they would have 
to perfo rm during the manufac turing process. Training content was largely technical , 
involving the di ffus ion of codified (Boisot 1986) or explicit knowledge. It was 
complemented with the presence of Japanese workers during the fi rst weeks of operation, 
when they could help local workers fac ing ini tial difficulties. Although I did not interview 
shop floor workers, it was possible to gather from managers ' interviews that, despite the 
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language difficulties faced by workers when trying to communicate, such interaction was 
instrumental in fine tuning the working routines, and involved the transmission of uncodified 
or tacit knowledge, when Japanese workers effectively showed how certain tasks should be 
done. 
Unlearning at this stage was mainly related to workers replacing the routines they used to 
perform when assembling microwave ovens with new ones fo r manufacturing air 
conditioners. On the one hand, that was fac ilitated by the fact that the new routines were 
being used for a different product, one which demanded di ffe rent skills, so there was no 
major conflict between old and new knowledge. Clearly the old knowledge was no longer 
very useful , then it was not difficult to discard it. On the other hand, the approach adopted by 
the Japanese, of starting the training from the most elementary steps of production, ri sked 
putting the British off. Context variables such as the fact of being trained in Japan and the 
already mentioned circumstances in which the ACD was set up helped to keep the workers ' 
interest during the initial stages of the training period, although there still are a lot of 
complaints. Unlearning was cemented when workers returned to Pl ymouth and test 
production started w1der Japanese supervision. As each finished unit was disassembled, and 
every minor error was identified and pointed out to the person responsible fo r it, it became 
even more clear that the new routines would have to be strictly fo llowed. Thi s approach by 
the Japanese embodies the presence of another important condition fo r learning at this stage, 
nan1ely control. 
Openness at this stage relates to the behaviour of British managers and workers in accepting 
the lead of the Japanese without restrictions. As the Managing Director explained, the 
honesty of the British tean1 in admitting their lack of knowledge and, at the same time, 
showing their willingness to collaborate, positively impressed the Japanese. The combination 
of openness and intention to learn appears to have accelerated the pace of transference of 
knowledge from the Japanese to the British. 
Flexibilily was an evident characteristic of the behaviour of local members, as was 
spontaneously acknowledged by Japanese managers. At thi s first stage, it was demonstrated 
in the initial allocation of staff to the various functions within the new division; many 
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workers were given very different tasks from those which they were used to performing. 
Managers also had to learn about a very different business than that they were used to deal 
with in the previous years. 
Time for execution of the first stage was short and schedules were tightly controlled by the 
project leaders. Thus, time, or lack of time , was instrumental in the occurrence of behavioural 
changes in the sense that there was a set plan to be followed and on many occasions 
managers and workers would follow instructions without fully understanding the reasoning 
for the behaviour. Again the reference from the Assistant Managing Director ACD about the 
lack of time for discussions and explanations to the locals about what was being done is a 
good example of the way things developed at that stage. On the other hand, the reference 
from a British manager about the lost opportunity of discussing with the Japanese about the 
shortcomings of the training period in Japan, is an example of how the lack of time was also 
a factor that may have hindered further organizational learning about cross-cultural training. 
The second stage started with the return to Japan of the Japanese who went to Plymouth to 
supervise the first weeks of production. It is worth repeating here the passage where the 
Assistant Managing Director ACD, who is Japanese, describes what happened then: 
"After Christmas holidays there were few Japanese here, so British people had to stand 
up by themselves, together with few permanent Japanese workers here. Therefore it was 
absolutely necessary to discuss many things. But speed was very slow, even though I 
had become much lower tempered at that time." 
Now the British would have time to better understand what they were doing, and the 
Japanese would have to adapt themselves to the daily routine of the job, closely working with 
teams composed almost entirely by British members. Teamwork became a pre-requisite for 
achieving the division' s business objectives. This situation represented additional contents of 
learning for everybody involved. The difficulties described in the previous chapter, mainly 
related to co111111unication and cross-cultural differences, became more evident. 
For many local workers and managers the technical challenge was just beginning. After 
learning basic working routines necessary for manufacturing air conditioners, the aim now 
was to extend the understanding of those routines, in order to be able to identify problems 
and make improvements. New activities were also being gradually introduced, like making 
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modifications in air conditioning sets to attend market demands, as required by the sales 
company. The point to note here is that all those routines were being embedded (Granovetter 
1985) in the internal context of the ACD, which was having its broad characteristics chiefly 
defined by the Japanese managers in charge of the division. However, those Japanese 
managers, regardless their will , could not simple reproduce the Fujiworks style. The ACD is 
part of TCP, a company with its own history and structure. Moreover, TCP is a company 
located in the UK and mainly staffed with British people, with their own individual and 
collective views of the world. The internal context of the ACD is unmistakably related to the 
broader contexts of TCP and the society around it, and all its members are simultaneously 
influenced by and influencing those contexts (Giddens 1984, Whittington 1992). 
The technical side of the routines was not the subject of much contention; on the contrary, 
local people were usually happy with the opportunity of learning the new skills. On the other 
hand, the managerial side of the division would sometimes generate disagreement. In trying 
to implement managerial systems at the ACD, Japanese managers discovered that the most 
effective route was through previous discussion of ideas with British managers. There seems 
to be two main reasons for that. First, when defining general issues like duration of holidays 
or extra-time work, they had to put forward systems which would be acceptable for local 
workers, and sometimes these were contrary to Fujiworks systems. Second, in the everyday 
contact with their tean1s, communication was a clear problem for both sides. A face to face 
contact with a local manager resulted in an effective way of getting to know local practices. 
But, perhaps even more important, this sort of interaction allowed di scussion to occur and, as 
a consequence, adequate systems could be proposed . Face-to-face contact is the richest 
medium to convey information, greatly reducing equivocality (Daft and Huber 1987, Daft 
and Lengel 1984). Misperception, misinterpretation and misevaluation are usual 
characteristics of cross-cultural communication (Adler 1991) and frequent face-to-face 
contacts appears to be one of the best ways of reducing the occurrence of such problems. 
Two extra factors made communication specially difficult at that time. First, the Japanese had 
only been in the UK for a short period of time, and command of the idiom was still a 
problem. Second, the managerial systems were in the process of being defined and, therefore, 
were not yet codified. According to Boisot (1986) "uncodified information is generally more 
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difficult to transmit in other than face-to-face situation", which also gives support to the 
practice adopted at the ACD. 
For British managers involved in these close interactions with the Japanese, this was also a 
singular opportunity for understanding the latter' s managerial style. If the Japanese were 
becoming acquainted with local practices and adapting their style to the situation, these 
British managers were also being influenced by the style of the Japanese. Some of the quotes 
in the previous chapter clearly show this. In this way, definition of managerial systems in a 
cross-cultural environment was part of a process where influences from both sides were 
present, although the Japanese influence was larger due to their more powerful position, 
regarding to both hierarchy and technical knowledge. What is more, in the first years of the 
division, those systems were essentially dynamic, in the sense of being continually redefined 
by the actors involved, who were also redefining their own perspectives as a result of daily 
experience. Examples of this include: a) TCP's Managing Director expressed his perception 
about the Japanese being gradually more on the company's side against the parent company 
in Japan than they were originally; b) the ACD' s Assistant Managing Director mentioned hi s 
concern with potential conflicts with the headquarters in Japan as "they are thinking by 
Japanese only" (s ic); c) a British manager said that after working with the Japanese he 
learned that "if the organization is gonna survive and protect everybody, those people have 
rather got to be filled with work"; and d) reading the excerpt below from an interview with a 
Japanese senior manager: 
"Q. Do you think there are also personal differences in the way people work (between 
Japan and the UK)? 
A. Little, little difference. In Japan if a manager say "White" (showing something 
black), they (the subordinates) say "White". In the UK even if a manager say "Black is 
black", they don't agree. This is much different. 
Q. How do you adapt yourself to this difference? 
A. Now I became a little bit an English personality. I allow the opinion of the person and 
can wait the long time. In Japan I ask my colleague the answer in one day, in the UK 
basically within one week. And if I never hurry them, no answer, forever. In Japan, if I 
ask once they make that answer even if I don't push. That is a different culture. 
Q. What do you do here, do you push the people or do you wait? 
A. Sometimes l push, but little bit I became an Engli sh. 
Q. What do you think about this? 
A. Now I can't say which is better. Sometimes one is better, sometimes the other is 
better. This is nationality . 
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Q. When you return to Japan, do you think you could work in the same way that you 
work here or you would have to change back? 
A. I can not return back to the Japanese way, genuine Japanese, I think." 
With regard to what has been learned by TCP with the evolution of the second stage of the 
process, the main points are: a) the company is able to produce a number of models of air 
conditioners, attending different markets as Europe, where there are marked differences in 
climatic conditions among countries, and the Middle East; b) the company has expanded its 
product range much faster than it was initially planned, which demonstrates its technical 
evolution; c) workers at the ACD have adopted many Japanese practices like cleaning the 
shop floor and giving maintenance to the equipment they work with; d) workers keep 
continuously improving productivity through the activity of cross-functional groups, in what 
is called 'small groups activity'; and, e) local managers have increasingly assumed 
responsibility for tasks previously undertaken by the Japanese, in a step-by-step localization 
of management. 
Another dewonstration of learning is the notable improvement in cross-cultural 
communication, but it is difficult to tell whether that should be considered as organizational 
or exclusively individual learning. This improvement is clearly a result of time spent working 
together. On the one hand, it is possible to imagine that if the Japanese are replaced by other 
Japanese, the latter will probably face similar problems of adaptation in relation to language 
and customs as the former did, which supports the i11dividual learning hypothesis. On the 
other hand, looking at the pattern of the A VD, which has a longer history, it is possible to 
perceive that, although each Japanese who arrives indeed takes around one year to settle in 
his job, the division has already got used to such replacements and work continues without 
much disturbance. It is true that the number and influence of Japanese at the A VD is lesser 
than at the ACD and, indeed, one of the reasons for that is exactly the possible difficulties 
resulting from a large number of influential professionals being regularly replaced. But two 
characteristics of the A VD pattern can be interpreted as a resu lt of organizational learning. 
First is the perception of some Japa11ese that many British at the A VD, particularly the top 
managers, are good in dealing with the Japanese, letting them feel comfortable when they 
arrive in Plymouth and, as a consequence, facilitating their adaptation. Second is the 
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adaptation of the division to the regular replacement of Japanese through the very reduction 
of their influence in the everyday routines. Therefore, the improvement in cross-cultural 
communication can be interpreted as a combination of individual and organizational learning. 
Each new expatriate manager will inevitably have to go through a period of individual 
adaptation where individual learning plays the central role. But, at the san1e time, those who 
remain working at the company learn how to deal with new expatriate managers, and 
institutionalize ways for avo iding di sruption of work as much as possible. One of these ways 
is to leave to newcomers a ro le where they do not depend very heavily on oral 
communication with many people for undertaking their job. 
The conditions I see as being central fo r enabling organizational learning at TCP with the 
second stage of the process are di scussed below. 
Intention was present in all actions which led to the learning mentioned above. Even in the 
case of activities which were not originally planned, like the quick expansion of the product 
range or producing fo r the Middle East market, there was intention fro m managers to find 
ways fo r increasing the division' s revenues, and from workers to cope with the new demands. 
Intention does not necessarily imply advanced planning. It may refer only to the commitment 
to pursue an activity, even if this activ ity was triggered by an unexpected factor or the agent 
has no ful l awareness of its possible outcomes. The adoption of working practices which 
originated in Japan, like the small group activities, the daily cleaning of the working place 
and the maintenance of equipment by workers, also show intention from employees in 
collaborating with the requirements fro m management. Regarding the localization of 
management, both Japanese and Briti sh managers seem to be committed to the process. 
Openness and flex ibility were important fo r overcoming cultural differences. Whil st in the 
fi rst stage the onus of adaptation was essentially placed upon British members, in the second 
stage British and Japanese had to adapt to each other. As systems could not be simply 
imposed from the Fujiworks style, managers had to fi nd integrative solutions (Follett 1963) 
which would suit both the Japanese and Briti sh approaches. The objectives of understanding, 
redefining and improving working routines within a cross-cultural social setting created a 
new ' law of the situation' (Follet 1995) which required inputs fro m both cultures . Therefore, 
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openness relates to the development of the capacity for perceiving differences and flexibility 
relates to finding integrative solutions to these. These are characteristics which need to be 
present in both parties within a cross-cultural interaction and, moreover, need also to be 
reflexive. Quite frequently a person may be willing to perceive the other' s perspective, but 
unaware of his/her own behaviour, as this is usually considered as ' normal '. So, openness not 
only relates to perceiving the other but also to perceiving the self. 
Time appears to be very important for raising such cross-cultural awareness. In practically all 
interviews it was possible to perceive that it took time for people to improve cross-cultural 
interactions. This seems to be caused by the fact that people tend to behave in accordance 
with the patterns of their own culture. Changes in such behaviour are dependent on cross-
cultural awareness, and awareness is essentially linked to cognition. Thus, time appears to be 
an important ingredient for cognitive changes to occur. This conclusion again brings the 
discussion on individual and organizational learning, as with expatriates managers being 
regularly replaced, the newcomers would usually need time to adapt themselves to the cross-
cultural environment. It would be useful for organizations if they could improve the cross-
cultural awareness of their expatriate managers, so as they would need less time to adapt to 
the host country conditions. This is an issue that I shall return to in chapter nine when 
discussing implications of this study for practitioners. 
Time has also been important for the localization of management at the ACD. Two issues are 
relevant here. First, Japanese managers wanted to make sure that, besides learning technical 
issues related to air conditioner manufacturing, local managers would internalize the systems 
implemented at the ACD which, as explained before, are strongly based on Japanese 
managerial practices. That is the main reason why the company has sent some British 
managers to Japan to attend courses where the Japanese culture and the Toshiba organization 
are discussed . Second is what the Japanese managers call the age gap existing at the ACD. 
They reckon that it will probably be necessary for themselves or other Japanese managers to 
stay for quite a long time in line management positions at the ACD until the current 
engineers are experienced enough to assume managerial positions. Time would then be also 
important for preparing those engineers. The two issues just mentioned characterize the 
adoption of a gradual approach by the Japanese in relation to localization of management. 
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Cross-functional teamwork is present in the small groups activity. These groups usually work 
in productivity and/or quality improvement initiatives, which involve members from different 
sectors within the division. Each group chooses a problem to tackle and, most of the time, the 
solution involves sectors diffe rent from the one were the problem is most fe lt. For instance, 
assembl ing of parts can be made easier with some modifications in the design of an air 
conditioning set. Workers from the assembling sector would suggest the change and design 
engineers would evaluate its feas ibility and its impact on the set and also fo r the tasks of 
other sectors in the company . These cross-functional contacts have also yielded other benefits 
for the company in the fo rm of workers having better knowledge about the tasks of others, 
which makes coordination easier. Some interviewees observed that the relatively small size 
of the ACD and the fact that the whole division is located at the same building make such 
cross-functional contacts more frequent and also fac ilitate coordination. 
Autonomy has been given to workers who take part in the small groups activities fo r choosing 
the processes which will be targeted in those activities. On the other hand, control was 
exerted by managers at the start of the small group activity fo r making sure that workers 
would not propose changes in product content instead of manufacturing processes. After the 
obj ectives of the activity became clear to workers involved, such sort of managerial control 
was no longer necessary, as groups would only select fo r implementation suggestions which 
deal with improvements in processes. 
Autonomy has also been increasingly given to local managers and engineers to make 
decisions, as a step fo r localizing management. Japanese managers consistently mentioned 
their purposeful gradual withdrawal fro m a number of tasks they judge local managers to be 
ready to undertake. 
Leadership, mainly from the Assistant Managing Director ACD, has been an important factor 
fo r the growth of the ACD in its ini tial years. Mr Ninomiya was personally involved with the 
transference of responsibility for attending the Middle East market from Fujiworks to TCP, 
keeping the ACD fu ll with work in a moment where the European market was not good. His 
demanding style of leadership has decisively collaborated to put the growth of the division 
ahead of which was initially envisaged, accelerating the pace of learning within the ACD. 
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5.3 Establishing the Local Design Centres 
5.3.1 Triggers and Objectives 
The main triggers for the establishment of the local design centres at TCP, which were 
described at section 4.4.1 , are swnmarized below: 
a) the growth of the Japanese economy and the difficulties for Toshiba in finding enough 
design engineers in Japan; 
b) growing demand for sophisticated TVs, with higher profit margins, and the lack of design 
engineers who could be mainly dedicated to those models; 
c) appreciation of the yen, making: cl) salaries of Japanese engineers comparatively higher 
then in other countries, and c2) Japanese components increasingly expensive; 
d) local design could reduce production costs at TCP as product adaptation to local 
components could be made faster; 
e) TCP would be able to better attend its markets through faster modifications in products; 
f) TCP was facing problems with the Income Tax Authority in the UK regarding the 
payment of royalties and technical support to Japan which was being considered excessive 
by the Authority. 
The objectives initially set for the design department at the ACD were related to small 
modifications in the products in order to attend market demands, selection of local 
components to substitute imported ones, helping the manufacturing division with 
manufacturing problem-solving, and making any adaptations to the design of products which 
could result in cost savings for TCP. At the A VD, besides these objectives, the department 
has also developed some TV models , which are sent to Japan in order to be approved. 
Although the design activity has officially started around the same time in both divisions, at 
the A VD there were already some engineers working at design previously and, therefore, the 
division has a larger experience in design than the ACD. 
For the Japanese managers who head the design departments, training the young local 
engineers is one of their most important objectives. This task is viewed by them and by some 
top managers of TCP as fundamental for strengthening the engineering skills of a 
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manufacturing company. It is also regarded by the Japanese managers as a naturally slow 
process, taking between five to ten years for a graduated engineer to become a really good 
professional. The Japanese fear that the mobile labour market in the UK, when compared 
with Japan, can spoil their efforts, as an engineer may leave the company after few years, 
attracted by a better salary. In any case, the approach given to the development of engineers 
is for a gradual and slow process which, sometimes, disappoints the engineers who would 
prefer a more exciting perspective. 
5.3.2 Content of Learning and Enabling Conditions 
The establishment of local design has indeed resulted in strengthening the engineering skills 
at TCP. The objectives set for the design departments have been gradually achieved, with 
good prospects for expansion. However, the investments in equipment and personnel which 
have been made for enabling the design activity are considered high, particularly fo r the 
A VD, which is struggling with difficult market conditions. As a consequence, pressures 
mount on the design departments fo r producing results which should not only pay for the 
investments but actually represent cost savings fo r the company. As the design activity has 
basically started with recently-graduated engineers, it may take some years of training before 
they can consistently produce such results, despite having already implemented some 
changes which saved money for TCP. Therefore, a conflict between the short term results 
wanted by some managers and the long term perspective adopted through the policy of hiring 
recent-graduates can be perceived within TCP. 
With regard to what has been learned by TCP with the local design activity, the main points 
are: a) better technical knowledge about the sets which are modified or designed locally; b) 
competence for making design changes which have attended demands fro m the market, saved 
money fo r the company or made the manufacturing of the sets easier; c) competence fo r 
solving problems related to manufacturing, using knowledge achieved through design; and, 
d) formalization of knowledge through docwnentation of activities related to design, 
including tests of products and problems presented by products after being launched in the 
market. 
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The conditions I see as being central for enabling organizational learning at TCP through the 
process are discussed below. 
Intention relates to the commitment of Toshiba Japan and TCP in developing local design. 
This commitment is expressed through the investments made by the company in equipment 
and personnel; through the presence of Japanese design specialists as head of the design 
departments in both divisions; through the desire expressed by design engineers to undertake 
a larger number of tasks; and through the growing number of design activities actually shifted 
fro m Japan to Plymouth. 
Training has been given to local engineers, some times in Japan, but mostly on the job, in 
Plymouth. Training is usually an opportunity for transmission of codified or explicit 
knowledge, but on the job training can offer more than that, as the continuing contact and 
discussion between the trainer and the trainee within the working environn1ent also allow the 
sharing of tacit knowledge. The periods of training in Japan have offered both opportunities. 
Some engineers, particularly during the first year of local design, were sent to Japan for 
introductory training, whose content was largely related to an overview of their job. Others, 
or the same ones in a later period, have followed the later stages of development of a new 
model in Japan, with the objective of reproducing the same steps when the model is launched 
by TCP. This experience generally involves a few months stay in Japan, when the TCP 
engineer actually works with a Japanese team and has the opportunity of sharing the 
experiences of developing a new model. In Plymouth, on the job training involves not only 
technical but also organizational aspects of the design activity. Thus, the Japanese managers 
constantly emphasize the importance of issues like careful documentation, personal plarming 
of act ivities, and regular meetings with the whole team so that every member is informed 
about what the others are doing. The idea is to instil into the engineers both technical 
knowledge and a working style which is similar to that the managers are used to in Japan. 
Leadership from the Japanese managers has helped the development of the engineers. These 
managers have considerable experience and technical knowledge about the products each 
division produces, and are a reference for the engineers. The approach taken by managers of 
giving incentive to engineers for solving problems by themselves, together with support in 
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case they make mistakes is conducive to learning and enhancement of self confidence. It is a 
good example of learning by doing. 
Autonomy is considered by managers as an important characteristic of a good engineer. As 
was described in the previous chapter, engineers are always stimulated to develop and test 
their own ideas for problem-solving before asking the opinion of the manager. But Japanese 
managers still complain that local engineers usually wait for instructions before taking action, 
whereas they would rather prefer if engineers made their own decisions. It is important to 
perceive that this concept of autonomy does not mean isolation. On the contrary, it implies on 
awareness about the work of colleagues so that each individual can take action which benefits 
the whole. The idea that each individual should be a specialist in his job and only the 
manager should take care of integration is in frontal conflict with the concepts of the 
Japanese managers at TCP. For them, each individual is, above all, member of a team and, as 
such, should always be aware of the work of other members. Managers do coordinate, but at 
a higher level , giving guidelines for the work of the team. This is perhaps one of the cultural 
differences most strongly felt by Japanese managers, as some quotations in the previous 
chapter have shown. 
Autonomy also relates to a feeling expressed by some local members in relation to the 
headquarters in Japan. They would like TCP to be more independent technically from Japan, 
in the sense of, for instance, being able to develop its own TV models without having to send 
them to be approved in Japan. The desire for autonomy nurtures the motivation for learning 
amongst local members, so as to prove their trust worthiness and being allowed more 
autonomy. The development of local design would help in achieving such a position. 
However, local members know that any step in this direction must be approved by Japan. 
Thus, this sort of autonomy has to be constantly balanced with control, which is mainly 
exerted by the two Japanese who head the design departments in both divisions . Some local 
managers consider that the presence of these Japanese is important, amongst other reasons, to 
give to headquarters the necessary confidence in the development of the local operation. As 
the managers who are responsible for control are also responsible for local development, a 
natural path, as development grows, would be to ease control , which, in a sense would be a 
proof of successful local development. 
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Inexperience from the young engineers has made it easier for managers to shape the working 
environment within the design teams . There is no need for rntlearning. Thus, besides the 
capacity for quickly absorbing technical knowledge, as would be expected from recent-
graduates, organizational skills are also more easily learned as they do not conflict with any 
previous working experiences. A good example of this was given by an engineer at the ACD 
when he mentioned the plan-do-see cycle, which was also mentioned by the Japanese 
managers at the division, as something good he has learned in his job. 
Teamwork is a highly appreciated characteristic within the design departments. It has been 
always pushed by the Japanese managers as an important component of the job. Again, the 
working inexperience of young engineers appears to have facilitated the setting of a working 
style based on teamwork. Teamwork has been both a stage and an outcome of learning 
processes. It is a stage because many design activities depend on teamwork to be successful. 
Each new engineer who joins the design teams depend on the others to learn his job. Its is an 
outcome in itself, as engineers have to learn how to work in teams, being constantly 
reminded about that by managers. Practices like the weekly meetings where each member of 
the design teams relates to the others what he/she is doing aim exactly at fostering teamwork. 
The same can be said about the rotation of project leaders fo r introduction of new models. 
Codification is an important way for diffusing knowledge, making individual knowledge 
accessible to others. Within organizations, codification makes possible the transformation of 
individual knowledge into organizational knowledge. At TCP, the insistence from Japanese 
managers for engineers to write reports every time they face and solve a more complex 
problem is a way of codifying their knowledge and making it available to others . The 
Japanese managers consider this activity even more important due to their fear that an 
engineer may leave the company. If at least part of his/her knowledge is not registered in 
company files it would also leave the company with the individual. These fil es are then part 
of the organizational memory, whose content can be later retrieved by other members of the 
organization. Furthermore, the repeated act of writing reports and building the files 
constitutes a standard operating procedure, and is in itself part of the organizational memory 
(March and Simon 1958). 
134 
A gradual approach has been adopted by managers, particularly the Japanese, in relation to 
the design activity. The choice of hiring recent graduates and training them in design, 
although TCP already had some design engineers at the A VD, is a clear sign of such an 
approach. It appears to have been adopted both because of the relevance of design for TCP 
and the desire from Toshiba to keep tight control over the activity. Both reasons justify the 
intention of having professionals fully trained within the company, according to its technical 
and organizational standards. A gradual approach is directly related with the use of time. Like 
the second stage of the establishment of the ACD, learning here is also dependent on 
cognitive understanding, which usually takes time to occur. This is true for the technical 
content of the design activity and even more important for the organizational routines. As I 
indicated earlier in the chapter, such an approach may create a conflict between managers and 
engineers as the latter, after few years of work, tend to desire a faster career development 
than they have within the company. It is interesting to perceive that the gradual approach for 
developing the design activity is simultaneously responsible for the hiring of recent-graduates 
and the possibility of conflict between them and their managers. It would be interesting to 
follow the development of the design activity within TCP to see how this latent conflict 
evolves. 
5.4 Enabling Conditions for Organizational Learning: a general view 
over the processes studied 
Table 5.1 presents the enabling conditions for organizational learning I have identified in the 
processes studied at TCP. The two processes have in common the fact that both relate to the 




Enabling Conditions for Organizational Learning 
in the Processes Studied at TCP 
Enabling Conditions for Establishment of the Air Establishment of 
Organizational Learning Conditioner Division Local Design 
First Stage Second Stage 
Intention X X X 
Leadership X X 
Training X X 
Unlearning X 
Openness X X 
Flexibility X X 
Lack of time X 
Time X X 
Gradual approach X X 
Cross-functional teamwork X 
Teamwork X 
Autonomy X X 
Control X X X 




The division of the establishment of the ACD in two stages seems appropriate since quite a 
few conditions present in one stage are not present in the other. This appears to be related to 
the different objectives for learning in each stage. In the first stage, the obj ective was mainly 
to reproduce the procedures for manufacturing air conditioners. The presence of codified 
knowledge which could be immediately transmitted through tra ining was essential for 
accomplishing the objective within the schedule proposed. The tight schedule resulted in lack 
of time and, as a consequence, pressure for reproducing the routines regardless of the level 
comprehension people had about them. 
Training usually aims at enabling comprehension, essentially bringing cognitive change 
before action. However, the combination of training and lack of time may result in scarce 
comprehension before action. In such situation, although training can provide a base for 
reproducing routines, it is in action that people really develop their understanding of them. 
An example of this was given by an ACD design engineer who had been trained in Japan 
immediately after joining TCP. After few years in the job he to ld me he would like to go 
back to Japan and this time ask ' good questions to them' . 
For achieving the objectives of the first stage, openness and flexibility by the British and 
cod ified knowledge and control by the Japanese appear to be the most relevant conditions. 
The characteristics of the second stage were, however, more similar to the characteristics of 
the establishment of local design, involving the development of a working re lati onship 
between British and Japanese, and the definition of organizational routines. Indeed, there are 
a larger number of common enabling conditions between the second stage and the 
establishment of local design than between any of these two and the first stage. Leadership 
was probably more relevant due to the longer time scale, which increases the importance of 
setting directions. 
Time is a condition present in all three colwnns of Table 5. 1, although in the first stage it is 
in the form of lack of time, and, in the other two columns in an opposite form , which I called 
simply time. This apparent contradiction can be explained by the fact that whi lst in the 
former the desired results of learning were essentially behavioural, in the latter cognitive 
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understanding was an important part of the learning process and, as I already pointed in this 
chapter, time seems to be essential for that. 
Autonomy is also a condition present in these two processes. It seems reasonable to suppose 
links between autonomy and time, in the sense that the endless character of some of the 
objectives of these processes, like improvements in both routines and design, leads to the 
necessity of allowing people involved to benefit from both time and autonomy, in order to 
achieve these objectives. 
Other common condition between the second stage of the establishment of the ACD and local 
design is teamwork, cross-functional in the case of the former, and within the department in 
the later. Both in the small groups activities and in the design departments teamwork help to 
improve coordination of activities. By stimulating discussion and problem-solving, teamwork 
is an essential condition for organizational learning. It allows both creation and acquisition of 
knowledge, as solutions for problem can be created during discussion or a team member can 
provide a solution for a problem another member is facing. Thus, teamwork can enable all 
four modes of knowledge conversion suggested by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995): a) 
socialization, from tacit to tacit knowledge, when one team member show another one how 
perform a task, even if can not explain it in words; b) externalization, from tacit to explicit 
knowledge, when a team member explain to another how to solve a problem; c) combination, 
from explicit to explicit knowledge, when two team members discuss their views over a 
problem and propose a joint solution to it; and d) internalization, from explicit to tacit 
knowledge, when a tean1 member takes a suggestion given by another member and applies it 
to his tasks. 
Intention and control are present in all processes. Although most of the strategic decisions for 
TCP are made in Japan, and that was the case for both processes studied, after the decisions 
were made clear, objectives were set, and in some cases expanded during the process. So, 
intention to achieve the objectives was always present, and it seems to have existed in all 
staff involved with the processes. Control is the other side of the coin, an activity perforn1ed 
to measure the practical achievement of objectives. Control is also related with the presence 
of autonomy, establishing boundaries to it. 
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Unlearning in the first stage of the establishment of the ACD and inexperience of design 
engineers are contrasting conditions which can be interpreted as different adjustments of 
agency in relation to structure. When historical circumstances heavily influenced the decision 
for estab lishing the ACD in Plymouth and employing workers from the previous MWOD, 
unlearning became a condition for organizational learning to occur, although it was not 
problematic for reasons already discussed . Even fac ing such structural constraints, managers 
acted to shape the internal structure of the ACD according to the objectives set for the 
operation. One such action was the redistribution of previous MWOD personnel in the 
various functions within the ACD. In the case of local design, having more freedom to act, 
managers have opted for hiring inexperienced engineers, which made unlearning 
unnecessary. 
Finally, in the second stage of the establ ishment of the ACD, mutual openness and flexibility 
were important conditions for faci litating cross-cultural integration. Communication seems to 
be the main cause for difficulties in cross-cultural interaction, and time and frequent face to 
face contacts the most effective ingredients for overcoming those difficulties. However, those 
two ingredients are not sufficient, being dependent of openness and flex ibili ty for yielding 
good results. Openness and flexibility are personal characteristics, but companies can both try 
to assign managers with such characteristics for foreign posts and foster the development of 
those characteristics in managers. Raising awareness of cross-cultural differences seems to be 
an important step in fostering that development. 
5.5 Overcoming Inter-Divisional Conflicts 
One last issue deserving discussion in this chapter is the existence of conflicts between 
managers of the two divis ions at TCP. Although this was not a subject of any specific 
investigation, it became quite clear during the interviews related to the establishment of the 
ACD. The relevance of the issue for this thesis is the potential barrier for organizational 
learning that it represents. The more the conflict grows, the more difficult it will be to 
139 
integrate the two divisions in the sense of sharing managerial experiences which can be 
usefu l for each one and for TCP as a whole. 
The main problems seem to be related to the absence at the ACD of managers who are 
members of the division ' s Board but are based at the AVD . It appears that these managers 
have difficulties in accepting the forceful managerial style of the Assistant Managing 
Director ACD and have opted for being absent from the ACD management until he is 
replaced by another Japanese who, they hope, will be more tractable. However, two problems 
arise from this attitude. First, managers at the ACD feel let down by the absence of the A VD 
managers, as if the latter are not rea lly interested in the ACD business despite occupying 
Board positions. Thus, regardless of the replacement of the Assistant Managing Director, the 
former are already forming an unfavourable opinion on the attitude of the latter. This may 
well develop in a strong resistance against any participation from the A VD managers in a 
later stage. The confl ict is resulting in the development of a ' divisional identity' at the ACD, 
which takes the place of an organizational identity. People at the ACD may well see their 
colleagues of the A VD as an outs ide group, which can hinder the development of 
organizational learning. 
Second, the attitude from the A VD managers is based on the previous situation of the 
MWOD, when its Assistant Managing Director behaved as a subordinate of the Ass istant 
Managing Director A VD. But in the world wide Toshiba organization, the air conditioner 
business is attached to a different division than the television business and, therefore, it is 
quite reasonable that managers coming to that division will not feel subordinated to managers 
from the television division. Thus, the next Assistant Managing Director ACD may have a 
softer style than the cwTent one, but sti ll not behave as a subordinate to the A VD. 
The question then appears to require an unlearning process for the A VD managers, who have 
to face the new reality of TCP. That will probably mean a more constant presence of those 
managers at the ACD so as to be better acquainted with the business. Although the TV and 
the air conditioner businesses are quite different, TCP is a single company which should take 
advantage from managerial experiences from both divisions. 
140 
At the end of this discussion I should address the secondary research question present in 
Chapter I and indicate whether the processes studied fostered the development or 
improvement of any organizational capability at TCP. The answer clearly appears to be yes. 
With the establishment of the ACD, TCP is now able to manufacture air conditioners. The 
expansion of the product line ahead of the initial schedule is an evidence of the technical 
competence achieved by TCP. The fact that the ACD-TCP is one of the first Japanese 
manufacturers of air conditioners to be established in Europe is regarded by its managers as 
an advantage over competitors. The company has already accumulated some important 
knowledge about the European market and established a local network of suppliers, being 
better positioned to attend the market than competitors who export their products from Asia, 
or have installed a manufacturing unit in Europe after Toshiba. 
The establi shment of the local design centres in both divisions of TCP has allowed the 
company a better and faster understanding of the European market requirements. Product 
adaptation is now made much faster than before, because of the proximity between design 
and both manufacture and market. TCP has already saved money through product 
modifications introduced by the local design teams and, with the passing of time and 
acquisition of experience by the local engineers, the benefits are expected to grow. 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented a discussion of the two processes occurring at TCP and described 
in the previous chapter. The objective has been to identify the main triggers and objectives of 
the processes, and to discuss the main conditions which have enabled the occurrence of 
organizational learning within the company. The conclusion has been that TCP has 
successfull y achieved the objectives set for each process, although they are still in the course 
of development. 
The main difficulties identified for the occurrence of organizational learning are related to 
cross-cultural adaptation, with communication being particularly problematic. As a process 
essentially related to individuals, difficulties may have a resurgent character as Japanese 
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managers are continuously replaced. Managers from both nationalities appear to be aware of 
such risks and have tried to institutionalize ways for reducing the difficulties, notably by 
setting localization of management as a priority for the division and by placing a local 
manager in constant contact with each Japanese manager as a way to facilitate 
communication. 
Inter-divisional conflicts are evident and present a latent problem for the management of the 
company. Such conflicts can endanger the development of learning at company level and 
should be dealt with sooner rather than later. As the ACD settles in its development, 
integration of the two divisions may become an important way of building managerial 
capabilities for TCP as a whole. The opposite route, letting the conflict escalate, even in a 
latent stage, may divide the company and result in large management efforts being wasted in 
internal conflict settling. Moreover, the stronger the negative feelings are, the more difficult it 





This chapter describes the processes of change which occurred during the last few years at 
Semp Toshiba. The first section presents a brief history of the company and some recent 
developments in the consumer electronics industry in Brazil. The second section gives an 
account of the main values and characteristics of the company, as viewed by its managers. 
The third section describes the development and implementation of three related processes: a 
quality prograrnme, a stock reduction initiative and changes on the assembly line. These three 
processes have had as a consequence an increase in the productivity level of the company. 
The fourth section describes the process of change in the commercialization policy of the 
company. All the fo llowing description is based on the interpretation of the interviewed 
managers about these developments. 
6.1 Background 
6.1.1 History of the Company 
Semp was founded in 1942 in the city of Sao Paulo with the objective of importing radios to 
Brazil and providing technical maintenance for them. At that time, there were a considerable 
number of such companies in Brazil, then called "commercial importers", which used to 
provide the same service as Semp, for different ranges of products. By the end of the l 940 's, 
Semp was the main supplier of radios to the Brazilian market. 
In 1951 , Semp produced the first Brazilian television set (TV). Following a strategy of 
vertical integration of its production line, by the end of the 1950's Semp was manufacturing 
80% of all parts for its TVs. Until the end of the following decade there was only a small 
number of television producers in Brazil, both national and multinational companies. With 
the advent of colour television and the rising of standards of living in the country in the early 
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1970's, a larger number of multinational companies started to produce TVs in Brazil. In 
1972, Semp moved most of its manufacturing plant from Sao Paulo to Manaus, which is 
located in the Northwest region of Brazil , 4000 kilometres from Sao Paulo. The objective 
was to take advantage of a government scheme which aims at promoting the industrial 
development of the region, by allowing companies located in Mana us to pay lower taxes and 
also to import components for their production lines at lower customs tariffs than in other 
regions of the country. 
In 1975, perceiving the increased difficulty of being successful in a more competitive market, 
Semp' s president, Mr Afonso Henne!, son of the company' s f0tmder, decided to open 
negotiations with foreign companies which could provide technology for Semp. Such 
negotiations were inspired by two basic principles : 1) the company did not want to buy 
technology in a one-off agreement; and 2) the company did not want to spend money to have 
access to the technology. The second condition opened the door for the fo rmation of a joint 
venture, where the foreign company would become a partner in the ownership of Semp. 
Semp contacted mainly large Japanese companies, Matsushita, Hitachi and Toshiba amongst 
others, which already were its suppliers, but were not yet producing TVs in Brazil. 
In 1977 an agreement was formali zed between Semp and Toshiba. Following this agreement, 
Toshiba acquired a stake in Semp by investing in the company two thirds of the amount of 
capital already invested by Semp. The company was renan1ed as Semp Toshiba SA, having 
Semp as the major partner, with 60% of the shares, and Toshiba as the minor, with 40%. Of 
the Semp shares, almost all belong to Semp Toshiba's president, Mr Afonso Henne!, which 
gives him legal control of the company with more than 50% of the shares. 
Semp Toshiba initially aimed to compete in the same markets as Semp, that is, TVs and 
audio equipment, although the agreement had given Semp Toshiba exclusivity over the 
introduction of any of Toshiba's consumer products into the Brazilian market. According to 
Mr Afonso Henne!, the management of the company, both in the technical and the 
administrative areas, was initia lly shared between the partners. But both partners soon 
perceived that the Brazilian market had such specific characteristics that foreign managers 
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would need a long period of adaptation before being able to work efficiently. Mr Henne! 
explains what then followed: 
" So, our admin istration has predominated, because we've got a system of open books 
with Toshiba, they have the access, there is no problem, everything we do is perfectly 
access ible to their knowledge. So, we ended up managing the company in the same way 
we used to do before. And indeed, that has been very good because each one of us, in 
assoc iative terms, each company, has offered what it has of best to offer. Toshiba had a 
large technological experience, we had experience in the market and also in technical 
maintenance, reasonab le manufacturing processes and a very good managerial 
experience." 
Concerning the presence of Toshiba personnel at Semp Toshiba, at the top level there have 
always been two directors from Toshiba. This is part of the joint venture agreement. One is a 
Vice-president, who is the leading Toshiba representative at Semp Toshiba and is responsible 
for a liaison ro le with Toshiba Japan on matters related to the general management of the 
company and also the sourcing of Toshiba components to Semp Toshiba's production line. 
The other is the Technical Director, who is responsible for assuri ng the technical standards of 
Semp Toshiba ' s products. In the first few years after the start of the joint venture, there were 
approximately ten technical staff from Toshiba Japan working at Semp Toshiba, mainl y 
electrical and mechanical engineers specializing either in television or audio equipment. They 
were responsible for transferring technologies related to assembling and testing the products. 
In the case of TVs, there was also the necessity of adapting to the Brazilian broadcasting 
standard, which was done jointly with Brazi lian engineers. 
The Japanese engineers would stay in Brazil for a period of three and a half years on average, 
being then replaced by other Japanese engineers. Their number remained about the same, ten 
people, tmtil the end of the 1980' s, when Toshiba decided to stop producing audio equipment 
world-wide. As a result of that decision aud io engineers who used to work at Semp Toshiba 
went back to Japan. Toshiba also suggested to its Brazilian partner that Semp Toshiba should 
stop production of audio equipment in Brazil. However, as Semp had a solid tradition and a 
good share of the Brazilian market, the final decision was for Semp Toshiba to conti nue with 
this product line. Also at the end of the l 980's, Semp Toshiba introduced video cassette 
recorders (VCRs) into its product range. 
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Since the beginning of the I 990' s the number of Japanese staff at Semp Toshiba has been 
reduced even further. Besides being very expensive to pay for their salaries, the company 
reached the conclusion that, after 13 years of joint venture, the Brazilian staff had enough 
expertise to handle the functions previously executed by the Japanese. As a consequence, in 
addition to two directors, the company has today only one Japanese engineer left, who heads 
the TV development sector. On the other hand, every time that a new product is launched or a 
new technology is introduced, some members of the Brazilian staff are trained either by 
going to Japan or by Japanese engineers who go to Brazil. 
The top managers of the company visit Toshiba at least once a year. In those visits, the 
Brazilian Vice President, who is responsible for marketing, usually looks for new products 
that might be launched in Brazil. The Industrial Director, sometimes together with the 
Industrial Manager of the Manaus plant, usually visits Toshiba assembly plants in several 
countries. The objective is to look fo r industrial processes which might be applied at the 
Manaus plant. Semp Toshiba' s President, during his visits, usually discusses strategic issues 
of the Brazilian operation and seeks to strengthen the relationship between the partners. In 
the same way, senior managers of Toshiba frequently visit the joint venture in Brazil. These 
visits have facilitated the w1derstanding and the building of trust between the partners and, as 
a consequence, made the flow of information between the companies easier. The fact that 
Semp Toshiba has made a profit in seventeen out of eighteen years of its operation has 
undoubtedly helped to generate a climate of mutual goodwi ll between the partners . 
6.1.2 Recent Developments 
In I 990, the then recently elected Brazilian government decided to stimulate competition in 
certain sectors of the economy through a programme of gradual lowering of import taxes. In 
some sectors, despite the presence of a large number of internal producers, the product 
technology was generally far behind international standards and production costs were high. 
That was the case with audio equipment. As a consequence, in a period of only eighteen 
months, this market was 'invaded' by imported products, which were of better quality and of 
the same price or even cheaper than their Brazilian equivalents. With the withdrawal of 
Toshiba from this sector, Semp Toshiba had to resort to producers from other countries, 
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mainly Asian, as a source of product technology. Other Brazilian producers were not so agile 
and had to shut down their operations. 
In the case of TVs, there were more variables attached to the issue. On the one hand, the 
product technology was not so far behind average international standards, as was the case of 
audio equipment. On the other hand, despite the existence of both a large number of 
producers and fierce competition among them, production costs were still very high, again 
compared to international standards. Although the size of the product and its weight makes it 
costly to external producers to export them to Brazil, the differences in production costs 
could make that business attractive for them. Thus, there has also been a real threat for TV 
producers in Brazil, which has forced them to squeeze their cost structures. 
In the last three years Semp Toshiba has introduced a new line of products, which is called 
"office automation" by the company. These comprise fax, cordless telephones and cellular 
telephones. There is a plan to introduce notebook computers shortly. All products in this line 
are produced abroad by Toshiba and shipped to Brazil for assembly. Hence the introduction 
of this product line did not require any Japanese engineer to work at Semp Toshiba. Today, 
there are only three employees of Toshiba Japan working at Semp Toshiba. They are: a vice-
president, a technical director and a technical adviser on TV production. 
To sum up, since the begirming of the 1990's, two important competitive pressures were put 
on Semp Toshiba and other companies in the consumer electronics sector in Brazil. One was 
to reduce production costs to match, in the first stage, external competitors and, at the second 
stage, internal competitors which, by trying to match companies abroad, set new internal 
standards. The second pressure was related to the levels of product technology. The 
' invasion' of imported products has sharply raised the standards expected by consumers. An 
image of latest technology, associated with high quality, has increasingly become a 
requirement for the commercial success of products. It is against this background that the 
two processes that will be later described in this chapter have developed. To conclude this 
section, Figure 6.1 present an organizational chart of Semp Toshiba. 
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6.2 Values and Characteristics of the Company 
Before describing the two processes, an account of how the interviewees defined the main 
values and characteristics of the company will be given. As was explained in Chapter 3, the 
objective of such account is to help to situate the interviewees' descriptions of the processes. 
The company value most frequently and strongly emphasized by the interviewees was profit 
making. It is evident in the interviews that managers who work at Semp Toshiba have this 
value ever present in the ir minds. From the president, 
"Our objective here is to produce profit. We are a company which puts emphas is and 
priori ty on the results. We are running after results. And we try to make that our 
employees imbue themselves with such objective, reaching efficiency levels as high as 
possible.", 
to the Industrial Director, 
"Look, the objective of the company has never changed, it 's to make money. This is our 
obj ective, it' s not to make TVs, it ' s not to give employment, our objective is to make 
money. This is what we have to do, what has always been and I think it will continue to 
be.", 
to the Materials Manager, 
"So that's it, we have to understand in a company, its strongest point must be its clear 
objectives, but clear objectives mean macro objectives, and nobody has any doubts 
whatsoever within this company that it is here to make a profit, it needs to make a profit. 
And each department needs to keep in mind that they are a profit centre and not a costs 
centre.", 
to the N ational Purchasing Manager, 
"To make money. The president is around, and when we fee l it in the pocket things 
change a bit. You are not go ing to give an account to a holding company, you are go ing 
to give it to Mr Afonso Henne!, who is there and wants to know why you didn ' t do it and 
when you are go ing to do it.", 
to the Sales General Manager, who has been in the company fo r seventeen years, 
"This company always worked to make profits, it always demanded a bit more from us 
in order to make a profit" . 
Perhaps one factor which reinfo rces this value is that Semp Toshiba adopts a reward policy 
where part of the salary of each employee is related to the results of the company. Thus, if the 
company makes a profit , salaries go up, but if it makes a loss, salaries also go down. 
149 
Amongst other values that were also frequently mentioned, there are three which are both 
related to each other and to profit making. They are: a strong work ethic, attainment of results 
and being highly competitive. The passages below give an example of how such values are 
ingrained in the managers minds: 
"The company has a very lean structure, it is like a football game, there is a man to man 
marking, so you ' ve got to do everything rightly, I think that is a good definition .. .. The 
Industrial Director has a mentality towards being always looki ng at what the larger 
companies are doing. He gives you freedom to work, and that is good because his 
demands are very strong. ( ... ) The important thing is to ga in market share, be 
competitive." (National Purchasing Manager) 
"You must not try to have too many activities out of work because, at the end of the day, 
we dedicate more than the normal working hours to the company. ( ... ) For the company, 
the important thing is keep itse lf well placed in the market, managing at least to keep its 
position in the market." (Industrial Engineering Manager) 
"This is a company where, essentially, you work a lot. ... You have the poss ibility, as the 
structure is extremely lean, to better perceive this causal relationsh ip between your 
performance and the results, but, on the other hand, you've got the on us of hav ing to 
give a direct account of the results because you are responsible for your resu lt. ... there is 
no way of say ing ' It was not poss ible ', and also it is not our function to say ' It was not 
poss ible because of such and such ', it has to be poss ible. Here, there is no poss ibility of 
being a bit different, either you are or you are not, because the company is clearly 
defined for one side.( ... ) Continuity, to keep present in the market, to keep its market 
share, to attain results." (Office Automation Sales Manager, who has been in the 
company for two years) 
" the difference of the people who are successful in this company is that they never have 
limited themselves to knowing only the information that they need for carrying out their 
activities. . if you want to be successfu l you've got to do what the company wants, that 
is to say, it is like there are I 0, 12 presidents within thi s company, we think like he 
thinks, or like our director, who thinks like our president does . .. . we are people who 
'wear the shiri of the company', people who live anxious, people who take their 
prob lems back home, so th is is what happens here. I am one of such people, I really like 
the company." (Sa les Genera l Manager) 
"(here) you take the corner, you run into the box, you head the ball and you score the 
goal. You understand? It ' s a very high degree of ded ication." (Promotions Manager) 
"This company is a highly competitive one, a company ready to face challenges and 
prepared to face them ." ( Industrial Director) 
"one has to maximally avoid to be a burden for the tasks of the others .... So that is what 
I would like my employees to know. You ' ve got to arrive on time, and leave when it is 
poss ible to leave, but arrive on time." (President) 
But in an interesting balance, another value which was mentioned was cautiousness, mainly 
in relation to the external environment. 
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"Every time that we face a problem, the first thing that we try to do is identify the 
position on the other side and to elect, within that position, what must be respected for a 
good solution of the problem ." (President) 
"Our pres ident always tell s us: never promise what you can't do, it is not your image 
that you are damaging, it is that of your company. .. so that is the way we have been 
working, the company has forecasts but cautious forecasts. I actually think that many 
times we did not earn much more for not being so daring, but, on the other hand, we also 
loose much less because we make fewer mistakes, we grow slowly but we grow we ll , 
with a firm foot. ... Some times, at heart we did not agree in loosi ng that deal , but it 
seems that something was worked inside our minds saying ' no, you can't do that', and 
we did not make the deal." (Sales General Manager) 
Such impress ion is shared by the Japanese Technical Director. When asked about what he 
thinks that the company does well , he said ' investment' , but praising the cautiousness of the 
president on making such decisions. 
"Last year other companies made a lot of investment, Semp Toshiba very few, but now 
it is very easy to make investments. He - the president - has a good opinion fo r 
investment, our company. For example, when there is a big inflation - as it was the case 
in the previous year - we cannot make huge investments." (Technical Director) 
Whilst people who work in different areas of the company mentioned simi lar va lues, the 
characteristics of the company seem to be defined by the interviewees from the standpoint of 
their functional positions . As an example of that, managers who work at the 
Commercialization Division emphasized the good relationship that Semp Toshiba has with 
its c lients as one of its most important characteristics. Such relationship has helped the 
company to sell its products despite sharp fluctuations occurred in the market. 
"(one thing that we do well is) this level of relationship that we manage to keep with our 
retailers, a commercial relationship which has al lowed us, in some specific 
circumstances, to minimize hurdles which cou ld surge up on our path. The level of 
confl ict tends to become very small as fu nction of such relationship." (Sales Promotions 
Manager) 
"Our sa les give us a lot of work but I think the company does it we ll . So, what the 
company does well is its products and, I' ll te ll you again , this relationship with the 
retailers. Now, this took many years to nurture, you have to create trust. How many 
times I told ' no' and the chap (the retailer) became angry but I kept the no .... The chap 
becomes angry with me in that moment but, indeed, at the end of the day he feels that 
we are really a serious company." (Sa les General Manager) 
For the managers who work at the Industrial and Technical departments and, therefore, are 
more directly related with the internal environment of the company, the characteristics which 
were most frequently regarded as important were its lean structure, fast implementation of 
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decisions and clearly defined obj ectives. The lean structure was already mentioned in some 
passages above, as it ties up with the work ethic existent in the company. It is a lso linked to 
fast implementation of decisions, as the former helps the latter. The fo llowing tlu-ee passages 
exempli fy such perception: 
" it is a very fast company, it ' s a company which has a broad vision of the market, we 
launch what the market needs, we fo llow quickly .... The pres ident, together with the 
board, define and quickly the next level , which are the managers, knows what is the 
position. We fo llow directly in the meetings, each one takes his slice and sta rts working 
towards the objectives of the company .... The responsibilities are clearly defined. And 
more, people have freedom to work. If you have a project, you can ask in any sector of 
the company, ask whoever you want for finding out about the issue." (Logist ics 
Manager) 
"we are assessed by our performance in relation to an objective, it 's painful but you 
know that. To work by objectives is painful because they day will come, the day when 
you ' ve got to give an account, and on that day there are no excuses." (National 
Purchasing Manager) 
" this is a owner' s company, it's not something like the owner is away. The objectives 
are always clear ly defined, there are no doubts about where we want to arri ve. So, it ' s a 
company which is willing to, which sets its plans and is wi lling to accomplish them , 
bear in mind the level of accomplishment or our objectives. Last year it was 99.9%." 
(Industrial Director) 
However, the Japanese Technical Director made some observations related to the 
centra lization of the decision-making process and how that can y ield different o utcomes. 
"decision-making is fast, but if the director is busy decisions can be much delayed. 
That' s the opposite, isn' t it? Other people cannot decide everything ... few people can 
make decisions, the majority can ' t. In Japan dec ision-making is divided. More 
important decisions, more important people have to make them, but small items have to 
be divided in order to get more detailed analysis." (Technical Director) 
6.3 Increasing Productivity 
There has been an increase in productivity at Semp Toshiba in the last few years which is 
closely related to the development and implementation of a quality progranu-ne, a stock 
reduction progran1me and changes in the organization of the assembly line. These tlu-ee sub-
processes were implemented at the same time and are intertwined in both their development 
and consequences. 
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6.3.1 The Immediate Context 
In the late l 980's, inflation in Brazil was absolutely out of control, reaching a peak of 80% a 
month in February 1990. The ational Purchasing Manager explains one of the impacts of 
this on the company: 
"We had a terrible inflation and were obliged to keep high levels of stocks due to 
insecurity in relation to our suppliers. Thus, we had to add that cost to the final cost of 
products because the cost of money was very high." 
Another consequence of high inflation for the company was the necessity of holding monthly 
price negotiations with each one of its suppliers. Those negotiations also represented a 
substantial overhead cost to the company' s products. On the top of that, smuggling, mainly of 
VCRs produced in Asia and entering Brazil through the border with Paraguay, was also 
representing a threat for internal producers in general. What had started as a relatively small 
quantity of VCR sets, was rapidly growing in number, because, as they did not pay any taxes, 
their price was much lower than their Brazilian equivalents. 
In March 19~0, the recently elected Brazilian government introduced an economic plan 
aimed at cutting the inflation rate. One of the measures of the plan was to drastically reduce 
the amount of currency in circulation by blocking the access for both individuals and 
companies to any amount in excess of US$ l ,000.00 in their bank accounts. The consequence 
of such measure was a strong reduction of conswner expenditure. Companies faced recession 
during the fo llowing two years. At the same time, the government annotmced the gradual 
lowering of import taxes for products in many industries, creating pressure for companies in 
Brazil to reduce their production costs. Moreover, by allowing such imported products to 
compete in the Brazilian market, the government wanted to push Brazilian companies into 
improving the quality of their products. 
Some industries, like semiconductors, were just too far behind international standards to be 
able to compete, even with high impor1 taxes. This particular industry was dominated by 
multinational companies which, operating in a closed local market, had not made investments 
in the previous ten years. Companies like Semp Toshiba stai1ed to import those components 
directly from international sources, with prices being about half or even one third of those 
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charged by the companies located in Brazil. Frequently, those international sources were 
companies which were also operating in Brazil. As a result, tl10se companies. in their great 
majority, decided to shut down their local operations and continue to make tl1eir money 
through selling from abroad. 
In other industries however, either imports were not so competitive, or there were also local 
companies which did not have the option of producing from abroad. For many companies. 
the response to the new environment was to engage in quality and productivity progran1mes 
and Semp Toshiba was no different in this respect. The pressure for cost reduction in its 
audio equipment line was really bard. The Industrial Engineering Manager talks about their 
worries at that time: 
" What did we have to do? We had to manage, in one way or another, to try to lower our 
costs, otherwise we would loose that market share. that was common sense amongst 
ourselves. We had many meetings for a long period of time, the committee basically 
would discuss cost reduction. ' How much is our cost and how much is a similar 
imported product?' So that was a parameter that we knew, the difference between what 
we were doing and where we needed to arrive. Thus, there was a consensus amongst 
ourselves, because the government was lowering the import tariff, so we knew that no, 
it would he 20%, for instance, at that time it was higher. '· 
Internally, the Industrial Director had left the company in 1989. After a period of around six 
months without a Director, the President of the company invited his brother-in-law, Mr 
Sergio Loeb, to assume the post. Mr Loeb was then working as Industrial Director at an auto 
parts company. He remembers the way things were at Semp Toshiba when be first came: 
"When we arrived at the company it was going through a very difficult period on management 
terms. On financial and direction terms there has never been a problem, but in management 
yes . The previous occupant of the post had left and it had not been possible to substitute him, 
to ensure the continuity of activities. So, there was a vacuum for six months which was 
sufficient to mess up the company's structure a bit and leave it without a clear direction on the 
industrial side. When I was appointed, the President established the objective of getting the 
train back on the rails, and that meant to produce the best possible product, with the best 
qua lity level and at the lowest cost. As I had the previous experience from the automotive 
industry, where the concepts which were introduced here were already deeply settled, what it 
was done was to transplant those concepts to this company." 
The concept be is talking about is total quality management. According to Mr Loeb, be had 
such objective in mind since be started working in the company, therefore prior to the 
government ' s economic plan, but he did not tell that to his subordinates because he thought 
they would not understand it. His strategy was to go step by step, promoting change 
gradually. He defines his first two years in the company as a period of ' mutual 
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acquaintanceship ' , of adapting the company to a new reality, of starting to reduce the level of 
stocks. 
6.3.2 The Quality Programme 
In the early 1990' s, Semp Toshiba used to produce a broad range of models, both in its TV 
and audio equipment lines. The idea was to be present in every segment of the market. There 
was no real concern about standardization of components an1ongst different products. Thus, 
with such a large number of models and components, the company used to have around 400 
different suppliers of parts. In its manufacturing plant in Manaus, production was scheduled 
to run a single monthly batch for each product. The stocks of components used to range 
between 30 and 50 days, for components produced in Brazil , and 2 months for imported 
parts. Even so, lack of control over the stock meant that the production line would frequently 
stop due to lack of some components. 
In order to meet the President' s demands, Mr Loeb planned to introduce a quality programme 
at both Semp Toshiba and its suppliers. He set up an internal committee which would be 
responsible for that programme. The committee was jointly headed by the Quality Manager, 
who was used to dealing with internal quality issues, and the National Purchasing Manager, 
who was used to dealing with suppliers. The conunittee decided to divide the task by creating 
two separated programmes, one aimed at Semp Toshiba and the other aimed at suppliers. 
Inside the company, the conunittee created two tasks forces, one in Sao Paulo and one in 
Manaus. Each task force was divided into small groups, each one composed of one 
representative from each area involved in the process which would be subject to the quality 
programme. Those processes were defined by the company according to specifications of the 
quality standard ISO9000. 
The members of the committee started their work by visiting other companies which already 
had implemented the standard, bringing people from outside to give training and lectures to 
the members of the task forces , making a film about a quality progranune, and hiring a 
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consultant on quality. The ational Purchasing Manager explains the objectives of such 
actions: 
"All those things to motivate the people, because we were changing everyth ing we had 
made until then. We had fear of throwing away the old and losing the reference, for us it 
was also something new." 
Members of the task fo rces were people with at least some years of experience within the 
company, albeit being generally young. Each member had to describe both his and his 
sector' s tasks and how they used to perform them. For that, they had to go to their sectors and 
ask people, including the managers, how they used to work. Some people took that 
opportunity to make suggestions about how they thought things should be done. The 
managers had to discuss these suggestions with both their staff and members of the 
committee and, in the end, some changes in the processes were actually made. Each area 
representative then presented his area processes to the other members of the small groups, 
and integrated these processes with those from other related areas . 
The occurrence of different opinions within the task forces was mainly related to 
understanding the standard and to belief in the value of implementing the progranune. Such 
differences were generally solved through discussion within the group, although it took 
around six months for people within the small groups to feel comfortable enough to make 
suggestions for change. The main difficulty, however, was for the area managers to allow 
their subordinates to take time to participate in the small groups. At the begirming, people 
inside the company used to see the programme as another worthless fad. Again, perseverance 
through time played a very important role in convincing people that that was a lasting 
initiative. Members of the committee held monthly meetings with area managers to follow 
the progress of the implementation. However, a continuous concern of the committee was to 
not interfere in the areas, to allow their people to bring their processes into discussion, in 
order to the results be acceptable for people involved. There was also a Dissemination Group 
[Grupo de Divulgm;iio] whose job was to show to the whole company what the quality 
progranune was, what was to be done and how it would be done. This job was carried out 
mainly by affixing posters throughout the company. Although the committee considered such 
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dissemination as important, it was carried out without making too much noi se in order to 
avoid startling people. 
The committee also gave training to people from all sectors of the company. The training was 
initially prepared for people who worked at the Sao Paulo site. Some adaptation had to be 
made in order to make it suitable to workers in Manaus, as there werere some cultural 
differences between the two sites, mainly related to the educational level of employees, 
which is higher in Sao Paulo. 
For implementing the programme, the committee had the support from the Board of 
Directors. Nevertheless, even at Board level it took some hard work for the committee to 
convince people. The main reasons were the amount of investment necessary fo r 
implementation and the fact that such programme does not usually bring any visible results in 
the short term. The heaviest investments were in buying new equipment for qua li ty control 
and in training the staff. As was mentioned before, Semp Toshiba traditionally has had a 
conservative view on spending. 
Two external factors that also helped the implementation were the continuous discussion in 
the Brazi lian media about the importance fo r companies to be certified on the international 
quality standards, and a legislation from the Amazon state which threatened companies in 
Manaus which were not certified on ISO9000 by the end of March 1995 that they wou ld 
loose their tax incentives. 
During the implementation of the programme, the committee also created auditing groups 
which were responsible for following the process and checking its execution. Those groups 
were trained in auditing and the main difficulty was fo r people to understand the quali ty 
system as a whole. Thus, the quality standard specifies auditing procedures in particular 
sectors of the company (e.g. procurement), but such sectors usually have many interfaces 
with other internal and external sectors. Therefore, the auditing groups had to understand 
such interfaces. In the words of the National Purchasing Manager: 
" It is necessary to understand more or less the mechanism of the company. ( ... ) Now I 
have to assure the certifyi ng company (the company which issues the quali ty certificate) 
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that I' m really doing what I 'm telling them that I do at the system level. Now you start 
to open even more your vision to see how things work." 
Even after having received the ISO9000 certificate, twice a year the company has to go 
through an external audit which checks if the company's processes are following the quality 
standard. According to the ational Purchasing Manager, there is always room for 
improvements: 
"To be able to make an improvement in something, that must be running all right. It's a 
different concept, people generally think that there is an improvement because an error 
has been found. o, the idea is not to have the error. Improvement is a study about 
something which is running all right, there is when you gain something. Otherwise 
you're gaining nothing, you're just fixing an error." 
A detail which was always emphasized by Mr Loeb during the implementation of the 
IS09000 standard was that the company should not loose its characteristic of fast decision-
making processes. The concern was related to the fact that the quality standard requires a 
good deal of formalization in the company's processes, hence the ri sk of slowing down the 
company's pace. In Mr Loeb's words: 
"People, initially, tried to shield themselves behind the ISO, ' Look, the ISO doesn't 
allow that', to justify not doing things. It was then made very clear to all managers that 
the characteristic of informality should be respected, our speed should be preserved and 
we would need to have somebody coming after and collecting the pieces which would 
eventually be left behind. That is to say, if I give a specific orientation and don ' t go 
through all the pre-determined steps, somebody will come after me and document 
everything.( .. . ) The standard in our conception is beneficial , no doubt about that, but we 
must remember its origins. Why was such standard created? To protect the European 
industry from Asian competitors. But people are smart, because they have adapted 
themselves to the ISO and so what? They create new ones. There is a new version of the 
standard wh ich is more strict and that will also be surpassed." 
At the external level, the company decided to demand quality related measures from its 
suppliers. For that, Semp Toshiba invited all suppliers for rounds of talks where certain 
objectives were proposed for them to meet. Those objectives were related to both new quality 
standards, where the suppliers rather than Semp Toshiba would in future be responsible for 
inspecting the quality of components, and new delivery timetables, where the components 
would be delivered in smaller batches and at shorter intervals to the company. As a 
consequence, some of the production costs, like inspecting the quality of components and 
partly stocking them, would be shifted from Semp Toshiba to the suppliers. As was a lready 
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anticipated by Semp Toshiba, many suppliers refused to assw11e such costs and their 
relationships with the company were brought to an end. However, according to Mr Loeb, he 
was expecting to cut the number of suppliers by half after a few years, but in the end the cut 
was much deeper. From a total of 400 suppliers, Semp Toshiba used to have 220 within what 
they then called A, B and C suppliers, which were responsible fo r 95% of the purchases. In 
the first cut, made only by the Purchasing Department, that number can1e down to 160. The 
company then started to work more closely with the remaining suppliers, expl aining its new 
quality policy and the necessity fo r suppliers to both increase the quali ty of their products and 
reduce their costs. Semp Toshiba established a set of quality standards, generally the 
ISO9000, and asked its suppliers to find an external institution which could orientate them 
towards how to achieve such standards. The large majority of the suppliers either thought that 
that was a cost which was not worth incuITing or simply did not have the fi nancial resources 
required fo r undertaking such measures. As a result, after three years of the progranune Semp 
Toshiba has now 32 suppliers within the A and B categories, which are responsible fo r 95% 
of the purchases. To achieve such results, many other steps had to be taken, like the reduction 
of the product line and the standardization of parts amongst di fferent products. The reduction 
of the product line wi ll be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, during the description 
of changes in the conunercialization policy of the company. 
6.3.3 Reducing Stocks 
For the people inside Semp Toshiba such measures represented a substantial change in the 
way they were used to work with their stocks. When Mr Loeb started to talk about cutting the 
stocks level of the company, the idea was received with a certain scepticism. The initial 
obj ective was to change fro m one to two deliveries of components a month. The Logistics 
Manager, who is responsible fo r guaranteeing that the components purchased by the 
company are available at the production line, remembers the general fee ling: 
"we thought that it was almost imposs ible fo r ourse lves to make that facto ry work, to 
have that responsibili ty and not have the material there, ready fo r us to do whatever we 
liked . Are you with me? It was sort of diffi cult to understand that. If, when we used to 
have 45 , 30 days, the line used to stop, we thought that if we reduced the stocks we 
would lose much more prod uction." 
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Mr Loeb promoted some changes in the structure of the Industrial Division, mainly towards a 
more horizontal design, where managers would have better defined and also more 
comprehensive responsibilities. He also hired some managers to fill positions where he felt 
the company was weak. One of those managers was the Materials Manager, who co-ordinates 
all the purchasing activity, both national and international. He came straight from a strong 
competitor of Semp Toshiba, a large multinational company where he had worked for 
nineteen years. There he already had had experience of the processes which were being 
introduced at Semp Toshiba, like quality programme, stocks reduction and just in time 
production. He gives an example of a change in the structure of the company and the 
consequences: 
"So, a production manager, he was becoming anxious when he realized that he now had 
a small stock, he was used to see a very large one. 'Look, it wi ll fini sh, production will 
stop, look ... ', are you with me? So we left his focus inside the factory, in things which 
were under his responsibility, and we went on reducing that stock. He staited to get used 
with the idea that he would have the material on the day when he would need it, he 
wouldn ' t have it before, it was not com ing before, right?" 
He also emphasized that in order to make those changes successfull y, it was very important 
the establ ishment of simple and clear rules for people to fo llow in order to undertake their 
tasks. People had to know that if they did anything differently something would go wrong. 
The process of reducing the stocks was led by a group of six managers: the Industrial 
Director, the Logistics Manager, the Materials Manager, the National Purchasing Manager, 
the Industrial Engineering Manager and the Product Development Manager. All of them 
work in Sao Paulo but each one has a corresponding manager in Manaus. The group used to 
hold a daily meeting where the current issues of the company were discussed and, in addition 
to that, in case of any urgent problem a meeting was called in order to solve it. Within the 
group, the way adopted to overcome resistance to the plan was main ly through peer pressure. 
People who were more convinced of the possible benefits of the changes usually would keep 
talki ng about that to other managers. The Logistics Manager explains how such pressure 
would work when new ideas were being discussed: 
"This is impossible.' (one would say) But it' s not impossible. If one says, other says, 
another also says, you start to see that the impossible is possible. Even if ones says no, 
you' ve got three saying yes." 
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And those within the company who were not convinced were replaced, at least for that 
project. An essential ingredient of such strategy was, however, the initial success achieved. 
As positive results started to appear resistance was broken and changes would go further. 
Once the fo rtnightly deliveries of supplies were running smoothly, the company moved 
towards weekly deliveries. Thus, although the changes initially seemed quite radical , they 
were actually implemented in gradual steps, each one based on a previous success, and that 
also assisted in the development of the process. 
There was no necessity of hiring new employees to handle the more frequent deliveries. 
Instead, what happened was a redistribution of tasks throughout the month. Most of the 
national components for the production line were purchased either at the Southeast or the 
South region of Brazil and delivered at the company's fac ility in Sao Paulo. They were then 
prepared and transported through a very long distance in order to reach the factory. 70% of 
the components used to be transported by surface, which means 4 days by lo1Ty from Sao 
Paulo to Belem plus 8 days by ship up the Amazon river from Belem to Manaus. The 
remaining 30% were transported by air, in a overnight flight between Sao Paul o and Manaus. 
With the reduction in the intervals of deliveries and with less stock avail able fo r production, 
such transport mode was modified towards an inverse situation where most parts purchased 
in other regions of the country are now transported by air. 
At Semp Toshiba' s facto ry in Manaus, to the amazement of almost everybody in the 
company, there were fewer production stops. Managers realized that with fewer stocks they 
had better control. It was easier to identify problems with specific suppliers and, as a 
consequence, to also have better control over them. From an initial situation where the stocks 
used to range around 40 days fo r national components and 2 months for imported ones, the 
company moved to work with 3 days of stocks for components purchased in Manaus, 5 days 
for those purchased in other Brazilian regions and 21 days for imported ones. Another factor 
which helped the whole change was that in the last few years some suppliers have established 
new manufacturing plants at the Manaus region in order to better meet the growing demand . 
That has now allowed Semp Toshiba to have 60% of its national supplies purchased locally 
and also to start to move to daily del iveries of the biggest components. 
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6.3.4 Changes in the Assembly Line 
Concomitantly with the two processes mentioned above, there were also some changes in the 
assembly line at the Manaus factory, always aiming at increasing the productivity of the 
company. Those changes are mainly related to three processes: outsourcing of some 
production activities, increasing mechanization of the assembly line, and the implementation 
of a Japanese technique for small but constant improvements called Kaizen. 
Until the early 1990' s the main concerns of managers at the Manaus factory were related to 
meeting the targets for quantity of sets manufactured, which were defined by the sales plan, 
and to improve the quality of products. The assembly line was characterized by the intensive 
use of labour. The Industrial Engineering Manager recollects the environment: 
"The question of productivity was not that important, there was a direct proportion that 
we used : if today we make 500 sets and we need I 0 employees, if we need to produce 
1000 we hire I 0 more people. ( ... ) We had no worries about production costs, I' m not 
talking about costs of materials, 1 ' m referring to the environment at the production line, 
at that time if we took I :00 hr, I: I 5 hrs or I :30 hrs to prod uce something there was not 
that much difference." 
With the recession of the Brazilian economy in 1991 -92 and low cost imported products, 
mainly audio equipments, " invading" the market, production levels at Semp Toshiba had a 
slight increase in 1991 but a sharp reduction in 1992. The company laid off some 40% of its 
personnel at the factory in Manaus and started to take measures in order to increase its 
productivity and reduce production costs. Those measures were based on two obj ectives : 
firstly, to produce faster in order to have a high turnover of stocks, considering that materials 
are responsible fo r 70% of the production costs; secondly, to have a more rational production 
line, without too much rework and quality problems, and that meant a production line with 
fewer and better prepared personnel. 
To achieve such obj ectives, it was decided that the company should concentrate in its core 
activities, that is, assembling products. Therefore, secondary activities were gradually being 
left for other companies to do. As that was a new initiative, Semp Toshiba did not have 
qualified suppliers which could assume such activities. The strategy adopted was to choose 
small companies and give them all the support they would need to be able to undertake the 
tasks. Thus, Semp Toshiba' s engineers went to those companies and made all the 
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specifications necessary for the tasks, equipment was lent by Semp Toshiba to those 
companies, and all the procurement activities were undertaken by Semp Toshiba in order to 
assure both low prices and quality of components. Semp Toshiba's employees who used to 
be involved with those activities were either shifted to other tasks within the factory or laid 
off and employed by the new suppliers. Acting this way, the company aimed to avoid 
resistance against the lay offs (remember that 40% of the personnel had previously been laid 
oft) and also to save on training, as the employees who went to work at suppliers already 
knew how to do the tasks. The rationale of such measures was that small suppliers, as 
opposed to Semp Toshiba, had very low overhead costs. The activities transfen-ed to those 
suppliers were simple ones, without much technical content. An example is preparation of 
cables. In that activity, the supplier would receive all material from Semp Toshiba, would cut 
and prepare the cables, and return them ready to be assembled into the products. 
With a small number of outsourced activities which involved more complex tasks the 
company initially had some quality related problems. The solution found was to keep a Semp 
Toshiba' s employee working within the supplier until the problems were solved . 
As time went by, an increasing number of activities were outsourced. In 1993 production was 
growing again . Then, instead of hiring new employees to cope with the growth, the company 
tried to outsource more activities, this time without laying off personnel. The rationale for 
such action was twofold : firstly, the company did not want to go through a continuous cycle 
of hiring and laying off people according to market fluctuations . The experience with the 
massive lay off of 1992 had been bad enough. Secondly, the factory had limited space. 
Through outsourcing, some space could be made available for activities which added more 
value to the product than those which were being outsourced. 
The second group of measures were directed at the main assembly line. They arose from the 
perception of the need for more flexibility in the production line. While before, the company 
used to run a single production batch a month fo r each product, now the idea was to be able 
to quickly change the production mi x in order to better meet the demands from the 
Commercial Division. With a mainly manual assembly line, there was no standard 
production time, there were en-ors and problems related to quality, and each time the 
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production mix was changed it was necessary to stop the line and reset the whole process. 
The first step towards mechanization was the introduction of automatic insertion machines, 
which assemble most of the components on the circuit boards. That noticeably reduced the 
number of errors and quality problems. With the increase of demand, more insertion 
machines were introduced . The workers substituted by machines were generally shifted to 
other tasks in the factory. The second step was to mechanize the two master assembly lines. 
Until 199 1 those lines were manual , where each worker would do his/her part of the 
assembly task and manually pass the product to the next worker. The company installed 
conveyor belts on those lines, trained the workers in each process and estab lished production 
times. Such production times are now always compared with the Toshiba Fu.kaya assembly 
plant in Japan. At the end of 1994 the assembly time of a TV set was, on average, 15% 
slower at the Brazilian plant compared with the Japanese. For 1995, the objective at Semp 
Toshiba was to reduce its average time in I 0%. However, the obj ective is not to reach the 
Japanese average time because, in spite of the continuing process of mechani zation, the low 
wages in Brazil still justify a much more labour intensive, and therefore slower, production 
line than the one in Japan. 
The third group of measures are related to the introduction of the Japanese technique of 
continuous improvement called Kaizen . Such technique is used at all plants of Toshiba 
subsidiaries around the world. It was brought to Semp Toshiba by the current Teclmical 
Director who was acquainted with the techn ique from his previous experience at the Fu.kaya 
plant. Having brought videos about Kaizen and training material, he gave the ini tial training 
fo r people at Semp Toshiba. The Kaizen process has been led by the Teclmical Director and 
the Industrial Engineering Manager. The latter defined the teclmiques as : 
" a philosophy where yo u take something and do it a bit better today, and keep doing it 
better, more and more. So, graduall y you get resul ts, you ' ve got a summation of small 
improvements and you end up with a big result, though on the long term, not on the very 
short term. So it ' s not an activ ity of innovation, it's an activ ity of improvement" , 
and he also drew the attention to the fit existing between such a philosophy and Semp 
Toshiba' s conservative approach to investment. 
The implementation of the acti vity consisted in the formation of groups of shop floor workers 
and their supervisors, who used to undertake production tasks which involve different sectors 
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within the Industrial Division. Each group has one representative of a different sector and the 
objective is to discuss possible improvements in those tasks. For that, the group firstly elects 
a target fo r improvement and afterwards discusses how that target can be reached. Targets are 
set every six months and the group meet at least once a month to discuss progress. Each 
member usually takes one hour a week to dedicate himself to the Kaizen activity. The main 
difficulty has been to have that one hour out of the production line. 
According to the Industrial Engineering Manager, workers usually enj oy taking part in 
Kaizen activities because they can see that they have been responsible fo r an improvement. 
Every Kaizen activity has to be technicall y and economically justified and its progress is 
documented. Thus, at the end of the activity the results are visibl e to everybody. The 
company also gives some incentives for participation and suggestions. One is an annual 
election of the best activities carried out during the year. In order to have everybody 
represented, at least one activity from each group is selected. Then, there is a competition and 
the three best activities, from both Manaus and Sao Paulo, are selected. Members of each 
selected group are then invited for an event where they present their acti vities to a large 
audience from the company, including the Board of Directors, and receive a thanks letter 
fom1 the director and a prize, usua lly a product from the company. Besides that, there are also 
other forms of incentive. Each time a worker makes a suggestion which is accepted by his/her 
group to be object of a Kaizen activity, that worker writes his/her name, function and 
suggestion in a notebook at the factory. In addition to that, he/she pumps air inside a footba ll 
ball which lays beside the book. The objective is to blow out the ball. There are also boards 
distributed across the factory with photos of the groups ' members, names, implemented 
suggestions and achieved results. 
Within the Kaizen groups, there are generally many suggestions about how to improve a 
specific issue. The choice of the suggestion which wi ll be implemented is made through 
group discussion. In case of di sagreement, the bottom line is always what is better for the 
company, what the company will gain in quality or economic terms. There is a concern about 
not making comments like ' Your proposal won' t be carried out because it 's no good' to 
workers whose suggestions have not been chosen, in order to not inhibit them to make other 
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suggestions. The group usually prioritize the suggestions given and, in the case the first 
choice has proved to be inadequate, the second is then carried out, and so on. 
The company controls the suggestions given in order that they are kept within the objectives 
of Kaizen, that is to say, to improve processes and not to change the content. An example of 
that is when there was a problem with the painting of some products and it was suggested 
that the paint should be changed. That idea was refused because the colour of the product was 
chosen according to market requirements, therefore it was not subject to change. The 
objective was to improve the painting process. 
The Japanese Technical Director highlighted the importance of Kaizen for the mechanization 
of the production line: 
" Kaizen is important. When we introduced machines, automat ion, we had to simpli fy 
the tasks before. If you don ' t do that the investment is too high. Kaizen is for processes, 
first you've got to do it, after you can invest, change to machines." 
According to him, Toshiba has an annual Kaizen event where Kaizen activities from 
subsidiaries all over the world are presented. That is a way for employees from different 
plants to learn from each other. Inspired by this event, Semp Toshiba has created its annual 
Kaizen event mentioned above. 
In 1994, a Kaizen specialist from Japan went to Brazil to give training. He spent fifteen days 
in Manaus and three in Sao Paulo. The training was focused on how to spot items for 
potential improvement. The Industrial Engineering Manager commented: 
"This is very difficult, if you are inside you r working env ironment you ' re already used 
to things and somebody who comes from outside can look and see what you' re looking 
but not see ing. ( ... ) but the more important is that he not only spotted but also showed 
people how to spot, what has to be observed ( ... ) We made a joke and told him that he 
was a Japanese with a big eye, he could see many things." 
Such visits from productivity specialists have been made frequently. In March 1996 a 
welding specialist went to Manaus to give training so that the TV and VCR welds comply 
with Toshiba's quality standards. In April 1996 another technician went to give training in 
maintenance and prevention of problems in the new automatic insertion machines. Figure 6.2 
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try and in 1991 there was no activity. Kaizen formally started in 1992, and during 1993 it 
saved US$ 1,850,694 fo r Semp Toshiba. 
Besides that, the Industrial Engineering Manager adds: 
"When we look inside the company the consequence that we see is not only economic 
but the involvement of people. Before it looked like they had no bra ins, only arm s fo r 
work. Now bes ides the arm s they've also got the bra ins, one has to think a bit, so always 
when they have something to do, mainly a new product, there are many suggest ions to 
do it better, to do it in a diffe rent way." 
6.4 Changes in the Commercialization Policy 
During the same period of change at the Industrial Division, the Commercial Division and 
the conm1ercialization policy at Semp Toshiba also went through a process of change. 
6.4.1 The Immediate Context 
The immediate external context has already been explained in section 6.3. 1, with economic 
recess ion and unstable levels of inflation being its main characteristics. As regards its 
commercialization policy, Semp Toshi ba has always been characteri zed by prioriti zing 
profitability. Therefore, price competitiveness has never been the strong point of its products. 
Compared with their competitors, they would usually be at the upper half of the price range 
for each model. Semp Toshiba has not usually occupied the position of market leader in 
Brazil. Such an approach is j ustified by the President in this way: 
"So, that's why I say that the market leader is not the one who ga ins more, usually the 
one who ga ins more is the second or third place. Because the commitments of the leader 
are with market share and not with profitabili ty." 
This emphas is on profitabili ty, relative success in the market and a conservative approach to 
financ ing, with the company always avoiding borrowing capital from banks, has given Semp 
Toshiba a stable fi nancial situation despite sharp fluctuations in the Brazilian market. The 
same conservative approach has been adopted in relation to production volumes, with the 
company carefully fo llowing market movements, without too steep increases or decreases in 
volume, when compared with its competitors. 
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Distribution of its products in large and medium cities is made mainly through large regional 
chains of stores. In small cities they are usually sold at local stores. The company also has an 
extensive network of technical ass istance shops. In Brazil it is usual to take domestic 
equipment for repair when they have problems. There are no rental shops like in the United 
Kingdom . 
The company had a large product range with small quantities of each model being produced. 
Some models had only s light differences in relation to others. The reason fo r adopting such a 
strategy was that the company considered that it was easier to sell small quantities of a 
product rather than large ones. In order to avoid clashes between similar products, the 
company would distribute them across the country. This strategy, however, presented two 
problems. First, it made producti on costs very high, as was explained at section 6.3 .2, and, 
second, although it indeed seemed to be easier to se ll small quantities of each model, when a 
specific model was successful salesmen never had enough volume to meet the demand. 
Retailers fe lt unhappy with that and would frequently complain to salesmen that it was 
awkward that when they wanted to buy large quantities of a product the company could not 
help them. This was an obstacle for the construction of stronger relationships between Semp 
Toshiba and retailers. 
For consumers, the image of Semp Toshiba ' s products was genera lly associated with the 
image of Semp, a traditional national manufacturer of reliable and popular products. Such 
image had basically been constructed upon the lasting presence of Semp in the Brazilian 
market, as the company had never run big advert ising campaigns in the media. 
Regarding the structure of the Commercial Divis ion, there used to be a Commercial Director, 
two General Sales Managers and some Regional Managers, all of them working at the 
company' s headquarters in Sao Paulo. There were also one or more representatives in each 
Brazilian state who were responsible for sales in that state or region of the state. These 
representatives were, with few exceptions, self-employed salesmen who would receive 
monthly quotas of products from Semp Toshiba to sell . 
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In 1989, the Commercial Director was replaced. The new Director, Mr Ney de Lellis, had 
previously been a representative of Semp Toshiba fo r many years in the state of Rio Grande 
do Sul. Therefore, when he came to work as Director he had knowledge both about the 
company and the daily work of the sales fo rce. In compari son with previous Commercial 
Directors, his style was perceived by his subordinates as being more open to suggestions 
coming from them. 
6.4.2 Changing the Image and Structure 
In the late 1980 's, the company decided to change its image with consumers towards one 
identified with more sophisticated products. It took two measures in the attempt to achieve 
that. First, it launched a range of modern products based on Toshiba's models fro m abroad. 
The consequences of such action will be described later in this chapter. Second, it started a 
media campaign with frequent presence in both television channels and magazines. Thi s 
campaign was aimed at associ ating the company ' s products with modern Japanese 
technology. At that time there were quite a few Japanese electronic manufacturers in Brazil. 
On trying to emphasize the Japanese links of the company but also to di fferentiate it from 
other Japanese producers, the advertising agency responsible fo r the campaign created the 
slogan "Our Japanese are more creative than the others' Japanese". The television 
advertisements had always a jocular tone which proved to be very successful in achieving the 
obj ectives. 
In 1989, as soon as he took over as Commercial Director, Mr Lellis started to identify the 
main commercial problems of Semp Toshiba in different regions of the country. The 
structure of the Commercial Division was based on the assumption that the smaller the 
geographical area a Regional Manager was responsible for the better, as he would be able to 
give more attention to his representatives and clients. However, Mr Lellis and his two 
General Sales Managers perceived two problems related to such structure. Firstl y, there were 
too many layers between the Director and the salesmen and, as a resul t, the fl ow of 
info rmation in both directions was usually slow and also info rmation originated at one end of 
the chain would lose some content before reaching the other end . Secondly, Regional 
Managers were too restricted to their geographical areas of responsibi lity. On fac ing a 
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problem, that would usually be spread across the whole area, making it difficult for them to 
find solutions. 
At the same time, Semp Toshiba was find ing it increasingly difficult to sell its products. 
Price was becoming a key issue for customers and with the company not willing to sacrifice 
its profitability policy, its salesmen had to spend much more effort in selling products than its 
competitors. Despite all the effort, Regional Managers were frequently unable to accomplish 
the sales quotas set by the company. It was then usual that the company would sack managers 
and replace them with people who were considered well known in the market, that is to say, 
who had good relationships with some important retailers. On doing that, the company aimed 
at strengthening its relationships with those retailers. However, some of those new managers 
used to adopt practices which were not in line with those of Semp Toshiba and, as a 
consequence ended up being sacked as wel l. 
Mr Lellis then decided to cut the level of Regional Manager, with few exceptions, and to 
have a larger number of representatives. The idea was that representatives should be 
responsib le for a smaller number of clients, being able to visit them more often . On the other 
hand, at the top level , the company would have fewer people for both faci litating the 
information flow and having a more comprehensive idea of the commercial business. An 
exan1ple of the latter objective would be when Semp Toshiba, on fac ing commercial 
problems in a particular reg ion of the country, would try to implement measures which were 
working well in another region. Such macro-vision was not possible under the previous 
structure where regional managers would try to find solutions within their limited sphere of 
responsibi lity. Also, under the new structure, the few top managers would usually be people 
who had been with the company for many years, and this would give more consistency to the 
implementation of the commercial strategy. As a consequence of the cut, the two General 
Sales Managers would now be responsible for a much wider body of activities. To be able to 
undertake them, besides working harder they had to give more autonomy to representatives, 
mainly in relation to discount margins for negotiating with retailers. Whilst before any 
variation in discount would necessarily have to be discussed with managers, now the 
company would immediately set the maximum discount margins for representatives and they 
would work out the best deal with retailers. 
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6.4.3 Crisis and Change. An Unusual Step 
With the company's decision to launch up to date models the product range was extended 
even further. Unfortunately fo r Semp Toshiba, the timing of that decision was bad. In 1992, 
the worst year of recession in the early 1990' s, inflation was aga in high in Brazil. Facing a 
combination of economic recession and very unstable prices, consumers opted for low price 
as the key factor for making their expenditure decisions. Sales for Semp Toshiba almost 
came to a halt. The President then took an unusual step. A General Sales Manager recalls: 
"Semp Toshiba was doing very we ll and, suddenly, it started to go backwards. 
Everything stopped. So, that was a period when the President of the company did not 
only held meetings with the Board of Directors, but he would also ca ll some people that 
he trusted. He didn ' t want to li sten only to directors, he also wanted to li sten to the base 
who were at the battlefront , and those were the managers. ( ... ) I think he was wary of 
people always telling him the same things, he started to take people from lower levels 
and let them speak, and the company started to speak. And one of the things we ' ve 
always argued for, and I' ve always supported, I thought that our product line was too 
large, we should produce less models with more quanti ty.( ... ) why insist with a client to 
buy products which are difficult to se ll? We should offer him what is easier to se ll , if 
nothing because in what is easy to sell you can get a better price." 
These meetings with a broader group of people made clear the existence of conflicting views 
within the company. Freedom to speak had, as a counterpoint, the fact that some people 
would have to li sten to critical comments. However, those comments were genera ll y made 
with respect for hierarchy and the work of others. They were important in convincing 
managers more reluctant to accept the necessity of changes in the company's strategy . After 
some time, the President decided to get rid of the company 's stock of fini shed products. He 
concl uded that it was better to sell them at a loss than to keep them, calculating that he would 
rather make a loss but get some money to invest in saleable products. The company went to 
the retai lers, checked the competitors' prices and in three months sold its whole stock. 
At the same time, people from Commercial Divi sion also asked retailers which models were 
selli ng better in that period of crisis and fed that in.formation into the company. It was then 
decided that the company would concentrate its production on those models, increasing their 
volumes and eliminating those which were difficult to sell. However, the decision of 
increasing production volumes during a period of crisis in sales was a ri sky one. As the 
company had a stable financial situation, the President decided to take the ri sk, although not 
to the extent desired by the Commercial Di vision. Thus, he would authorize smaller increases 
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than the Commercial Director was asking for and would also maintain a continuous 
monitoring over the progress of sales. If the company managed to sell the whole production, 
he would then authorize another increase in volume. Such increases would generally be 
resisted by people from the Industrial Division as they represented a completely new 
production strategy. Therefore, the changes described in section 6.3 were also triggered by 
that commercial pressure. 
In the same period, the President also gathered all the employees together and reminded them 
of Semp Toshiba ' s policy of sharing profits. If the company didn ' t manage to sell its 
products and incurred in a loss, salaries would go down in relation to previous years. That 
served as an extra incentive for harder work within the company. 
On trying to concentrate its production on fewer models, the company also started to pay 
more attention to the strategies of competitors. An example of that was a TV model launched 
by Philips, which was characterized by a very simple remote control, containing only the 
basic functions of switching on/off, volume and channel. Through market research survey, 
Philips discovered that most consumers would use only such functions and that it could 
reduce its production costs by manufacturing a model with such characteristics . With a lower 
price than its competitors, that model was an astonishing commercial success. Retailers 
commented to Sernp Toshiba ' s salesmen about how the model was selling well and the 
company then launched a similar one, which was also extremely successful. 
Another change in the commercial strategy was related to the introduction of new models. 
Usually, when the company launched new models or products, that decision would be made 
by both the Marketing and Industrial Di vis ions, without any consultation with the 
Commercial Division. For instance, when Semp Toshiba decided to launch modern Toshiba 
products, the selection of models was based on the commercial success of such models 
abroad. However, a good number of them actually turned out to be a failure in the Brazilian 
market. The strategy was then changed towards consulting the Commercial Division. The 
latter would then listen to purchasing managers of the main retailers, people who are 
considered to be very knowledgeable about the preferences of the local market. Thus, when a 
new model or product is now introduced, the company invites some of those purchasers, 
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shows them a mock-up model and asks fo r their opinion. They then criticize and make 
suggestions for improvements according to their experience and also by comparing it to 
models produced by Semp Toshiba's competitors. 
After the media campaign was considered to be well established, Semp Toshiba looked for 
other ways of reinforcing its image in consumers' minds. The advertising agency did a 
market survey and found that fo r consumers the most important characteristic for a TV was 
reliabili ty. The company then tried to find out what steps it could take in order to associate 
such characteristic with its products. It was then recalled that a few years before, Mitsubishi 
had a very successful promotion where it gave four years guarantee for its products. Semp 
Toshiba then decided to do a bit more and offer five years guarantee, initially only for the 
more expensive parts of some models. The Quality Department measured the number of 
products' faults and concluded that the rate was relatively low. The promotion was given the 
'go ahead' and was initially valid for a limi ted length of time. Media campaign continued to 
use the same slogan, but would now also emphasize the product quality and the fi ve years 
guarantee. The result was extremely successful. Some competitors tried to do the same, with 
guarantees extended to the whole product, but most of them went back to the usual one year 
guarantee after the end of their promotions. That move from competitors made Semp Toshiba 
extend its guarantee to the full product and also to the whole product range. By the end of the 
initial period of promotion, that was so strongly associated with products that the company 
decided to extended it for a further fi ve years. 
6.4.4 Relationship with Retailers 
As it was mentioned before Mr Lelli s had two characteristics that differentiated him from 
previous Commercial Directors, a vast knowledge about salesmens' work and an openness in 
relation to his subordinates. A General Sales Manager thus describes such openness and some 
of its consequences : 
" .. . our re lationship with Ney (the Commercia l Director) is truthful , we don ' t speak on ly 
what the director wants to listen, so much so we li ve in friction , friction that I' m say ing 
is tota lly professional. That is a freedom that he' s always given to us, we tota ll y respect 
the hierarchy but we tell the truth, there has always been such sincere re lationship . So 
much so that it ' s sometimes wearing out, it' s difficult to convince him, or even fo r him 
to convince us . We get into friction, friction that I'm saying is within all the respect that 
he deserves, here we ' ve got such freedom. So, look, he gives such freedom because the 
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main interest.. .he is the person responsible fo r the area, you understand?! So, that same 
relationship he has had with us, we've given to the representatives, we don't allow 
things to be formal." 
With Semp Toshiba's decision to increase production volumes during a difficult period for 
sales, Mr Lell is knew that, despite dealing with more saleable products, the sales activity 
would need to reach higher levels of effectiveness. The objective of reducing production 
costs and, as a consequence. products' prices was being achieved but the company's prices 
were still higher than most competitors. The profitability principle was never abandoned. 
Mr Lellis sent his two General Sales Managers to travel all over the country to meet sales 
representatives and also to visit the fifty largest chains of retai lers. There were several 
objectives behind such action. Managers had to closely monitor the behaviour of 
representatives. Being generally self employed, representatives earn their living by selling 
Semp Toshiba· s products. Their income vary with sales volumes. For them, the easier 
products are to sell, the better. Thus, although they had welcomed the company's change 
towards more saleable products, they would usually resist the increased sales quotas Semp 
Toshiba was assigning to them. Despite the potential for larger income those volumes could 
represent, they also meant a much harder sales performance. Overcoming that resistance from 
representatives was considered by Semp Toshiba's managers as one of the main difficulties 
in the whole process of changing the commercialization policy. General Sales Managers went 
on explaining representatives that they should now visit clients more frequently and try to 
sell Semp Toshiba's products as a package. Prices should be the last thing discussed. 
Representatives should emphasize the product quality, the heavy advertising campaign 
backing the products, the five years guarantee, the large technical assistance net of shops and 
the good distribution channels the company had. Resistance from representatives was 
confronted with threats made by managers of replacing them with other people. As sales 
volumes were increasing, the position of a Semp Toshiba representative was becoming very 
attractive and the threat could carry more weight. The Commercial Director also spoke 
directly to some representatives trying to convince them to embrace the more aggressive 
commercial strategy. Some representatives who did not comply with the new strategy were 
either replaced or had other representatives assigned to work in the same area, dividing the 
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sales volumes. The General Sales Managers also enticed representatives from competitors or 
even from different industries to come to work with Semp Toshiba. One of the managers 
recollects the changes: 
·'So, there was also a recycling process of our representatives. They were aged, they 
were from different times, ifs not about their chronological age, aged regarding to the 
sort of relationship, they didn 't nurture the relationship. We thought that the 
fundamental thing was the relationship with the client, it was to get up with the client in 
the morning, ha e lunch with the client and go to sleep with the client. This is important, 
because he starts to trust you. ( ... ) that ' s something we worked hard on." 
The frequent contact between General Sales Managers and representatives also made it easier 
for the former to transmit changes in the sales strategy, like credit policies. Managers 
acknowledged that with such contacts adaptation to market requirements in relation to 
co=ercial policies became much more agile. They could be readily present in regions of the 
country where representatives were facing problems, in order to help them to sell. 
On their visits to large retailers, the General Sales Managers had two main objectives. One 
was to explain the new strategy of the company and try to build a more stable relat ionship. 
They proposed partnerships where Semp Toshiba would provide all the backing through its 
sales package and retailers should increase the volume of their orders. Through its 
Promotional Department, the company would also help retailers in selling the products by 
sharing the costs of advertisements in newspapers, training the retailers' salesmen and 
promoting prize competitions involving those salesmen which would give incentives related 
to sales performance. The second objective of visiting was to monitor the performance of 
representatives. Thus, the General Sales Managers would ask retailers whether they were 
happy with the representatives who worked with them. They would also gather information 
about competitors ' best representatives in order to, if necessary, entice them to work for 
emp Toshiba. 
Semp Toshiba has also regarded its distribution policy as an important part of its 
co=ercialization strategy. With the constant fluctuations of Brazilian market, bargaining 
power frequently shifts between producers and retailers. Thus, when the market is growing 
f~ producers cannot attend to all the demands from retailers and. therefore, have the power 
to favour some chains of stores. On the other hand, when the market is slowing down, 
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producers depend on orders coming from retailers who then have power to get better 
purchasing conditions. 
Following the idea of a partnership between the company and retai lers, Semp Toshiba has 
proposed a policy of mutual help aimed at reducing the impact of such market fluctuations . 
The company would do its best to supply retailers by treating all its clients equally, that is to 
say, without offering better conditions to any of them. Also, during periods when demand 
was high, the company would provide retailers with at least the same volumes they had been 
ordering in the past. For their part, retailers should help the company during periods when 
demand was low by placing orders at least at a minimum level. The principle behind the 
policy of equal treatment to all clients was the intention of keeping a wide sales base. By not 
giving special conditions to any retailer the company did not create resentment among other 
retailers. However, such actions were received with resistance by many retailers as other 
manufacturers could offer better commercial deals, like bigger discounts or even leaving 
products on consignment. Also, at the beginning some retailers did not believe that Semp 
Toshiba was actually not offering a better deal to competitors. 
A factor which helped to break resistance by retailers was the constant presence of Semp 
Toshiba's managers at clients. They have visited clients regardless of the market conditions. 
This contrasts with some competitors' managers who are available only when the market is 
bad and therefore the producers need orders from retailers. A General Sales Manager 
explains: 
"That' s when you win the bloke over to your s ide, you understand , we are a lways in the 
c lient, always present, in bad times, in good times. In good times is fo r say ing ' You 
remember that you helped me? So now I' m go ing to he lp you' . In bad times, ' You 
remember, now I need you, you can' t compare me to the others, I didn ' t let you down ' , 
those are things that others do, they vanish." 
Such presence has also been important because while competitors usually send their 
representatives or their regional managers to visit clients, Semp Toshiba has freq uently sent 
its General Sales Managers and even, to very important retailers, its Commercial Director. 
Again a General Sales Manager explains: 
"You know, they were used to ta lk to the manager subord inated to the manager ... never 
with the ... so with us they were talking di rectly with the company, because look, they 
were talking to the Genera l Manager, above him there is only the Director and the 
President. The President is the owner of the company, he wants to know just the final 
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result. So, that' s it, the one who commands is the Director. In the majority of times there 
were myself and the Director, other times myself alone, that is to say, it was the second 
man of the company who was there. So that was a difference for us. While we would 
find the third, the fourth man of competitors, we were the second, so the chap gives 
more importance to us, I am more important than the regional manager of the 
competitor. If they were using the same weapon, sending people from the same level , 
who knows we would be dividing a bit more of the space. So, what we did, the 50 
largest mainly we did a close marking. So, I think that then we were those who basically 
commanded the business." 
Another strategy used by the company for widen its sales base was, through its large number 
of representatives, making an effort to attend small local retailers. One General Sales 
Manager explains such strategy: 
"What we had was a larger number of sa lesmen in a smaller space, for them to have to 
go four, five times in the same client, to win by insistence, and many clients put orders 
by visits, the smaller do that. The small client, when you visit him, he feels ob liged to 
put an order. And the large majori ty of our competitors don ' t loose time with small 
cli ents. So he also 'Well , he doesn ' t come here, I don ' t care about him ' . Now, with 
Semp Toshiba no, many times he ' I bought fi ve TVs, I sold onl y two but, OK, send two 
to me, replace at least two ' ; you understand our move, so that is a strategy that we've 
applied." 
6.4.S Within the Commercial Division 
A few other points related to the work at the Commercial Division are worthy of mention. 
The first is the fact that the Japanese have not interfered in the commercial policy of Semp 
Toshiba. As the company produces only for the Brazilian market and has been usually 
profitable, both partners of the j oint venture agreed that this part of the business should be 
handled exclusively by the Brazilians. 
A second significant point is that inside the Commercial Division communications are very 
informal. There is practically no schedule of meetings. Managers meet whenever they think it 
is necessary and they can go into the Director' s office at any time they think it is important to 
talk to him . One of the few formal meetings is when the company gets all its representatives 
together to show the general numbers and to discuss the different commercial performances 
in various regions of the country. That occurs twice a year. Even the frequent trips of General 
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Sales Managers around the country to visit retailers and representatives have their itineraries 
usually decided only one week in advance, according to necessities of the moment. 
A third point is that with the increase in production and sales volume of the last few years, 
the company again hired a Regional Manager who works at the headquarters and is 
responsible exclusively fo r the city of Sao Paulo. However, a General Sales Manager 
emphasized that he keeps a close contact with that manager "trying to transform him in one 
like us". 
6.5 Hard Data 
To conclude this chapter, below there are some fi gures which present the evolution of 
production volumes, productivity, market share and turnover of Semp Toshiba dur ing the last 
few years. 
Table 6. 1 presents the number of sets produced of the company ' s main products between 
1990 and 1995. 
Table 6.2 presents the production of colour television by size during the same period. Note 
the concentration of production on both 14 and 20 inches models after I 993. Note also the 
re introduction and increase of production of large size models in 1994 onwards, as a result of 
the recent period of stabil ity in the Brazilian economy. Such stabili ty has allowed the return 
of consumer credit which facilitates sales of those more expensive models. 
Figure 6.3 presents the evolution of productivity at Semp Toshiba between I 990 and 1995 . 
Figure 6.4 presents the evolution of Semp Toshiba' s market share in TVs and VCRs between 


















Semp Toshiba - Sets Produced 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
325,614 276,625 430,000 613 ,470 
311 ,347 150,7 16 235,710 229,115 












1,608 ,729 5,428,074 
Table 6.2 
Semp Toshiba - TV Sets Produced (by size) 
TV (inches) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 TOTAL 
10" 41 ,140 28,804 16,450 29,275 23,600 16,000 155,269 
14" 85 ,425 108,198 100,248 169,350 239,090 355,398 1,057,709 
15" 950 3,400 4,000 8,350 
16" 85,146 79,682 22,356 187,181 
20" 81,877 97,580 125,501 216,375 326,240 502,698 1,350,27 1 
21" 14,090 1,800 240 325 16,455 
28" 7,634 6,150 7,830 15,000 24,540 15,360 76,514 
29" 27,057 27,057 
34" 1,752 1,752 
TOTAL 316,259 325,614 276,625 430,000 613,470 918,590 2,880,558 
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Figure 6.4 
Evolution of Market Share 
TV Production 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Brazil 2,891 ,000 2,990,000 2,624,000 3,824,000 5,470,000 6,204,000 
Semp Toshiba 316,259 325,614 276,625 430,000 613,470 918,590 
Market Share 10.94% 10.89% 10.54% 11.24% 11.22% 14.81% 
VCR Production 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Brazil 494,000 581,000 696,000 554,000 816,000 1,234,000 
Semp Toshiba 82,050 97,598 73 ,691 111,810 174,304 306,800 
Market Share 16.61 % 16.80% 10.59% 20.18% 21.36% 24.86% 
Turnover Sales by Employee 
USS thousands US$ 
1993 385,000 337,700 
1994 531 ,600 522,500 
1995 719,600 589,122 
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Another relevant item of information is that the most important business magazine in Brazil 
every year elects the best companies in different industries, based on six indices related to 
financial and productivity measurement. That has happened since 1975, and, in its sector, 
which compri ses electric material , household electric goods, commw1ication equipment, 
bulbs and accessories, Semp Toshiba has won the first prize in 1993, 1994 and 1995 (Exan1e 
I 993 , Exame 1994, Exame 1995). In I 996, Semp Toshiba won the first place not only in its 
sector but in the overall competition, being elected the best company in the country (Exame 
1996). 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter has described two processes occurred at Semp Toshiba in the last few years : an 
increase in productivity, and changes in the conunercialization policy of the company. The 
description has also covered the most prominent values and characteristics of the company, 
as defined by its senior managers. Particular attention was given to the context in which the 
processes have developed, including the wider context of changes in the Brazilian economy. 
The changes described have involved not only Semp Toshiba, but also other companies wi th 
which it has close relationships, such as suppliers and retai lers. The description has attempted 
to show the relationships between the processes, the role of main actors involved, actions 




This chapter presents the analysis of the two processes described in the previous chapter: 1) 
the increase in productivity levels, and 2) the change in the commercialization policy of 
Semp Toshiba. The analysis seeks to identify and discuss the main conditions which have 
enabled the occurrence of organizational learning at Semp Toshiba. The first section 
discusses whether Semp Toshiba has accumulated any knowledge with the development of 
the processes. The second section identifies the main triggers for the processes. The third 
section is the core of the chapter and di scusses each process by: a) identifying its main 
objectives, b) identifying what has been learned by Semp Toshiba, and c) proposing and 
discussing the main enabling conditions for organizational learning in each process. The 
fourth section presents a general view of all enabling conditions proposed and their 
relationship with the evolution of the processes. The fifth and final section establishes some 
links between the processes and the decision-making and organizational theory literatures, 
drawing the reader' s attention to the presence of factors related to both structure and 
managerial agency for the inception and evolution of the processes. 
7.1 Has Semp Toshiba Accumulated any Knowledge? 
The first point to be addressed is whether Semp Toshiba has acquired or created any 
knowledge with the evolution of the two processes. It was already mentioned in Chapter 3 
that the criteria for choosing the processes studied were their relevance for the company and 
their learning potential. In Semp Toshiba's case, its highly successful performance in the last 
few years, and the association established by the interviewees between the changes resulting 
from the processes and the company's performance indicate the occurrence of organizational 
learning. It is quite reasonable to assume that the cost reductions yielded by the increase in 
productivity, the successful media can1paign and the changes in the commercialization policy 
were directly related to the improvement in the company's performance. In the view of its 
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managers, Semp Toshiba has changed many of its procedures, some of them in a quite 
fundamental way, and those changes have proved highly beneficial for the company, its 
owners and its present employees. In other words, from the outcomes of the processes it is 
possible to infer that these have fostered a number of dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen 1992) within Semp Toshiba which have put the company in a very strong competitive 
position in its sector. What requires better understanding is which aspects of those changes 
can be regarded as central for the achievement of the outcomes, and this is what this chapter 
discusses. 
On analysing the processes studied, the first characteristic which caught my attention was the 
perception that if I considered each sub-process individually they would appear quite 
ordinary. Some of them are managerial practices widely implemented in companies around 
the world in the last fifteen years or so. However, their aggregated impact on the competitive 
position of Semp Toshiba has been remarkable. And that is not due to the company' s 
competitors being inefficient or the competitive environment slack. On the contrary, the 
sector is highly competitive, with the presence of many important world players and the 
recent arrival of some aggressively competitive companies. It is highly probable that at least 
some of those managerial practices are present in these companies, although with possibly 
different outcomes. The Brazilian market, mainly for TVs, has been growing at impressive 
rates in the last three years but Semp Toshiba has managed not only to follow this growth but 
to actually gain significant market share (see Figure 6.4). Thus, the study became even more 
interesting for me. What is it that made each process studied so successful and, moreover, the 
combination of them yield such remarkable outcomes? Which characteristics of their 
evolution can be deemed as central for achieving such outcomes? 
Bearing in mind the changes in the external environment described in the previous chapter, 
let me recall some of the values ofSemp Toshiba ' s internal environment, described in section 
6.2 : profit making, strong work ethic, attainment of results, being highly competitive and 
caution in relation to the external environment. In addition, there are a lso the characteristics 
of lean structure, fast implementation of decisions, clearly defined objectives and good 
relationships with retailers. It is with these values and characteristics in mind that the 
evolution of the processes will be discussed. 
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7.2. Triggers 
It is possible to identify a number of triggers for the two process of changes at Semp Toshiba, 
some external and some internal. Externally, the changes in the Brazilian economy from 
1990 onwards, with the reduction of import tariffs and the ' invasion ' of the market by 
imported products indicated to companies located in the country the necessity of a change in 
the basis of their performance towards better cost management and product quality. The 
recession in 1992-93 made sales an increasingly difficult task and reinforced the importance 
of price as a competitive factor. Internally, the appointment of Mr Loeb as Industrial Director 
in 1989 represented the arrival of a manager with both experience in the industrial and 
managerial processes which were later implemented in the company, and a positive 
leadership style spontaneously acknowledged by all his subordinates who I interviewed. The 
appointment of Mr Lellis as Commercial Director, also in 1989, represented the arrival of 
someone with a deep knowledge of both the market and the work of salesmen, and also a 
person who was able and willing to listen and di scuss ideas with his tean1. 
Although the changes in the economic environment of the country impacted many sectors, 
and consumer electronics was one of the most strongly affected, actions taken by the different 
companies in response to these changes varied remarkabl y. As was mentioned in the previous 
chapter, whi lst some companies in the audio sector almost immediately closed down 
operations for failing or not willing to adapt to the new environment1, Semp Toshiba took 
that opportunity to outsource all its audio line to Asian producers and continue to be present 
in the sector. Another swift action from Semp Toshiba was related to the procurement of 
components for its TV and VCR lines. With the lowering of import tariffs, the company has 
managed to buy components for very attractive prices in the international market, with an 
agility which was praised by a Toshiba representative in the company . Such agility has 
greatly helped the company in reducing its production costs. Mr Loeb observed that he had to 
replace the manager responsible for the international procurement sector three times until he 
found someone who could do the job in a way that conformed to the necessities of the 
company. 
1 See Johnson ( 1987) for a discuss ion of how managers of the clothing firm Foster Brothers had difficulties in 
adapting to a modified competitive environment. 
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Another distinctive movement for the company was the decision to increase production 
volwnes as a way of cutting costs during a period of recession. These decisions are an 
example that, although objective changes occurred in the macro economic level, companies 
in the same industry responded differently to them. Some of these environmental changes had 
an institutional character, as when the Amazonas state government required the ISO9000 
certification for companies installed in the Manaus' Free Trade Zone. That can be seen as an 
example of coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell I 991 ), with government exerting 
pressure for change on companies towards more competitive products. However, even when 
some of the attitudes adopted by companies in the same sector were similar2, as many 
consumer electronics companies in Brazil embarked on programmes aimed at reducing costs 
and increasing quality and productivity, the success achieved varied. Such different outcomes 
support the notion that managers have a considerable degree of discretion regarding the 
relationship between the company and the environment (Child 1972) or, in other words, that 
managers have some power to enact their environments (Weick 1969) . In the case of Semp 
Toshiba, the assessment of the environment, the making of decisions and their 
implementation have resulted in the successful management of processes of change. 
Although these processes have involved the whole company, they were internally started and 
given the guidelines for development by the two directors previously mentioned. 
7.3 Objectives, Content of Learning and Enabling Conditions 
The establislunent of objectives in principle relates to the outcomes expected by agents at the 
outset of processes. However, many of those objectives are usually set or expanded during 
the unfolding of the processes, as managers frequently have no clear idea about the outcomes 
they expect at the initial stages of decision-making processes (March and Olsen 1976a). In 
general , that seems to be the case in the processes described in the last chapter. There is the 
particular case of the stock reduction and quality progranunes, where Mr Loeb claims 
knowing beforehand exactly what he intended . It is difficult to know the truth about this 
particular point, as the research was carried out after the development of the processes. In any 
2 Spender ( I 989) discusses how managers in the same sector tend to share a common set of strategic recipes 
which may prevent th em to adopt innovative action when facing changes in the competitive environment. 
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case, the two sub-processes referred to by Mr Loeb are well known parts of Total Quality 
Management programmes and it is not inconceivable that he had indeed envisaged the 
objectives in anticipation. On the other hand, understanding of such objectives deepened as 
the processes developed. Nevertheless, what is important to discuss here is how the 
objectives were established and the implications they had within Semp Toshiba, in the sense 
of being either a 'natural' development of the situation or something that could challenge the 
status quo . The following sub-sections wi ll present the processes and sub-processes studied 
and discuss: a) the objectives and their implications for people involved and for the company; 
b) what has been learned by the company with the process; and c) the conditions I deem 
central for the occurrence of organizational learning in each process. Due to the 
characteristics of the processes, I decided to break down the stock reduction process into its 
three constituent sub-processes and discuss the changes in commercialization policy as a 
single process. 
7.3.1 Quality Programme 
For the quality programme, the internal objective was to obtain the 1SO9000 certificate and 
there was no dispute about this. Nevertheless, the implementation of the programme brought 
changes to some routines within the company, and that was occasionally resisted by the 
people involved. For the first time, some managers had to discuss with subordinates the tasks 
their area performed, and to consider changes suggested by them. That was an opportunity 
for people to make explicit the tacit knowledge they had about their jobs. However, the 
coordinator of the programme told me that people usually felt wary of making criticisms in 
the presence of their managers about the way routines were performed. It took around six 
months of meetings for people to fee l comfortable enough to speak freely. Considering that 
the prograrrune did not represent any serious threat to the power of managers, it is possible to 
perceive how difficult it is to overcome the usual barriers hierarchy represents within 
organizations. This contrasts with the usually rosy image that much of the business literature 
on the ' learning organization' gives about the possibilities of change within organizations, 
usually glossing over questions of power. 
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Externally, the programme faced much more resistance, as suppliers frequently would not 
agree with the idea of assuming responsibilities and investments related to quality which had 
always been considered as a function of Semp Toshiba. For them, accepting or rejecting the 
programme indeed represented a vital decision, at least concerning their relationship with 
Semp Toshiba. 
With regard to what Semp Toshiba has learned with the quality programme, the main points 
that can be highlighted are: a) formalization of all procedures comprised in the programme, 
which demanded the review of each component of the procedures, and consequent 
optimization of routines mentioned above; b) better understanding of systems within the 
company and the consequent broadening of the knowledge base on internal integration, partly 
as a result of the auditing regularly executed in all areas included in the programme; c) 
continuous improvement of the procedures, also as a result of auditing, as the company is 
reassessed every six months in order to have the quality certificate rei ssued; and, d) ability to 
make the programme compatible with the company ' s characteristic of fast decision-making 
and implementation. After receiving the 1SO9000 certificate, the company extended the 
quality progran1 to areas not covered before, like products' design, in order to qualify to 
receive more comprehensive certificates as the 1SO9004. That was accomplished in 1995 . 
This has given to the quality initiative within the company the character of a continuous 
learning process, where there is an external stimulus, the quality standard; an internal drive 
which establi shes the obtainment of a ce1iificate as an objective; a learning process for 
adapting the company to the requirements of the standard; and an internalization of the new 
know-how. A more comprehensive standard is then set as the next objective, starting off a 
new learning process. 
The conditions I see as being central for enabling organizational learning through the quality 
programme are discussed below. 
Intention relates to commitment which the group responsible for the programme had 
throughout the whole process, despite the initial difficulties and the relatively long period of 
time it took for them to fee l the real possibility of a successful outcome. It also relates to the 
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support the company's Board gave to the programme, including the approval of investments, 
despite the lack of visible outcomes in the short term. 
Cross-functional teamwork relates to the fact that the both the committee which steered the 
implementation of the programme and the tasks forces were composed of members from 
different areas with.in the company. That allowed a wide range of knowledge about the 
company to be brought into the discussions and implementation, facilitating integration. This 
also helped in the sense of people in different areas not seeing the programme as a property 
of one specific area. 
Autonomy given by the Board to the committee to set all implementation strategy for the 
programme. Autonomy also given by the committee to the areas to define their procedures 
and possible changes in them. Within the areas, such autonomy meant that there was no 
interference from the committee in the decisions about how they should work and, this made 
the implementation of the programme, even when it brought changes, more acceptable for the 
people involved. For the committee, autonomy meant the possibili ty of implementing the 
programme in the way they judged best fitted for the company. However, thi s autonomy had 
clear boundaries establi shed by both the objective of obtaining the quality certificate and the 
directions contained in the instructions related to the 1SO9000 standard. 
Control was exerted by the Board over the committee and by the committee over the task 
forces . Both had objectives to achieve and deadlines to meet. Control can be seen as opposite 
to the autonomy mentioned above, but striking a balance between the two was an important 
step in implementing the progran1me. Such balance was central in meeting the demand from 
the Industrial Director that the implementation of the qual ity progran1me should not put at 
ri sk the company's characteristic of fast decision-making. Control was also exerted over the 
suppliers who agreed to promoting quality measures in their own companies. 
Openness was another characteri stic shown by the committee, particularly when accepting 
suggestions from members in the task fo rces about how to overcome resistance from areas 
managers, which led to the policy of non interference. Openness was also important in 
adapting the content of training for workers in Manaus. This characteristic helps to create an 
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environment propitious to the sharing of ideas, which is described in the organizational 
learning literature as the sharing of mental models (Kim 1993, Senge I 990a). 
Time as ally relates to the fact that the committee allowed a large period of time fo r people in 
their areas to bring their procedures into discussion, to the degree necessary fo r them to fe ll 
comfortable enough to reveal their opinions in the presence of their managers. This was 
considered by interviewees as being of fundamental importance in helping changes in 
procedures to occur. On the other hand, this did not mean that the programme had no 
implementation deadlines, but rather that the autonomy given to the committee allowed that 
the initial di fficulties related to the active participation of employees was taken in 
consideration when fix ing deadlines. 
Gradualism was an approach adopted during the implementation, with changes being made 
step-by-step, but at a steady pace. So, the committee managed to stri ke a balance between too 
sudden changes, which would have to be imposed and possibly resisted, and a very slow 
pace, which would give room to discredi t the process. The nature of the changes, affecting as 
they did the daily routines perfo rmed by people, required a period of internalization of the 
modified prax is, and that was made easier because the changes were the result of discussions 
involving the very people affected. 
Unlearning occurred when routines were changed. Although the quali ty program has started 
from top level within the organization, the changes in routines within the areas were a result 
of internal di scussions and, therefore, the unlearning process was not fo rced from outside. In 
thi s case, changes in routines involved both cognitive and behavioural changes fo r the people 
involved. The aforementioned use of ti me appears to have been important for the evolution of 
such smooth unlearning process. 
Training was largely used fo r informing personnel about the programme and preparing at 
least one employee from each area to take part in the task fo rces. Training involved the 
diffusion of explicit knowledge and the internalization by participants of the programme's 
goals. 
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External information gathering was used at the initial stages as a way to make members of 
the committee more knowledgeable about the programme. Both visits to other companies and 
talks given by consultants and members of companies which had already implemented a 
programme were used. 
Institutional support from external agents had an indirect but important effect on calling 
people's attention to the debate on quality and also on reinforcing the objective of obtaining 
the certificate. The former happened in the early l 990's, when important newspapers 
continuously published articles about the ISO9000 standard and quality programmes in their 
business sections. The latter when the Amazonas state government required the ISO9000 
certification for companies installed in the Manaus ' Free Trade Zone. The influence of 
institutions on organizations has been the object of growing attention in both organization 
and economics literatures, but it can be more subtle than these analysis usually acknowledge. 
For instance, information acquired while reading a newspaper on a quiet Sunday morning at 
home can sometimes have more impact than the same information received in a memo 
circulated at work. Internally, the already mentioned ove1i support from the company' s Board 
to the implementation committee can also be viewed as an institutional support, as the 
initiative carried the weight of the company' s nan1e and was recognized as such by 
employees. 
Dynamic objectives relates to the way that, after receiving the ISO9000 certificate, the 
company then sought to obtain other quality certificates involving a larger number of 
procedures. Such engagement demonstrates the commitment of top management to furthering 
quality improvements, which has as consequence a continuing learning process related to 
quality. 
Codification relates to the formal description of routines performed by each area. It was a 
requirement for obtaining the quality certificate, but the involvement of many employees in 
the activity of codification represented an extra opportunity for transforming tacit into 
explicit knowledge. Moreover, the description can be used as both a memory of each area' s 
routines, so that new employees can refer to them when learning their jobs, and a control 
instrwnent, as the routines are audited periodically. 
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7.3.2 Stock Reduction 
For the stock reduction process, the initial objectives were set by Mr Loeb and they perplexed 
his subordinates. The hierarchical style of Semp Toshiba appears to have assisted in 
overcoming such perplexity, in the sense that the objectives were not immediately resisted by 
managers. They were received with scepticism but managers knew that they had to discuss 
with Mr Loeb possible ways of achieving them. The hierarchical style does not mean that 
subordinates have no voice in decision-making, but rather that in the lack of a consensus 
among the team the final word always belongs to the superior, and, after a decision is taken, 
all people involved must direct their best efforts towards the objectives. Thus, the clear 
hierarchy is a characteristic of the company culture, but the willingness to involve 
subordinates in discussions which lead to decisions and, consequently, in actions necessary to 
implement them is a characteristic of the management style of the Industrial Director. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to infer that top managers have some discretion to act within 
an existent organizational culture in ways which respect the basic principles of this culture 
but also leave room for attitudes which are not usually associated with it. Acting in this way, 
top managers can provide a context where other members of the organization can fee l 
encouraged to contribute with their own experiences (Fial 1994, Hedberg 1981 , Mintzberg 
and Westley 1992, Nonaka 1994). In the case of the stock reduction process, such context 
involved a paradox between an objective which appeared to be unachievable for the team and 
the necessity of finding a consensual way of achieving it. Child (1997) propose that 
.. it may be necessary to susta in certa in paradoxes for learning to take place as a 
collective phenomenon in organizations, such as the need to achieve consensus from a 
diversity of v iews and the preservation of some continuities within the process of 
introducing change" . 
This seems to be quite app licable to the situation of the stock reduction process at Semp 
Toshiba. 
With regard to what Semp Toshiba has learned with the process, the main aspects are: a) a 
different mindset concerning the relationship between stock and production, from high stock 
meaning safety for production, to low level of a balanced stock (items in the right 
proportional quantities) meaning cost saving and production flexibility; b) better control 
over suppliers, with low stock they must deliver products at the right time and with the 
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required quality, and, also, with fewer suppliers and supplies it became easier to identify 
problems; and c) knowing that stock management could be done in a different and more 
efficient way resulted in a willingness to make further improvements. This last issue has been 
vital for establishing the continuity of the process, as the company has consistently set new 
lower targets fo r its stock level. On trying to improve its stock management Semp Toshiba 
has found new ways of increasing its productivity levels, in a process similar to what 
happened at Toyota (Coriat 1993). 
The conditions I see as being central for enabling organizational learning through the stock 
reduction process are discussed below. 
Newcomer as source of innovation, in the person of Mr Loeb, who brought into the company 
the idea of reducing stocks. The ro le of newcomers as diffusers of information and, therefore, 
as sources of innovation, is acknowledged in the organ izational learning literature (Huber 
1991 , Levitt and March 1988). The Industrial Director borrowed the idea fro m previous 
working experiences and also from his visits to other Toshiba's plants, scanning the 
environment and acting in a way similar to what the irmovation literature calls ' boundary 
spanner' (Aldrich and Herker 1977, Tushman and Scanlan 1981). 
Intention relating to the commitment of all six managers involved in the process, especially 
the Industrial Director who kept saying to the team that the objective was feasible, when the 
others did not believe it. 
Leadership exerted by the Industrial Director throughout the whole process. Bringing new 
ideas, estab lishing objectives, debating suggestions coming from managers, coordinating the 
managerial team, proposing solutions to some problems, personally thanking managers and 
employees fo r their collaboration every time an object ive was reached, were attitudes which 
provided a context were teamwork could flourish and organizational learning occur. 
Cross-functional teamwork, starting from the tean1 which guided the process, was paramount 
fo r its accomplishment. This team included managers from four different areas within the 
Industrial Division and, as tasks were being defined, cross-functional teams of workers were 
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involved in their implementation. Furthermore, as could be observed in the previous chapter, 
the three sub-processes which led to improved productivity were closely interconnected and 
involved different areas and tasks. Coordination, achieved through teamwork was vital. As 
one sub-process impacts the others, improvements in any of them frequently involved 
changes in the others. Thus, cross-functional teamwork was an important source of variety in 
ideas for problem solving. There is also the question of teams working interdependently 
between the two sites of the company, which are geographically very distant from each other. 
This adds another dimension, space, to the coordination of teams. 
Partnership with Toshiba has been important as an exemplar and as a support. The former 
comes through the visits of Semp Toshiba ' s managers to Toshiba 's plants, from where most 
of the ideas which started the processes were drawn, and is an example of external 
information gathering. In this case the concept of external is relative as Semp Toshiba is a 
company affiliated to Toshiba, and such status allows its managers full access to Toshiba ' s 
plants. The latter is exemplified in the assistance Toshiba gives to Semp Toshiba in the 
procurement of parts from foreign suppliers. Although the negotiation is done by Semp 
Toshiba's personnel , the global brand name of Toshiba and its previous relationship with 
some of those suppliers has helped build a direct relationship between Semp Toshiba and 
them. Thus, sometimes in a indirect way, the partnership with Toshiba has helped the 
company towards an easier integration into international markets for components following 
the lowering of import tariffs in Brazil. As was mentioned before, agility has played a 
decisive role in lowering costs. 
Unlearning was crucial for the evolution of the stock reduction process. From the three sub-
processes which led to the increase in productivity, this was the one which involved the most 
radical change in the way people worked. The objectives proposed actually pointed in the 
opposite direction to established ·practices and beliefs. Within the tean1 which guided the 
process, peer pressure from those who were more quickly convinced of the merits of the new 
ways of operating, was an effective attitude towards unlearning. However, two other issues 
appear to have been even more fundamental for unlearning to occur. One was the use of 
power over those who resisted more strongly to the changes. Thus, some middle managers 
were relocated to other functions in the company when top managers felt they were not acting 
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in accord with the new requirements. This sort of forced change may have not changed the 
beliefs of the individual who was relocated, at least initially, and, therefore, unlearning has 
not occurred at this level. But when the manager who took over started to act differently from 
his predecessor, it is possible to say that the company has unlearned because its praxis has 
truly changed. So, at the organizational level there has been a forced unlearning. 
The second way in which unlearning has occurred was the use of success as leverage. As the 
changes were gradually implemented, for instance, intervals for deliveries of supplies were 
reduced from monthly to fortnight ly, and then to weekly and so on, people started to perceive 
that the new procedures were not only feasible but also were bringing benefits for production, 
and resistance was broken. The point here is that some interviewees admitted that, at the 
beginning, even when people were acting according to what was expected from them, they 
were actually not convinced that the changes would be successful. Thus, at that stage, a 
behavioural change had occurred but a cognitive change had not. After the first positive 
results were visible, people indeed started to believe in the value of the changes and, then, it 
seems reasonable to say that a cognitive change had occurred. 
Dynamic objectives relates to the continuous resetting of objectives for stock management 
and suppliers ' delivery intervals. During the interviews I fe lt that managers were proud of the 
results achieved, but still willing to improve on them. The use of success as leverage has 
made possible this constant resetting of objectives which, in turn, starts a new cycle of 
organizational learning. Adoption of static objectives would, in contrast, mean that after they 
were achieved people would be satisfied, until , perhaps, a new crisis or sudden environmental 
change sparked off a new series of actions. The adoption of dynamic objectives is in line with 
the concept of dynan1ic capabilities proposed by Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1992 p.18) as ' the 
capacity of a firm to renew, augment, and adapt its core competences over time' . An 
important observation regarding the adoption of dynamic objectives in this case is that it has 
come for managers as a natural next step after an objective has been reached. The idea of 
continuous dissatisfaction may sound thrilling in theory but can be quite annoying in real life. 
That is exactly where the use of success as leverage can make further improvement a natural 
step. The emphasis is on a positive value, more success, and not on a negative one, 
dissatisfaction. 
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Gradualism was a policy adopted during the process which has facilitated its evolution. Due 
to the character of the changes, their acceptance and feasibility of implementation would be 
in serious ri sk if they were promoted all at once It is the gradual approach that has made 
possible the use of intermediate success as leverage for furthering the objectives. If one looks 
at the initial objectives and the outcomes of the changes, one might probably describe them 
as radical change, but when their development is examined in detail it is possible to perceive 
incremental evolution, which is a consequence of the gradual approach. 
Institutional support happened when some suppliers of large components moved their 
production lines to the Manaus region, making possible a deepening of the process. Some of 
those components, such as TV cabinets, are now delivered several times a day, eliminating 
the necessity for Semp Toshiba to stock them. On the other hand, this brought with it the 
necessity of reorganizing the production line in order to receive components straight from 
suppliers . Such reorganization involves close coordination of activities with suppliers, 
expanding the learning process outside the formal boundaries of the company. Thus, a new 
level of inter-organizational learning is added to the process. Institutional support is also 
present when the company uses the Toshiba brand to negotiate with foreign suppliers. 
Better control over both the stock and suppliers was, at the same time, part and consequence 
of the process. The evolution of the process allowed to the company better control which, in 
turn, allowed further development in stock reduction and coordination with suppliers. 
7.3.3 Assembly Line 
Concerning the changes in the assembly line, the idea of outsourcing was brought in by the 
Industrial Director with the usual justification for such measures, that is, the company should 
concentrate on what it does best and leave low added-value tasks to smaller companies. The 
people who were immediately affected were the workers whose tasks were outsourced. The 
strategy of finding jobs for these people at the companies which took over the tasks avoided 
most of the problems related to lay ing them off. Other groups affected were the new 
suppliers, some of which did not even exist before starting to work for Semp Toshiba. For 
these small companies the process has represented a significant learning experience, as they 
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have to comply with production standards which, although generally simple, are more 
sophisticated than the ones they used before. 
The acquisition of automatic insertion machines was jointly decided by Brazilian and 
Japanese directors as a consequence of the previous decision to increase production volumes 
and also as a way of avoiding human errors in product assembly. Their introduction on the 
assembly line was preceded by training and reorganization of work routines in order to adapt 
to the new machinery. The introduction of the Kaizen activity was suggested by the Japanese 
Technical Director. For the Kaizen, tasks objectives are decided by each Kaizen group of 
workers, but controlled by the company' s managers. 
With regard to what Semp Toshiba has learned with the changes in the assembly line, the 
main aspects are: a) purposeful optimization of the assembly line, with more flexibility , 
decreasing assembly times and higher productivity; b) knowledge successfully transfe1Ted to 
suppliers which took over the outsourced activities; c) a series of small improvements in the 
production processes as a result of Kaizen activities; and d) knowledge on how to identify 
points for improvement in production processes. 
The conditions I see as being central for enabling organizational learning through the changes 
in the assembly line are discussed below. 
Newcomer as source of innovation, in the person of the Technical Director who came from 
Toshiba in Japan where he had worked with productivity systems. Mr Asakura brought the 
practice of Kaizen into Semp Toshiba, was directly involved in the introduction of new 
machinery in the assembly line, and also organized the outsourcing of activities. 
Intention relates to the commitment of the team responsible for implementing the changes. 
As it was described in the previous chapter, the initial objective was to increase productivity 
and reduce costs in order to be able to compete with imported products. Not only was this 
accomplished but also the company became one of the most productive in its sector in the 
country. 
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Cross-functional teamwork is a maj or characteristic of the Kaizen activity. Improvement in 
production processes are usually achieved through small changes in one sector of production 
which make the work of another sector easier. It is this understanding of the integration 
between different sectors within the production line which allows improvements to be 
achieved. In the outsourcing sub-process, production engineers worked with the new 
suppliers in order to set up their operations. 
Partnership wilh Toshiba has been central fo r changes in the assembly line. Kaizen 
specialists from Toshiba have regularly visited Semp Toshiba to give training and make 
suggestions on how to improve productivity. All Kaizen prograrnmes are inspired by 
Toshiba 's Kaizen. Reorganization of the assembly line to fac ilitate the introduct ion of new 
machinery was supervised by the Technical Director. 
Gradualism was also adopted in this process. It is, by definition, part of the Kaizen 
philosophy. It was also used fo r the outsourcing, where the company first tried it with a small 
number of tasks, acquired experience with dealing with small companies as suppliers, and 
then expanded their numbers. When quality problems occurred with some suppliers, the 
company left speciali sts working within the supplier as long as was necessary fo r the 
problems to be solved. 
Autonomy is given to members of the Kaizen groups to decide which problems they want to 
tackle and how they will do it. This is considered important in order to foster creative 
solutions. Autonomy is also given to small suppliers which can work for Semp Toshiba's 
competitors, even when they are using Semp Toshiba ' s equipment. According to the head of 
the Industrial Engineering Division, some suppliers already suggested small changes in their 
products inspired by those contacts with other companies, in an indirect form of external 
information gathering for the company. This is, to some degree, similar to what Smith, Child 
and Rawlinson (Smith, Child and Rawlinson 1990) describe in the case of Cadburys, when 
equipment suppliers provided information about production technology to the company. 
Openness is an important requirement for teamwork within the Kaizen groups. Members of 
the groups have to discuss and implement suggestions that sometimes were preferred by the 
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group over their own personal suggestions. Moreover, they also have to implement 
suggestions given by workers from other areas which alter their work routines. 
Control, on the other hand, was exerted over the Kaizen groups in the initial stages, in order 
to established limits for the changes that could be undertaken through their activities. In other 
words, the company made sure that workers suggested changes which basically considered 
the interest of the company, as defined by its owners, in first place. Control is also exerted 
over suppliers, mainly related to quality and delivery time issues. The changes in the main 
assembly line, involving mechanization, setting of production times and training of workers, 
all involved a tighter control over production, here comprising both processes and personnel. 
Training was important for setting up operations in the small suppliers. Although in many 
cases a former employee of Semp Toshiba, who used to do the same task previously, was 
working in the supplier, in other cases that did not happen. Also, with the increase in 
production, some activities were outsourced and the workers responsible fo r them stayed in 
company doing different tasks . In this case, both those workers and the new suppliers had to 
be trained. There is also regular training given by Kaizen specialists from Toshiba. 
Dynamic objectives is another characteri sti c of Kaizen. When one activity is fi nished, 
members of the group e lect another process to be improved. The outsourcing and 
mechanization activ ities have also had their objectives expanded, as a consequence of the 
rapid growth in production volumes. The effect of dynamic obj ectives in this sub-process has 
been the sam e as in the others, renewal of the organizational learning cycle. 
7.3.4 Commercialization Policy 
The changes in the commercialization policy should be seen as complementary to those at the 
Industrial Division. If the success of the fo rmer heavily depended on the outcomes of the 
latter, the opposite is also true. The two processes, therefore, fo rm a virtuous circle where 
intermediate successes fed the continui ty of changes. 
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At the Commercial Division, the changes were conducted by the Commercial Director, who 
had recently assumed his position, and the two General Sales Managers, who have worked at 
Semp Toshiba for many years. The first group of measures was directed at the structure of the 
div ision and their objective was to facilitate internal communications. As it was described in 
the previous chapter, managers concluded that information transmitted was being distorted by 
the excessive number of layers within the company. According to Edmondson and Moingeon 
(1996 p.24), " learning in organizations is dependent upon being able to transmit relevant 
information without distortion - to enable high levels of understanding and productive 
decision making". The immediate implications for people was the lay off of some regional 
managers, the hiring of more representatives and an increase in work load for the General 
Sales Managers. For the company it meant that top managers within the division would be 
closer to the market and this outcome influenced the decisions for other changes (Mintzberg, 
Raisinghani and Theoret 1976). 
The reduction in the model range was suggested and initially supported by the same people, 
but they were inspired by talks with retai lers about which products were sell ing well. In 
economic terms, it would only make sense for the company with the simultaneous increase in 
the production volumes of the remaining models. That depended on support from the 
company' s President and agreement and cooperation from the Industrial Division. In that 
case, the openness from the President in agreeing to try the new strategy, and the ro le of the 
Commercial Director in convincing the President and the Industrial Director seem to have 
been fundamental. Another factor that may have helped is that the Commercial and the 
Industrial Directors assumed their positions in the same year and, therefore, started to work 
together. Added to their individual styles, that might have made ideas coming from the other 
area more acceptable, as there was no such thing as an ' old guard ' and a ' newcomer' battling 
fo r power within the company. I personally witnessed an exan1ple of the good interaction 
between these two directors during an interview with the Commercial Director, when we 
were interrupted by a telephone call from the Industrial Director who asked the Commercial 
Director which products, quantities and dates fo r delivery he thought the company should 
plan for the following month. According to the Commercial Director, such sort of 
consultation was not a practice within the company before they two arrived. Also, in an 
interview with Semp Toshiba' s President, he acknowledged the importance of those two 
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directors by defining Mr Loeb as someone more in tune with his (the President's) ideas than 
his predecessors, and Mr Lellis as a Commercial Director who ' se lls the company' s products 
to retailers ', whi le his predecessors used simply to ' deliver those products ', not negotiating 
for the benefit of Semp Toshiba. 
In relation to the changes in the relationship with retailers, this is a process which has 
developed over time, again under the inspiration of the Commercial Director. The objectives 
have been the construction of a better relationship between the company and the retailers, 
based on trust and interdependence. Its implications have been enormous for Semp Toshiba, 
as it can be directly associated with the increase in market share achieved by the company in 
the last few years. For people involved, the most affected were the representatives, as their 
work load has notably increased. On the other hand, for the majority of them their sales 
volumes, and consequently their income, has also increased. 
With regard to what has been leaned by Semp Toshiba with the changes in commercialization 
policy, the points that can be highlighted are: a) faster and qualitatively better feedback from 
the market; b) better relationship with retai lers involving mutual help to compensate market 
fluctuations ; and, c) better control over the performance of representatives, including their 
relationship with retailers. 
The conditions I see as being central for enabling organizational learning through the changes 
in the commercialization policy are discussed below. 
Newcomer as source of innovalion, in the person of the Commercial Director. In this case, 
Mr Lellis is a singular newcomer as he had previously worked as Semp Toshiba' s sales 
representative for many years, but that is a function undertaken outside the company, a link 
between the company and retailers. What he seems to have brought into the company is a 
closer connection with retai lers, the idea that the company should work in partnership with 
them. With his first hand experience of the market, he seems to be able to understand the 
retailers needs and, moreover, to reconci le these needs with Semp Toshiba' s interests. 
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Intention relates to the commitment from the team, mainly from the Commercial Director 
and the two General Sales Managers, in convincing representatives and retailers of the new 
policy. The three of them were personally involved in frequently talking to both retai lers and 
representatives. Even after the changes were accomplished, the General Sales Managers 
continued to travel around the country helping representatives which are facing difficulties, 
and listening to retailers' suggestions. 
Leadership by the Commercial Director who brought a new way of commercializing to the 
company and guided his managers on how to achieve the objectives. The leadership style 
involved listening to what subordinates and retailers had to say and taking that into 
consideration when making decisions. Again his first hand experience appears to have been 
important as Mr Lellis would frequently discuss sales strategies with representatives with full 
knowledge about their jobs. 
Autonomy given to representatives to negotiate with retailers, as a consequence of the cut on 
regional managers. Autonomy also given by the Commercial Director to the General Sales 
Managers to solve problems with representatives and retailers. 
Control as a counterbalance to autonomy. Thus, representatives have autonomy to work out 
deals with retailers as far as they manage to accomplish their sales quotas. Also, feedback 
about the representatives, from retailers directly to the General Sales Managers, functions as 
a control over the quality of their work. The company has also a detailed control over the 
performance of each retailer in relation to Semp Toshiba ' s products and use it when 
distributing products. 
Openness from the team to listen to suggestions at all levels. In a function were the contact 
with clients is direct and their satisfaction paramount for success, openness is a vital 
characteristic. That seems an obvious point but indeed difficult to be put in practice. 
Suggestions many times imply in direct or indirect criticism about the current policy. 
Openness relates not only to listen but to actually analyse suggestions and promote policies 
which take them into consideration. The example given by the Commercial Director's style 
appears to have inspired his team to behave in a similar way. 
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lnter-organizalional network as a result of the new relationship with retailers. The presence 
of purchasing managers from the main retailers criticizing mock ups of products have greatly 
increased the company knowledge about market requirements. In a different arrangement, the 
marketing function of the company is practically undertaken by an adverti sing agency. The 
Brazilian Vice-president is responsible fo r the marketing area within the company and works 
together with the agency, which, besides doing the media campaign, collects info rmation 
directly from consumers. These activities have also characteri zed the use of external 
information gathering. 
Figure 7.1 depicts the fl ow of information which leads to the choice of models that will be 
produced by Semp Toshiba. Such choice is a result of matching the market requirements, as 
presented by both the Commercial Division and the adverti sing agency, the models produced 
by Toshiba in other countries and the feas ibili ty of producing these models in Brazil , as 
defined by the Industrial Division. After being chosen, the models usually undergo 
modifications in order to be adapted to local conditions like components, broadcasting 
standard and external look. 
Unlearning occurred mainly for representatives who had to change their routines towards 
more frequent visits to clients. The fi rst attempts by the company' s managers was directed to 
convince representatives of the necessity of working in a different way in order to sell the 
increasing production volume. However, those who did not changed afte r some time were 
either repl aced or had to share their geographical areas with new representatives, reducing 
their number of clients. In this case, it is possible to identify the occurrence of a fo rced 
w1Jearning at the company level, as a result of the use of power by managers. At the 
individual level, the pattern was similar to what happened within the company wi th the stock 
reduction process . After the sales started to grow in different regions of the COW1try , resistant 
representatives were convinced of the merits of the new policy. 
Time was an important facto r, as the process was not plarmed beforehand. It was basically 
constituted by a chain of decisions, where the outcomes of one led to the next. Obj ectives 
were defined during the development of the process. In this sense, gradualism can also be 
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in productivity, but as an intrinsic characteri stic of the process. Time was also important in 
convincing some representatives of the benefit s of the change, as the increase in sales over 
time cemented support. 
Success as leverage was a lso important to give continuity to the process. For representatives 
and retailers which were already working with the company ' s products, increasing sales were 
an argument fo r greater vo lumes in the fo llowing orders. With retailers which were not 
selling Semp Toshiba ' s products, representatives would use the company success to try to 
attract their attention. 
Dynamic objectives in re lation to sales volumes have been a constant in the last few years. 
The Brazilian market has grown at high rates after 1992 (Figure 6.4), but Semp Toshiba ' s 
production has grown even more. The objectives are set between the Commercial and the 
Industrial Divisions, but it is the former which practica lly suggests the numbers, with the 
latter analysing the feas ibili ty of producing them. During the interviews I could see how 
managers at the Conunercial Division were enthusiastic about finding ways fo r achieving the 
initial targets fo r TVs sales in 1995 , which represented a 63% increase over I 994. A ll 
comments were positive, with managers believing that they could do it. In the end, the 
company managed to increase sales in 50%, which was considered very good. 
Institutional support was given through the media can1paign. The institution here is Semp 
Toshiba itself, whose image with consumers was strongly reinforced by the campaign. Thus, 
the support was given not only through the investment made in adverti sement, but chiefly 
through the return of this investment in the fo rm of consumers associating the company' s 
products with technology and quali ty. Interviewees observed that sales to retailers were 
faci li tated by the campaign. Retailers conunented that they were happy with the constant 
presence of the company in the med ia because that made them fee l supported in their sales 
effort. 
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7.4 Linking the Enabling Conditions for Organizational Learning to 
Process Development 
Table 7. 1 presents the enabling conditions fo r organizational learning I have identified in the 
processes and sub-processes studied at Semp Toshiba. 
A few other points on the enabling conditions can be added to the discussion already made 
previously in the chapter. Five conditions are present in all sub-processes; intention, dynamic 
objectives, control, gradualism and external information gathering. Intention was evident in 
the sub-processes related to the increase in productivity, as managers planned in advance the 
changes implemented. Regarding the changes in commercialization, although managers did 
not plan them, and that is an issue that I will return to later in the chapter, intention to achieve 
the objectives in each stage was always present. 
Control can be seen as one side of a coin, whereas autonomy is the other side. Control was 
mainly used by managers as an instrwnent fo r assessing the achievement of objectives. The 
presence of external information gathering shows readiness from the company in searching 
the environment for information which could help both the definition of objectives and the 
implementation of change. Gradualism was a chosen approach in the sub-processes which led 
to the increase in productivity, and an intrinsic characteri stic of the changes in 
commercia lization policy . 
I did not include newcomer as source of innovation as one of the enabling conditions for 
organizational learning in the quality programme because, although the Industrial Director 
was responsible for the initiative of implementing the programme, many other companies in 
Brazil were also involved in quality initiatives at the time. It seems reasonable to asswne that 
Semp Toshiba would, sooner or later, also implement a quality progran1me. 
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Table 7.1 
Enabling Conditions for Organizational Learning 
in the Processes Studied at Semp Toshiba 
Productivity Commercialization 
Enabling Conditions for Quality Stock Assembly 
Organizational Leaming Programme Reduction Line 
Newcomer as Source oflnnovation X X X 
Intention X X X X 
Leadership X X 
Cross-Functional Teamwork X X X 
Inter-Organizational Network X 
Partnership with Toshiba X X 
Institutional Support X X X 
Unlearning X X X 
Power X X 
Success as Leverage X X 
Dynamic Objectives X X X X 
Gradualism X X X X 
Autonomy X X X 
Openness X X X 
Time X X 
Training X X 
Codification X 
Control X X X X 
External Information Gathering X X X X 
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Cross-functional teamwork was germane to the evolvement of all three sub-processes within 
the Industrial Division. For the commercialization changes, a similar characteristic, inter-
organizational network was, and sti ll is, paramount for their successful implementation and 
continuity. Integration of different activities, being then internal , as in the first processes, or 
external , as in the second, is an effective way of both increasing the quality and speeding up 
processes. That can be an important source of advantage in a competitive industTy like the 
consumer electronics. The processes studied, besides yie lding the results directly related to 
each of them, seem to have allowed Semp Toshiba to achieve such integration. Furthermore, 
managers within the company appear to perceive the importance of such integration. They 
frequently praised during the interviews the freedom existing within the company for people 
to involve whoever is necessary fo r solving a problem. The san1e can be said in relation to the 
external network, with the current dominant mentality being characterized by a partnership 
with retailers. Thus, integration is a component of teamwork/network, but is also a 
consequence of it. A flexible structure, one which allows for integration, facilitates 
teamwork/network. But in perceiving the benefits the company can reap from integration, 
managers actively strive to build a flexible structure. 
It is interesting to observe that while some conditions are present in all four processes/sub-
processes, others are related to only some of them. On trying to understand what could link 
certain conditions to specific processes, I decided to question the type of changes occurred in 
organizational routines and also the dominant character of the development of each 
process/sub-process studied. Those two issues appear to be not only relevant for 
organizational learning, but also presenting different features within the processes. 
In relation to organizational routines, it seems clear that the stock reduction and the changes 
in commercialization policy represented the most radical changes for people involved. A 
strong support fo r this conclusion is the occurrence of forced unlearning in both cases. 
Taking the development of the two broad processes in consideration, while the increase in 
productivity can be described as a deliberate strategy, the changes in c01runercialization 
policy can be viewed more as an emergent strategy (Mintzberg 1994), in the sense that they 
were a result of measures which were decided separately, each one as a consequence of a 
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previous decision. But examining in more detail the sub-processes of the increase in 
productivity, it is also possible to conclude that, while the whole process may have been 
planned, the implementation of the quality program involved changes in work routines which 
were a result of proposals coming from the employees involved, which gives to the sub-
process also an emergent 's ide'. The same can be said about the Kaizen, whose practice, 
although planned by the company, is based on suggestions coming from workers, again an 
emergent ' side' of the process. Those conclusions support Mintzberg's (1994 p.25) 
observation that 
" ... few, if any, strategies can be purely deliberate, and few can be purely emergent. One 
suggests no learning, the other, no control. All real-world strategies need to mix these in 
some way - to attempt to control without stopping the learning process", 
and also led me to try to identify the main source of knowledge in each process. The idea is 
that the source of knowledge can also help to understand why some of the proposed enabling 
conditions for organizational learning are only related to some of the processes studied . 
Table 7.2 lists the processes/sub-processes, the dominant character of their development, 
their main source of knowledge and the type of changes occurred in organizational routines. 
The joint analysis of tables 7.1 and 7.2 allows some insightful infe rences: 
a) the importance of leadership and unlearning, including forced organizational unlearning, 
in the two processes where organizational routines suffered radical changes; 
b) the use of success as leverage in the same processes helped cognitive changes to occur 
and, as a consequence, consolidated the adoption of new routines; 
c) the importance of autonomy and openness in the two processes within the Industrial 
Division where workers are source of knowledge; 
d) autonomy and openness are also important in the commercialization process, but here they 
are linked to the role of the inter-organizational network as source of knowledge. 
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Table 7.2 
Dominant Character of Process Development 
and Source of Knowledge 
Productivity 
Quality Stock Assembly 
Programme Reduction Line 
Dominant character Planned/ Planned Planned/ 
of development Emergent Emergent 
Main source of . Managers . Toshiba . Toshiba 
knowledge . Workers . Managers . Managers . Workers 
Change in Smooth Radical Not relevant 






From items a and b, it is possible to perceive a pattern where, in order to make radical 
changes in organizational routines, managers have forced change in behaviour. Successful 
outcomes from those behavioural changes were then instrumental for cognitive acceptance 
and learning. In items c and d it is possible to associate autonomy and ope1mess with 
transformation of tacit into explicit knowledge. 
The importance of time was identified at both the quality programme and the changes in 
commercialization policy. It seems related to the characteristic of emergent changes in these 
two processes. Jn the quality programme, changes were in part a result of suggestions coming 
from workers. As I mentioned before, time was necessary for workers to overcome 
hierarchical barriers and give suggestions for changes in routines. In the changes in 
commercialization policy, objectives were decided during the evolution of the process. Thus, 
although time may have not been consciously used fo r allowing changes to occur, it was an 
important factor in the process. 
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Finally, it seems never excessive to again draw the reader's attention to the fact that the 
resetting of objectives, or use of dynamic objectives as I called it, is what permitted the 
continuity of the processes as a cycle, giving to organizational learning a continuous 
character. 
7.5 Final Remarks 
Looking at the processes through a decision-making perspective takes us to the conclusion 
that the two broad group of processes can be considered strategic changes as they were taken 
at the higher levels of the company and they undoubtedly had strategic consequences 
(Mintzberg and Westley 1992). Considering the categories proposed by Hickson and his 
collaborators (1986), complexity and politicalit/ , the two processes can be assessed as 
carrying a high degree of complexity, with some variance among the sub-processes, and a 
low degree of politicality. Again, the hierarchical style of the company seems to have direct 
influence on the degree of poli ticality. It is possible to perceive from the values and 
characteristics of the company described at section 6.2 that the interviewees have always 
present the idea of accountability to superiors, of responsibilities clearly defined and 
necessity to achieve the objectives assigned to them. In an environment where there is no 
significant clashes between conflicting views about the objectives, people can concentrate on 
ways of achieving them. Thus, complex changes can be accomplished, as far as they do not 
challenge the power structure. 
I have already made the point that the if one looks at the situation of Semp Toshiba before 
and after the development of the processes studied, most probably the idea of radical change 
would come to mind. However, their development shows that, even when the outcomes 
represented a fundamental move from the initial situation, gradualism has always been an 
important characteristic. As a matter of fact, some interviewees who were directly involved 
3 Complexity refers to how complex a decision is in term of three variables: rarity, which relates to the 
frequency with which similar decision recur; consequentiality, which relates to how much commitment and 
consequences a decision carries; and precursiveness, which relates to whether a decision sets precedents. 
Politicality is the degree to which influence is exerted through a decision-making process upon the outcome. 
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with the processes acknowledged that the company has 'changed a lot ' during the processes, 
but also that there were no ' big leaps' during the processes. With his long term experience 
and view of the organization, Semp Toshiba's president perceives the changes as being a 
natural consequence of the evolution of the company. According to him, there was a 
"continuous search fo r many years which found a felicitous answer in a particular moment, 
with the solution of the problem of the Industrial Director and the Commercial Director" . He 
considers that a combination of factors was decisive for the successful performance in the last 
few years, namely : a) those two managers coming to work in the company at the san1e; b) an 
avai lability of own capita l, resulted from many years of careful financial management, which 
allowed the financing of the media campaign; and, c) the company being technically 
competent fo r the market, as a result of many years of assoc iation with Toshiba. His 
perception is similar to Pettigrew' s (1985 p.1) observation that " the more we look at present-
day events the easier it is to identify change; the longer we stay with an emergent process and 
the further back we go to disentangle its origins, the more we can identify continuities." 
Although Mr Henne! thinks of the processes as being 'natural ' , his mention to a ' continuous 
search for many years' allows us to, at least, quali fy the word ' natural' . The choice of the two 
directors does not seem to be only a case of serendipity , as Mr Henne! already knew both 
men for some years. What he defined as fortunate was the fact that both becan1e ava ilable for 
Semp Toshiba at the same time. The characteristics of the managers he wanted fo r the two 
positions, however, seem to have been relatively clear in his mind. 
It is also interesting to observe that the facto rs pointed by Mr Henne! involve both structure 
(capital, teclrnical fit with the market) and agency (managers), which bridges insights from 
both structural (Lawrence and Lorsch I 967) and cognitive (Argyri s 1993 , Weick 1969) 
theories of organizational behaviour about what is responsible for organizational outcomes. 
Mr Henne! perceptions also give strong support the strategic choice framework (Child 1972, 
Child 1997) in its basic aim of balancing the influences of agency and structure in 
organizational analysis. 
Regarding the role of Toshiba in the development of the processes, the current division of 
tasks within Semp Toshiba, with the Japanese being basically responsible for providing 
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product technology and assistance in production processes, leave them practica lly out of the 
daily management of the company. This is why their ro le in the processes studied is mainly 
as a source of knowledge. However, it is exactly the joint venture arrangement which allows 
Semp Toshiba privileged access to both hard (product technology) and soft (process 
technology) knowledge. It is important to stress that both types of knowledge are adapted to 
local conditions by people at Semp Toshiba, and also that successful adaptation seems to be a 
result of almost twenty years of partnership. The fact that only three profess ionals from 
Toshiba currently work at Semp Toshiba is an evidence of the trustful and mature 
relationship existent between the partners, as control by Toshiba is exerted more through 
systems than through persormel. It is also an evidence of the joint venture reaching a point of 
stability in relation to the number of Toshiba' s perso1rnel, as I was to ld that there is no 
intention of altering the current situation in the near future. After the company has achieved a 
reasonable level of knowledge in relation to product technology, and has established channels 
with Toshiba to facilitate technological development, its managers concluded that there was 
no point in having Japanese personnel working in technical functions. According to some 
Brazilian top managers, from the average five years of ass igmnent abroad, the Japanese 
usually take two years for adapting to local conditions before fee ling really comfortable. So, 
the net value of their presence in such functions is no longer worth, as they can·y high costs 
fo r the company. Nevertheless, as I mentioned before, besides directly providing product 
technology, Toshiba has a very important ro le as an exemplar and as a support to Semp 
Toshiba. The huge growth of Semp Toshiba in the last few years, with profi ts reaching 
US$ 155 ,500,000 in 1995, is responsible for a notable increase in the interest Toshiba has for 
the joint venture. This is demonstrated by an increase in the rank of the manager Toshiba 
send to be its highest representative at Semp Toshiba, taking the position of vice-president. 
Whereas before this professional would be a manager in Japan, now Toshiba always send a 
senior manager. The company' s president explained me that this change resulted in more 
effective chairnels of communication between the two compai1ies. 
Finally, I should return to the justificat ion given in Chapter I for my interest in studying 
processes of orgai1izational learning, and ask which capabilities, if any, Semp Toshiba has 
built or created with the two processes. I think the answer is relatively straight forward in the 
light of the di scussion contained in thi s chapter. The company has developed two strong and 
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interdependent capabilities : I) being able to w1derstand market requirements, and 2) the 
abi lity to manufacture products with high quality, at a competitive cost and which are 
technologically up-to-date. On the top of that, the company has managed to commwucate to 
conswners that its products have such qualifications. What seems to be even more important 
for the company is that, so far, it has also managed to give a dynamic character to those 
capabilities, continuously refining them and developing a virtuous circle of organizational 
learning. 
7.6 Summary 
In this chapter the two processes described in the previous chapter have been discussed. The 
conclusion has been that Semp Toshiba has learned with the evolution of the processes. 
Factors related to both structure and managerial agency appear to be amongst the main 
triggers and responsible for the development of the processes. A group of enabling conditions 
for organizational learning through the processes has been proposed and discussed. Wlule 
some condit ions are related to all processes studied, other are related to only some of them. 
Features of the development of each process have then been suggested as being responsible 
for such variation. 
Finally, as a consequence of the processes, the company seems to have developed capabilities 
which have put it in a very strong competitive position in its sector. Furthermore, the 
company has also managed to sustain such capabi lities in a dynan1ic way, giving continuity 





CONTRIBUTIONS TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
This chapter presents a cross-case discussion of the enabling conditions for organizational 
learning proposed for the processes studied. In this discussion the theoretical contributions of 
this study are suggested . The chapter first considers some differences existent between both 
the companies and the processes studied, so as to emich the contextual background of the 
discussion. Throughout the chapter the insights developed in this study are compared with 
those in the literature to understand how they support, diverge, or further build on existing 
relevant research. In so doing, I seek to enhance the generalizabi lity into theory of the main 
findings of this research (Eisenhardt 1989, Yin 1989). The chapter is divided in three 
sections. The first section discusses some differences between TCP and Semp Toshiba. The 
second section highlights some differences between the processes studied. The third section 
presents a cross-case discussion of the enabling conditions for organizational learning 
suggested for the processes studied. 
8.1 TCP and Semp Toshiba 
In Chapter 3 I have explained how the IBVs which participated in this study were selected. 
One of the criteria for selection was the existence of simi larities between the companies, 
which could help me to compare the cases in the different companies. In this sense, the 
presence of Toshiba as the fore ign investing company, the production of TV sets as their 
main economic activity, and the technology for producing TVs are all similarities between 
TCP and Semp Toshiba. However, there is also a number of differences between the 
companies which may bear upon the processes of organizational learning. In this section I 
will discuss these differences. 
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8.1.1 Ownership 
Ownership is the first notable difference between TCP and Semp Toshiba. Whereas the 
former is a wholly owned subsidiary of Toshiba, the latter is a joint venture, in which 
Toshiba has a minority stake of 40%. At TCP, the major strategic decisions are taken in 
Japan, usually with the consultation of the company' s managing director. After the decisions 
are made, the company has autonomy to decide how to implement them. Both processes 
studied at TCP had their origins in decisions made in Japan. 
The structure of Toshiba' s European consumer electronics business is also decided in Japan. 
Within this structure, TCP is exclusively a manufacturing unit. All commercial activities are 
under the responsibility of other companies. As TCP has always been a manufacturing 
company, this structure does not seem to be disputed by local managers. However, the study 
at Semp Toshiba has shown how the integration of the manufacturing and commercial 
activities has been important in the development of the company in the last few years. In the 
UK, I focused the research on TCP and, as a consequence, did not study the commercial 
function and the relationship between TCP and the sales companies. This is a limitation of 
this study. But from the information I could gather at TCP, it appears that the links between 
the company and the market are weaker than those observed at Semp Toshiba. Thus, it seems 
that TCP ' s status as a subsidiary poses some limitations for its autonomy of decision making, 
and may constrain the scope of learning about its clientele. 
In contrast, at Semp Toshiba the combination of the ownership structure, where the local 
partner has a majority stake, with a profitable operation in most of the years since the joint 
venture was formed, has resulted in a very large degree of autonomy for local managers. This 
autonomy is expressed in the fact that all strategic decisions are taken locally, with the 
agreement of the vice-president representative of Toshiba. The fact that Toshiba does not 
interfere in a successful operation supports Killing 's ( I 983) observation that parent 
companies tend to give more autonomy to a joint venture when its performance is perceived 
as successful. It is also evidence that Toshiba has a collaborative perspective in relation to the 
joint venture, that is, it is interested in a process of joint creation of value with Semp. As a 
result of this autonomy, decision-making at Semp Toshiba is not slowed down by frequent 
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consultation with Japan, and the company can fully employ its local knowledge in its 
operations. In a circular process, autonomy begets successful performance, which begets 
more autonomy. Furthermore, Semp Toshiba can develop complete learning cycles (Hedberg 
1981 ), which embrace all aspects that are important for the success of its operations. 
Another difference between the companies is the degree of localization of management. 
Although TCP is just a few years younger than Semp Toshiba, management is much more 
localized in the latter. At TCP, there is a notable difference between the two divisions, with 
the A VD, which is older, being more localized than the A.CD. Added to the explicit intention 
of Japanese managers at the A.CD to localize management, it shows that the passage of time 
plays an important role in localization. However, even if we compare the A VD with Semp 
Toshiba, the presence of Japanese managers is larger in the former. It is reasonable to expect 
the fore ign investing company to have a larger degree of influence in a subsidiary than in a 
joint venture where the investing company has a minority stake. What is important in relation 
to organizational learning is that expatriate managers are regularly replaced and this 
invariably brings difficulties of adaptation for both the newcomers and those in the local 
operation who will work with them. Time appears to be one of the most important 
ingredients for overcoming problems related to cross-cultural adaptation. However, the 
regular substitution of expatriate managers acts against this logic, as it turns back the 
adaptat ion clock. Thus, ownership seems to be related to localization of management, and 
this, in turn , seems to be related to organizational learning. I am not arguing for a totally local 
operation, on the contrary, newcomers can be a valuable source of new knowledge. The point 
is that, from what could be observed in the companies participating in this study, after the 
administrative systems are established, expatriate perso1mel can better help the local 
operation if they are not directly involved with daily operational tasks. 
8.1.2 Market Conditions 
The economic enviro1m1ent in which the two companies operate has been very different. 
Until few years ago, the economic environment in Brazil was rather turbulent, with high 
inflation being its main characteristic. The market for consumer electronics was closed for 
products manufactured abroad. Si nce the beginning of the 1990s, the market was open, and, 
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from mid 1994, inflation has been considerably reduced. In the UK and in Western Europe in 
general , the environment has been comparatively more stable. If, on the one hand, economic 
instability has created a risky environment for manufacturers in Brazil, on the other hand 
companies which have managed to cope with it have seen high return rates for their business. 
The relative stability of the last two and a half years has resulted in a huge expansion of the 
conswner electronics market, as was shown in Chapter 6. The opening of the market to 
foreign competition has created new standards of product quality, production costs, and 
manufacturing processes. Some companies already established in the country, like Semp 
Toshiba, have perceived the existence of a performance gap in their operations, which has 
created plenty of room for learning and growth (DiBella, Nevis and Gould 1996, Hedberg 
1981). 
In relation to TV sets, both companies operate in very competitive markets. Nevertheless, 
there is a fundamental difference between these markets. Whilst the European market is 
mature, presenting very low rates of growth, the Brazilian market has grown at very high 
rates in the last few years. Semp Toshiba has been able to increase its share in this growing 
market, which has resulted in sharp increases in turnover for the company. Added to the 
productivity gains of the last few years, the profitability of the company has soared. 
As it was discussed in Chapter 7, success has played an important role for the continuity of 
the learning processes at Semp Toshiba. Favourable market conditions in Brazil have helped 
the company in the sense of allowing its top managers to set successively higher objectives 
which, despite the ri sks taken, have been largely achieved. I am not, however, denying the 
importance of the decisions and actions taken by the company' s members. I have indicated 
previously that Semp Toshiba has consistently outperformed its competitors. If the processes 
studied in the company have been initially motivated by external difficulties and 
opportunities, which is in accordance with most of the literature on organizational learning, 
their continuity is mainly due to the internal drive of the company' s top managers. l have 
pointed out in Chapter 2 that most of the literature does not acknowledge self-motivation as a 
trigger of learning. But, we can suggest from this study that internal drive is a significant 
propeller for learning. 
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At TCP, the difficulties the company faced in the European TV market have resulted in some 
managers feeling uneasy with the investments made in local design, as the return may only 
come in the medium to long term. Thus, business conditions may impact on the type of 
expectations people have on processes. The worst the conditions are, the greater the tendency 
of people to look at short term results . This situation resembles Senge' s (1990b) point about 
managers concentrating on events and not being able to perceive the underlying cause of 
problems. However, when the difficulties are related to general market conditions, it is hard 
to blame managers for concentrating on short term results. There is a dilemma between 
attending the short term necessities and investing for long term growth. Either option, if 
taken to the exclusion of the other, appears to be problematic. Reconciling this dilemma may 
be a vita l managerial learning process. 
8.1.3 Organizational Culture 
A third factor of relevance is the organizational culture of each company. In this sense, it is 
appropriate to observe some aspects of their history. As it was described in Chapter 4, TCP 
was established after the failure of the joint venture between Toshiba and Rank. The 
circumstances in which the employees were selected, the emphasis put by the company on 
the necessity of both teamwork and commitment from employees, and the systems 
implemented have helped the development of a strong sense of company identity in the staff 
who joined the company at day one. For these people, their full commitment to the company 
has been rewarded by the guarantee of employment, which, though not explicit, has been the 
company' s continuous policy. Many managers at TCP see themselves as working for 
Toshiba, a huge Japanese company which provides stability to TCP, helping it in case 
problems arise. An example of such a help was the establishment of the ACD without any 
staff being made redundant after the closure of the MWOD. 
Two other important traits of the company culture are the concept ofa single-status company, 
and the existence of the COAB as a forum where the company's decisions are discussed with 
employees . So, stability, teamwork and joint responsibility are some of the important 
characteristics of TCP' s organizational culture. 
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At Semp Toshiba, Brazilian managers see themselves as working for a company owned by 
Mr Afonso Henne!, who is at the company every day, and wants to know whether each 
manager is doing his/her job as expected. The few Japanese managers are Toshiba employees 
seconded to Semp Toshiba. They see their role as bringing Toshiba's technology and other 
resources (good relationship with international suppliers, for instance) to help Semp Toshiba, 
and also as assuring that products conform Toshiba ' s quality standards. Employees have a 
share in the company ' s profit, so they know that the more profitable the company, the higher 
their income. Teamwork is considered important, but individual responsibility is made very 
clear. So, profitability, teamwork and individual responsibility are some of the important 
characteristics of Semp Toshiba ' s organizational culture. 
Both cultures seem to be conducive to learning. The main difference between them is a more 
consensual style of management at TCP, as compared to a more top-down approach at Semp 
Toshiba. A lthough profitabil ity is more emphasized at Semp Toshiba, it is also a concern at 
TCP. There is no one best culture regarding to learning. What appears to be important is the 
coherence of the culture, in the sense that its va lues make sense for the people w ithin the 
company, being really shared by its members. It also important that facto rs which hinder 
learning do not abound, and this seems to be the case in both companies. As it will be 
discussed later in this chapter, several factors which faci litate learning were identified in both 
companies, showing the existence of similarities between their cultures. 
8.2 Starting, Changing, Continuing 
An important difference existing between the processes studied is that whilst those occurred 
at TCP are related to the start of new activities, the ones at Semp Toshiba relate to changes in 
current activities. At TCP, both the first stage of the establishment of the ACD, and the first 
years of establishing local design were periods when members of the company were basically 
learning how to w1dertake tasks they had never done before. However, they did not have to 
learn from scratch, as in both cases there were people from Toshiba Japan coming to work in 
Plymouth to help in the implementation of the activities. These periods were, therefore, 
characterized by the transference of knowledge, most of it codified, between Japan and the 
223 
UK. They can be seen as examples of what Edmondson and Moingeon (1 996 p.27) call 
' learning how' , "organizational members engaging in processes designed to transfer and/or 
improve existing skill s and routines" . 
The second stage of the establishment of the ACD had a different characteri stic. As was 
discussed in Chapter 4, during th is stage administrative systems were being implemented . 
These systems were neither a copy of those in Japan, or those at the A VD. Their 
implementation basically depended on adaptation to the ACD conditions. Systems were 
being created rather than transferred. Briti sh and Japanese managers had di ffe rent cultural 
and work backgrounds. They could not directly implement the systems they were used in a 
situation where they were working together. Cognitive changes were necessary before action, 
in the fo rm of implementing the systems, could happen. In order to define what was suitable 
fo r the local operation, managers needed to understand why a system was suitable. Members 
of each culture had to confront theirs and others' ideas. Notions which were shared by 
members of one culture, not needing to be codified, had to be codified in order to be 
discussed with members of the other culture. Managers of each culture were respecting the 
others' identities, when try ing to understand the others' perspective. But they were also 
trying to keep their own identi ties, when trying to have their perspectives taken into 
consideration. Managers from both cultures were simultaneously open to change, when 
adapting to the other cul ture, and wanting continui ty, when trying to preserve some 
characteristics of their own culture. The development of blended administrative systems 
demonstrates both the existence of a shared identity and the joint creation of knowledge. This 
conclusion corroborates Child and Rodrigues ' s (1996) argument on the importance of social 
identities in the international creation and transfer of knowledge. It also bears similarities 
with Salk ' s ( 1992c) notion of ' integrative convergence' within cross-cultural teams, with the 
growth of cultura l hybridization. However, it seems important to note that, with the growing 
localization of management, the systems may slowly change towards local practices. In fac t, 
Briti sh managers commented that the Japanese influence at the A VD is much smaller than at 
the ACD, including that on some of the administrative systems. 
At Semp Toshiba, both processes relate to changes in activi ties already undertaken within the 
company. Thi s meant a greater requirement fo r unlearning than at TCP. Stages of learning 
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how and learning why succeeded during the different sub-processes. For instance, in the 
quality programme, people had to consider how they used to work, then why they worked in 
such a way, then how they could improve the work routines. The coexistence of change and 
continuity (cf. Child and Smith 1987, Pettigrew 1985) was a frequent characteristic of the 
processes studied. In the implementation of the quality program, the Industrial Director made 
clear that he did not want the company to loose its characteristic of fast decision-making. 
Even when some of the routines were changed rad ically, as in the case of changes in the 
commercialization policy, the company kept some of its most ingrained principles. For 
instance, despite being able to reduce its production costs, prices were kept higher than most 
competitors. The principle that every sale should be profitable was never abandoned . 
This conclusion is relevant, as most of the literature on learning greatly emphasizes change, 
at the expense of continuity. Its in only recently that some authors started to consider 
continuity as an important element of learning (Cook and Yanow 1993 , Weick 1996). For 
instance, Weick and Westley (1996 p.448) maintain that "(L)earning may be most likely to 
occur when situations are explored but identities are exploited. People learn how to innovate, 
but they also learn how to reaccomplish their identity amidst a new set of threats". 
Another characteristic of the processes at Semp Toshiba was the small involvement of 
Japanese personnel. Thus, differently from TCP, cross-cultural adaptation was not a very 
re levant issue. 
8.3 Enabling Conditions for Organizational Learning: 
a Cross-Case Discussion 
In this section I wi ll discuss the enabling conditions for organizational learning identified in 
this research, considering the similarities and differences between the cases studied. I will 
also compare these conditions to references in the literature in order to understand how they 
support, diverge, or further build on existing relevant research. Table 8.1 presents the 
enabling conditions fo r organizational learning identified in both companies. 
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Enabling Conditions for Organizational Learning 
Enabling Conditions for 
Organizational Learning 
Programme Reduction Line 
Intention X X X X X X X 
Control X X X X X X X 
Autonomy X X X X X 
X X X X 
X 
N I Uoenness I X X X X X 
N I Flexibilitv X X 0\ 
X X X 
X X X X 
X X 
X X X X 
Power X X 
Time X X X X X 
Codified Knowledge X 
Gradualism X X X X X X 
Success as Leverage X X 
Dvnamic Obiectives X X X X 
External Information Gathering X X X X 
Newcomer as Source oflnnovation X X X 
Intention and control were the only conditions identified in all processes and sub-processes . 
Intention is here considered as both something which is done purposefully and commitment 
to something. As commitment was present in all processes, intention was identified even in 
processes which were not planned in advance. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) propose 
intention as one of the required conditions for organizational knowledge creation, and argue 
that strategy is the usual manifestation of intention. Their notion of strategy entails the 
conceptualization of a vision about what kind of knowledge should be developed, and its 
implementation through a management system. In Chapter 7, I pointed out that some 
processes at Semp Toshiba were characterized by an emergent strategy, where objectives 
were defined during the development of the processes. The definition of administrative 
systems at ACD-TCP can also be viewed as an emergent strategy. Writers on strategy, 
notably Mintzberg (1994), argue that a realized strategy usually comprises both intended and 
emergent aspects. The inclusion of commitment in the concept of intention extends the 
latter's explanatory potential. The other option, to separate commitment from intention, does 
not appear adequate, as intention without commitment is normally useless with regard to 
outcomes. 
Control refers to both the establishment of limits to the actions of participants in the 
processes, and the assessment of outcomes. The former happened when managers wanted to 
make sure that workers would act within pre-established limits, in an attempt to control the 
range of possible outcomes. Exan1ples of that are the types of changes which are stimulated 
at both the small group activities at TCP, and the Kaizen at Semp Toshiba (changes only in 
processes, not in the content of products). It has also happened in relation to the degree of 
autonomy given by Toshiba Japan to the design departments at TCP. Assessment of 
outcomes makes possible the generation of feedback during a process, so it can be adjusted in 
order to meet the initial or some modified objective. An example is the disassembling of air 
conditioning sets by Japanese technicians at the start of the ACD operations, so as to make 
sure that all standards were being followed by the local members. Another is the better 
control over stocks and suppliers at Semp Toshiba, which allowed the company to set new 
targets for both stock reduction and coordination with suppliers. 
227 
Control is not usually mentioned in the literature as a factor which can facilitate learning. In 
fact, learning is normally associated with autonomy and creativity, which are considered as 
opposites to control. This seems to be a consequence of the non political stance taken by the 
large majority of authors on learning. However, it seems quite na'ive to think that those who 
hold power within organizations will not try to direct organizational processes towards 
objectives defined by them. Whether these objectives satisfy the interests of a larger or 
smaller portion of the organization's stakeholders is another issue. The point here is that if 
learning is considered to comprise processes and outcomes 1, control seems to be a very 
important condition for its occurrence, for it allows intention to be directed. 
DiBella, Nevis and Gould (1996) suggest 'concern for measurement' as a facilitating factor 
for learning, as it can help the provision of accurate feedback. Their concept is, therefore, 
similar to the category here labelled as control , when the latter refers to the assessment of 
outcomes. In this sense, control is partly supported by the literature. A remaining part, which 
refers to establishing limits to human agency, actually diverges from most of the literature. 
Senge (1990a) makes reference to control when discussing the issue of decentralization of 
authority and power. He argues that organizations will increasingly be ' localized ' , extending 
authority and power as far from corporate centre as possible. He then questions how an 
organization can distribute business responsibility widely and still retain coordination and 
control. Senge acknowledge that control is important, but argues that the idea that people at 
the top are ' in control ' is an illusion. A ' learning organization' would be characterized by 
" local control - countless local decision-making processes that continually respond to 
changes, so as to maintain healthy conditions for stability and growth" (Senge 1990a p.293). 
This type of control, ' localness ', would only be possible through skilful coordination. Senge 
argues that sharing mental models and tean1 learning are two important ' disciplines ' which 
can facilitate coordination. Another important ingredient would be the role of central 
management, which should be in line with the roles of designer, teacher and steward, as 
discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Senge' s approach to control is no more than an 
acknowledgement of its inevitable presence within organizations, and a suggestion that it 
1 The concept of outcome as a moment in a process has been discussed in Chapter 3. 
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should shift to a local level in a ' learning organization ' . This is different from what I am 
proposing in this study, where control is seen as a facilitator of learning. Senge' s discussion 
on local control , nevertheless, lead us to another condition identified in this research, namely 
autonomy. 
In the sub-processes where autonomy was identified, it basically relates with freedom for 
choosing a course of action. However, as it was stressed in the ana lysis of the cases, 
autonomy is usually balanced with control. Thus, groups of workers involved in small group 
activities at TCP, and Kaizen at Semp Toshiba have autonomy to choose the problems they 
will tackle, as long as these problems relate to processes of production. Similarly, the groups 
who implemented the quality programme at Semp Toshiba had autonomy to set the 
implementation strategy, but within the time frame set by the company' s Board, and the 
boundaries established by the instructions of the quality standard. At the design departments 
at TCP, and the Commercial Division at Semp Toshiba, engineers and managers have 
autonomy for and are expected to solve most of the problems without consulting superiors, in 
examples similar to Senge's notion of ' localness'. In other words, autonomy has been 
balanced with contro l in the sense of management establishing the parameters of learning. 
The way in which (how) autonomy and control are exercised determines the balance between 
the two and, crucially, whether these categories fac ilitate or hinder learning. It is, therefore, 
through skilful management that the right balance for a specific process is achieved . Different 
processes require different ways of exercising autonomy and control. Tt seems important to 
identify where the main sources of knowledge are in a process, and to give incentives for 
autonomy to these people. Knowledge can be both created within the company or acquired 
from outside sources. In the latter case, incentives to autonomy should be given to people 
who have the closest contact with the knowledge sources. An example of this was given by 
the Commercial Division at Semp Toshiba, when some sales managers started to invite 
retailers' buyers to see and comment mock ups of new products. Control, on the other hand, 
appears to relate to the degree in which context is shared by people involved in a process. 
The more people believe in common objectives, the more localized control can be. In this 
case, there is no strong need for external control to be exercised. 
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In the literature, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) regard individual and team autonomy as a 
condition for organizational knowledge creation. They emphasize self-motivation, creativity, 
and better diffusion of information as the main advantages of autonomous individuals and 
teams. In a similar vein to what I have discussed in the case of local design at TCP, Nonaka 
and Takeuchi argue that autonomy requires coordination with other individuals and/or teams. 
Teamwork and inter-organizational network are, if considered together, a condition present 
in almost all processes and sub-processes studied. Indeed, as a social process, organizational 
learning requires the existence of a social network for knowledge to flow. Thus, it seems 
quite obvious that tean1work is an important condition for organizational learning to occur. It 
is difficult to conceive any organization nowadays which would not boast teamwork as one 
of its characteristics. But teamwork is not something ready that organizations can simply use; 
instead, they have to build the conditions for it to happen. In this research, teamwork was 
identified out of the analysis of the evolution of the processes, and not only from the 
references made by managers to it. What then appears to be relevant is to discuss the 
structures and processes which have allowed teamwork to happen. 
At TCP, processes of staff selection emphasize the abili ty to work in teams and acceptance of 
flexib le work roles, following practices widely adopted in Japanese companies (Wi lkinson 
and Oliver 1992). Despite complaints from Japanese managers about cultural differences 
between British and Japanese in relation to teamwork, some of the quotations in Chapter 4 
demonstrate how teamwork is continuously emphasized by managers. They also show the 
adoption of practices aimed at fostering teamwork, like the daily meetings in all sections. 
In four of the sub-processes, tean1work was identified as cross-functional, in one as within 
the same department, and in another as extending to an inter-organizational network. The 
basic difference amongst these three qualifications is the scope of the network, but the 
importance of the social chain is similar in all cases. It stems from both a wider range of 
knowledge which can be brought into the process, and the diffusion of knowledge across the 
relevant groups. 
230 
In two of the sub-processes, the second stage of the establishment of the A CD-TCP, and the 
changes in the assembly line at Semp Toshiba, cross-functional teamwork was identified as 
part of the small group activities and the Kaizen, respectively. In fact, these are two similar 
activities which receive different names in each company. These are a common practice in 
Japanese manufacturing companies, where workers suggest and implement small changes in 
production processes, generally aiming at increasing productivity. Both TCP and Semp 
Toshiba promote these activities by both setting a structure which supports them, and giving 
incentives to workers who participate, as described in Chapters 4 and 6. 
Productive teamwork was also identified within TCP's design departments. The Japanese 
managers insist with the young engineers on the imp01iance of both being aware of the 
activities of the others, and also infom1ing the teams about their own activities. This 
communication takes place both through scheduled meetings and informal discussions. In 
this sense, the practices which allow productive teamwork are being institutional ized in 
routines. Moreover, the teams members have spontaneously acknowledged the benefits of 
these practices, which guarantees their continuity. 
In two sub-processes at Semp Toshiba, the quality programme and the stock reduction 
process, teams were formed as task-forces to deal with specific questions. These questions 
required cross-functional knowledge, thus influencing the composition of teams. Again, the 
company provided the structure necessary for the work of the teams. Achievement of success 
and revision of objectives towards higher levels appear to have motivated the teams to work 
together. In the commercialization process, there has been a different form of teamwork, 
identified as an inter-organizational network. In this case, Semp Toshiba managed to build a 
relationship with retailers whereby the latter see the benefits of their participation as 
informants of market tendencies. It is an informal relationship, but one which has brought 
vital informational inputs to the company. A learning process occurs not only through the 
functioning of the network, but also in the activity of sustaining it. 
It is interesting to perceive that from all teams identified in the sub-processes, the only ones 
whose members remained constant are the design departments at TCP. The others were 
formed as task forces, dealing with specific problems. After the problems were tackled, either 
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the teams were disbanded or the ir objectives were changed, which sometimes also led to 
changes in the composition of the teams. It has been noted in the literature that the use of 
cross-functional task forces may help the development of mutual trust and confidence 
between departments, enhancing organizational integration (Child 1984). The inter-
organizational network is a slightly different case, where the participants from the retailers 
vary according to the type of information the company is seeking. 
In the literature, teamwork is emphasized by Senge (1990a), who defines ' team learning ' as 
one of the 'five disciplines of the learning organization ' . Senge argues that team learning has 
three critical dimensions: a) the need to think insightfully about complex issues; b) the need 
fo r innovative, coordinated action; and c) the role of team members in other teams. It is 
possible to identify at least some of these dimensions in the teams at both companies studied. 
The definition of administrative systems at the ACD and the changes in the 
commercia lization policy at Semp Toshiba are examples of complex and innovative issues 
tackled by well coordinated teams. Regarding the role of team members as diffusers of 
productive teamwork practices, that can be identified at both the team who directed the 
implementation of the quality programme at Semp Toshiba, and the design teams at TCP. 
Members of these teams participate in other teams, like the des ign engineers from TCP 
taking part in the small group activities. In doing that, they connect both teams bridging 
information between them. Redundancy of information is regarded by Nonaka and Takeuchi 
(1995) as one of the most important conditions fo r organizational learning. 
Another condition present in almost all processes is openness, which was identified as 
heedfulness for others' views. It is a condition which fac ilitates teamwork and learning. In 
conjunction withjlexibility, openness was important in the processes studied at TCP when 
they involved cross-cultural relationships. In their initial stages, these relationships were 
problematic due to cultural differences and communication difficulties. Openness by 
members from both cultures facilitated the overcoming of the differences and difficulties. It 
was also important in both companies every time teamwork was involved, as the capacity to 
consider different perspectives allows for a wider range of knowledge to enter the processes. 
Examples are the joint creation of administrative systems at the A CD-TCP, and the changes 
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in commercialization at Semp Toshiba, where inputs from salesmen and retai lers helped the 
reformulation of policies. 
A climate of openness, meaning access ibili ty of information, sharing of errors and problems, 
and acceptance of conflict, is suggested by DiBella, Nevis and Gould (1996) as a fac ilitating 
factor for organizational learning. In the processes studied, sharing of problems and 
accessibili ty of information were particularly stressed by the Japanese managers at TCP. 
They have constantly argued for the importance of documenting the occurrence of problems 
so as they can be avoided in the future. Written docwnentation also guarantee that the 
information is available regardless the presence of the people who initially dealt with the 
problem. At Semp Toshiba, this practice does not appear to be a concern of the company. On 
the other hand, people have freedom to seek information wherever it may be within the 
organization . The informal environment appears to help this practice. 
Sharing of errors is a more del icate issue. It can be partly included in the sharing of problems 
mentioned above, as engineers at TCP sometimes have to document problems which were 
originated by their or others ' mistakes. However, this seems to happen only with technical 
problems. People are not generally willing to acknowledge the existence of managerial 
errors. This is also a limitation of the method adopted in this research. When describing 
processes occurred in the past, managers usually tend to hide any mistakes, unless their 
outcomes were amended. An example is the change in commercialization at Semp Toshiba, 
where managers acknowledged the mistakes of the past, but always referring to how practices 
are now improved. 
Regarding acceptance of conflict, its mere existence was denied in almost all interviews, with 
the exception of the inter-divisional conflicts at TCP. One possible explanation is that the 
processes studied were generally successful, and, again, people tend to talk about positive 
instead of problematic aspects of the processes. Although the learning literature usually 
considers conflict as positive, for its allows a wider range of inputs, the idea of confl ict is 
generally not well regarded within organizations. Diversity is perhaps a more appropriate 
term when discussing with managers. In this sense, some examples of divergent aspects 
within the processes were described previously, particularly cultural diversity at TCP. At 
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Semp Toshiba, mention was made only of the existence of some divergent views within the 
company when more fundamental changes were being di scussed, like the reduction of stocks 
and changes in commercialization policy. In these cases, openness, as defined in this study, 
was indeed important for the successful development of the processes. 
Senge ( 1990a) also regards opermess as a fundamental characteristic of a ' learning 
organization ' . He distinguishes 'participative openness', the freedom to speak one ' s mind, 
from ' reflective openness ', the willingness to challenge our own thinking, arguing that both 
are important. However, whereas many managers stimulate participative openness through 
the sharing of views, actual decision-making is rarely changed because people do not easi ly 
change their ways of thinking. Senge maintains that this can be achieved through reflective 
openness, which requires the skills of reflection, inquiry, dialogue and dealing with defensive 
routines (cf. Argyri s 1985). 
If the processes studied are analysed using the two types of operu1ess suggested by Senge, it 
is possible to identify participative openness in all processes where openness was regarded as 
being relevant, except for the first stage of the establishment of the ACD. Incentives for 
workers to give suggestions for the small groups activ ities and Kaizen, and emphas is on the 
importance of accepting suggestions are example of structures and processes which fac ilitate 
participative openness.It is possible to identity reflective openness in the definition of 
systems at the ACD-TCP, the quality programme and the changes in commercialization 
policy at Semp Toshiba. In these three sub-processes, staff involved had to question their 
own way of working and propose changes. More important, they had to question not only 
how they used to work, but why they used to work in that way. 
Leadership was identified as an enab ling condition for organizational learning in four sub-
processes. Leadership is another category which is pervas ive in organizations and, therefore, 
only to identify its importance for learning does not seem sufficient. It is necessary to discuss 
why it was important and which effects it had on the evolution of the processes. Thi s was 
partially done in the analysis of the processes. Here I wi ll go further in this discussion. 
234 
At the second stage of the establishment of the ACD-TCP, leadership was identified as 
important mainly through the role of the Assistant Managing Director ACD . Mr Ninomiya is 
regarded at TCP as a person who has influence within Toshiba Japan. His subordinates 
consider him a very demanding manager, but one who is involved with the business, 
providing stability for the growth of the division. It is interesting to perceive that whilst 
managers at the A VD have conflicts with him because of his very independent style, 
managers at the ACD like his stance of not deferring to the A VD. He sends a c lear message 
to his subordinates that the ACD is a promising business, and that if they work well enough 
their employment should be safe. 
At the design departments at TCP, the two Japanese managers are considered as experienced 
and technica lly qualified professionals. As the two departments are mainly formed by young 
engineers, the managers have more facility in shaping the culture . As it was discussed before, 
teamwork, autonomy (including for making mistakes), and self-confidence are valued by the 
managers. The result is an environment conducive to learning. 
At the stock reduction process at Semp Toshiba, the importance of the leadership of the 
Industrial Director was recognized by all interviewees. His attitudes, as discussed in Chapter 
7, provided a context favourable to learning. Particularly important was his continuous belief 
in the possibility of achieving the objectives, and the way in which he transmitted that to 
managers when they were lacking confidence. 
At the changes in the commercialization policy, the most important characteristics of the 
Commercial Director were his knowledge about the market and his openness to suggestions. 
The combination of the two facilitated learning, with the adoption of new and more 
aggressive commercial strategies as the process evolved. He is also considered a demanding 
manager, but one who provides good conditions for subordinates to work. 
Schein (1985) suggests a number of mechanisms through which leaders embed and transmit 
culture in organizations. One of the mechanisms which seems to suit the cases studied is 
what leaders pay attention to, measure and control. Schein argues that a leader 's consistency 
of attention to particular areas is very important in shaping culture, as it signals to the 
235 
organization what is important. Chapter 4 described how Japanese managers emphasize the 
importance of the ' plan-do-see ' cycle to all members of the company. This routine stimulates 
reflection and the test of assumptions, in a cycle which enables learning. The establishment 
of structures and processes which facilitate teamwork has a similar effect. At Semp Toshiba, 
the Commercial Director was consistent throughout the process about the importance of 
continuously following market demands for determining which products should be 
manufactured . He also helped the building of structures and processes which facilitated 
learning to occur, like the network with retailers. 
DiBella, Nevis and Gould (1996) claim that involved leadership is a facilitating facto r for 
learning. They argue that leaders have not only to create visions, but also to engage in hands-
on implementation of the vision. The Industrial Director's attitudes at Semp Toshiba are a 
good example of such involvement. The success achieved in increasing the company' s 
productivity, and the occurrence of learning which have allowed the extension of the process, 
give strong support to the authors' claim. 
Training was important when codified knowledge had to be systematically transmitted. 
Training also can be relevant for transmitting organizational culture. At the local design 
departments at TCP, training is mostly on the job, which allows for both codified and 
uncodified knowledge to be shared. Thus, the insistence from Japanese managers that 
engineers document all the problems they faced and the solutions they applied (codification 
of their knowledge), effectively establi shes a routine which becomes part of the 
organization's culture. 
Codification of knowledge was also required during the implementation of the quality 
programme at Semp Toshiba. Organizational routines had to be described in written 
instructions, according to the requirements of the quali ty standard (ISO9000). Besides 
serving as parameters for the regular audit activities related to the quality programme, these 
instructions constitute an important part of the organizational memory (cf. Nelson and Winter 
J 982). Knowledge embedded in the routines can be transmitted through the instructions. 
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As it was mentioned earlier in this chapter, the processes studied at Semp Toshiba have 
required a greater deal of unlearning that those at TCP. The reason is that, at Semp Toshiba, 
the processes are related to changes in routines which were already being performed at the 
company, whereas at TCP the processes relate to the introduction of new activities. Two 
interesting insights from this study, which extend our understanding of unlearning, are the 
identification of forced unlearning at the organizational level, and the use of success to 
legitimate new knowledge and, consequently, fac ilitating its acceptance over the old. The 
former clearly suggests that learning and unlearning can be consolidated at different 
organizational levels. In both the stock reduction and the changes in conm1ercialization 
policy processes at Semp Toshiba, the reallocation or dismissal of staff who were resisting 
change showed how the use of power resulted in forced organizational unlearning, while 
individual learning had not yet occurred. The use of initial successful results in both 
processes in order to convince managers who, despite acting accordingly to the instructions 
of top managers, were not convinced of the merits of the changes, indicates a way of 
promoting unlearning at the individual level, through cognitive changes provoked by the 
triumph of the new knowledge over the old. 
It seems relevant to note that whilst the role of power has been subject of debate in the 
literatures of organizational theory (Clegg 1990), organi zational culture (Fleury and Fischer 
1989, Schein 1985) and organizational change (Wilson 1992), it is almost absent from the 
organizational learning li terature, in which learning processes are usually assumed to be all 
'sweetness and light ' . The findings of this study, however, diverge from such a view, and 
indicate that power can be a significant issue in processes of organizational learning. These 
findings undoubtedly call for further research on this issue. 
Time, including lack of time, was identified as a relevant facto r for the occurrence of learning 
in five sub-processes. It is true that any process occurs over time, but the insight coming out 
of this study is that time has some specific and important relationships with processes of 
organizational learning. Jn the analys is of the first stage of the establishment of the ACD-
TCP, lack of time was identified as a factor which helped the occurrence of behavioural 
changes, even if local workers had no full understanding about their jobs. These behavioural 
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changes were also fac ilitated by the existence of codified knowledge, in the form of 
instructions fo r manufacturing air conditioners, which could be readily transmitted . 
In the other four sub-processes where time was identified as a relevant factor, cognitive 
changes had to occur before or simultaneously to behavioural changes. Thus, at the second 
stage of the establislunent of the ACD-TCP, time was important for raising cross-cultural 
awareness and collaborating in the joint development of systems by British and Japanese 
managers. T ime has also been important for the localization of management, as the Japanese 
want local managers to internalize the division's systems. When local design centres were 
being established at TCP, the importance of time was associated with the necessity for design 
engineers to understand both the technical content of their jobs and the work routines 
implemented at the departments. Only through continuous practice and discussion could this 
understanding take place. During the implementation of the quality progran1111e at Semp 
Toshiba, time was required for staff to feel comfortable to bring their working procedures out 
into open discussion with colleagues and managers. In case of changes in the 
commercialization policy, time was required for the formu lation of new strategies during the 
evolution of the process, and the persuasion of some representatives of the merits of the new 
policies. 
From the analysis of these five sub-processes we can suggest that behavioural changes which 
do not require prior cognitive changes can be stimulated by time pressure. Two qualifications 
must be added to this suggestion. First, knowledge needs to be already codified or explicit in 
order to be transmitted to those who are supposed to change their behaviour. Second, with the 
passage of time, people will need to undergo cognitive changes which legitimize their 
behavioural change. 
From the suggestion above we can then consider the opposite situation, that is, if cognitive 
changes are required before behavioural changes can take place, people wi ll need time to 
undergo these cognitive changes. This seems to be the case when tacit or uncodified 
knowledge needs to be cod ified or made explicit. In the processes studied, the creation of 
administrative systems at the ACD-TCP, and the discussion of old routines and proposition 
of new ones during the implementation of the quali ty progran1111e at Semp Toshiba are 
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examples of cognitive changes occurring before behavioural changes. But given competitive 
and financial pressures, time is usually an important contingency in most organizational 
situations. In these cases, it seems that cognitive and behavioural changes occur 
simultaneously. This simultaneity then suggests that two mutually reinforcing learning 
processes may be under way: I) an initial cognitive change leads to new behaviour, and 2) 
the new behaviour leads to further cognitive understanding. The difference between this 
process and the previous one is that here people do not have enough time to undergo a 
comprehensive cognitive change before acting. Thus, a certain degree of cognitive change 
leads to action, and the process of acting, including some early feedback, leads to further 
understanding. In the processes studied, the localization of management at the A CD-TCP, the 
establishment of local design centres at TCP, and the changes in the commercialization 
policy at Semp Toshiba are examples of simultaneous changes2. In both situations, when 
cognitive changes happen before behavioural ones, and when they happen simul taneously, 
the probable result is a gradual evolution of the organizational process (cf. Quinn 1980). 
The analysis of the relationship between time and organizational learning allows yet a third 
suggestion. If we consider the three types of learni ng proposed by CIBAM (1993); technical, 
systemic, and strategic, it is possible to think that technical learning follows either the 
sequence behavioural • cognitive or simultaneous cognitive and behavioural changes, 
whereas systemic and strategic learning follow either a cognitive • behavioural sequence, or 
simultaneous cognitive and behavioural changes. Considering the suggestions made 
previously, the effects of time constraints will vary between these three sequences. 
Figure 8.1 exhibits relationships between types of learning and sequences of cognitive and 
behavioural changes. The large 'X' means the most likely sequence of cognitive and 
behavioural changes for a type of learning, whereas the small ' x' means a possible sequence. 
The figure is a tentative schema arisen from the findings of this study. The suggested 
relationships deserve further investigation. 
2 In the changes in the commercialization policy at Semp Toshiba, managers and most representatives went 
through this process of simultaneous behavioural and cognitive changes. A few representatives who refused to 
change their behaviour because they did not believe in the new policies (no cognitive change) were removed, 
but this was an exception in the process. 
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An additional comment relates to the indication of a possible behavioural • cognitive 
sequence in systemic learni ng. This suggestion is based on the experience of some joint 
ventures in which systems are initially copied from one of the parent companies. In this case, 
managers within the joint venture may not be familiar with these systems, and understanding 
about the systems occurs after their implementation. 
Figure 8.1 
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Gradualism was a factor identified in almost all processes studied. It is not an issue discussed 
in the organizational learni ng literature, but it is debated in the strategy literature. Quinn 
(1980) argues that well-managed major organizations approach strategy through a series of 
'strategic subsystems', each attacking a specific class of strategic issues in a d isciplined way, 
but which are blended incrementally into a cohesive pattern that becomes the company's 
strategy. This conscious incrementalism would help the organization to: a) cope with both the 
cognitive and process limits on each major decision; b) build the logical -analytical 
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framework these decisions require; and c) create the personal and organization awareness, 
understanding, acceptance and commitment needed to implement the strategies effectively. 
Whilst in most processes studied in this research gradualism was an intended approach 
adopted by managers, in the changes in the commercialization policy at Semp Toshiba 
gradualism was an intrinsic characteristic of the process, in the sense of not being a chosen 
approach, but even so describing how the process evolved. The significance of gradualism 
for organizational learning in some processes was related to the importance of time, that is, 
when the occurrence of cognitive changes was relevant, a gradual evolution of the processes 
allowed the necessary time for these changes. Also, if we consider that the processes at TCP 
relate to the introduction of new activities, a gradual approach was required for allowing time 
for people to define and internalize the new activities and systems. In establishing routines 
which incorporate practices they judge fundamental fo r the successful execution of work, 
Japanese managers at TCP are making these practices part of the organizational culture and, 
therefore, increasing the chances that they will last (Wilson 1992). 
At Semp Toshiba, although some of the changes introduced can be characterized as radical in 
their consequences, gradualism has been important for their acceptance and extension of their 
objectives. In two processes time was not identified as an enabling condition for 
organizational learning, but gradualism was. The first was the changes in the assembly line, 
where the Kaizen activity played an important role. As explained before, Kaizen is based on 
small changes in production processes, with gradualism being an inherent part of the 
activities. The second process was the stock reduction. In this case, the identification of 
gradualism was perhaps only possible because the process has al ready developed during the 
last few years. When the initial objectives for stock reduction were proposed by the Industrial 
Director, they looked quite radical to the managers involved. Only through the analysis of the 
process, with the achievement of the initial objectives, and the setting of new and more 
an1bitious ones, it is possible to describe its evolution as gradual. 
The resetting of objectives was a factor identified only in the processes at Semp Toshiba. 
This may be related to the characteristics of the processes. At TCP, with the processes 
studied being related to the introduction of new activities, the objectives established needed a 
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longer period before being achieved, when compared with those at Semp Toshiba. Also, the 
demands for change posed by the economic environment in Brazil required urgency in the 
dec ision-making and its consequences. Feedback has been fast (Hedberg 1981 ), allowing 
corrections and expansions to be defined in relatively short periods of time. 
These relatively short cycles at Semp Toshiba have then permitted the use of success as 
leverage. Each objective successfully achieved is transformed in a bas is for a next, higher, 
objective. Organizational members who did not believe in the feasibility and value of some 
changes were convinced by the visible success achieved. As discussed in Chapter 7, the 
combination of success as leverage and the use of dynamic objectives have permitted Semp 
Toshiba to give to organizational learning a continuous character. This is an excellent 
example of outcomes as a moment in a process (Fo llett 1924). The continuity of the 
processes allows us to perceive that each objective achieved can be seen as an outcome only 
if we look at sections of a bigger process. If we look at the bigger process as a whole, each 
objective achieved is a new start, becoming pa.rt of th is process. An ascendant enlarg ing 
spiral could perhaps v isually represent this phenomenon. 
The continuity of the processes also mean that change is becoming institutionalized, perhaps 
no longer being change, but rather continuity. Even so, learning keeps on occurring, as 
knowledge is being created. Contrary to what is commonly emphasized in the literature, 
learning does not need to be exclusively related to problem-solving, it may also refe r to what 
goes right within an organization (Cook and Yanow 1993). 
Another factor identified only in the processes studied at Semp Toshiba was external 
information gathering. It relates to the attention the company dedicates to the external 
environment in all its activities. It includes contacts with suppliers, other Toshiba ' s plants 
around the world, retailers and consumers. It allows both fas t feedback on the company' s 
products, and early awareness of market tendencies and different production processes. 
At TCP, the non identification of external info rmation gathering as a condition for learning 
does not mean that it is not important, or that the company pays no attention to the external 
environment. It relates with the stage of development of the processes studied . One of the 
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reasons for the establishment of the local design centres at TCP is exactly to increase its 
relationships with both local suppliers and the markets it serves. On the other hand, I have 
already commented that the non existence of a market function within the company may 
jeopardize the development of a closer relationship with its clientele. Currently, the sales 
companies channel market information to TCP, and the latter can concentrate exclusively on 
developing its manufacturing capabilities. This situation is, arguably, a short-term advantage, 
but it may well not continue to be so over the long-term. 
The importance of external information gathering is supported by DiBella, Nevis and Gould 
(1996), who argue that the scanning imperative is a facilitating factor for organizational 
learning. By this term they mean "an ongoing effort backed by a well-assimilated acceptance 
of the importance of vigilance. Sound learning cannot occur without a foundation of 
enhanced consciousness or apprehension of the environment in which one is functioning" 
(p.42-43). In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I have also mentioned Thompson's (I 967) notion 
of 'opportunistic surveillance ', the activity of monitoring the environment for opportunities, 
and how thi s can be a trigger of learning. 
The presence of a newcomer as source of innovation was also identified as an important 
factor at Semp Toshiba. Three directors who joined the company roughly at the same time 
were the initiators of most of the processes/sub-processes studied. The role of newcomers as 
triggers of learning was also discussed at Chapter 2, with the mention of Huber's (1991) 
notion of 'grafting' as the hiring of new members who possess knowledge not previously 
available at the organization. Also, newcomers do not necessaril y identify with existing 
routines and the thinking behind them, and, in case of change, do not have to go through a 
process of unlearning. This can also be linked to Nonaka and Takeuchi 's (1995) suggestion 
that requi site variety, the existence of diversity within an organization, is an enabling 
condition for organizational knowledge creation. For instance, the Industrial Director at 
Semp Toshiba told me that some of the ideas related to manufacturing processes he 
introduced into the company were brought from his previous experience in the motor 
industry. 
Table 8.2 summarizes how this study compares with the literature on organizational learning. 
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Table 8.2 
Findings of this Study and the 
Literature on Organizational Learning 
Findings of this Study How they Reflect on the Existing Literature 
Intention Extend 





Training and codified knowledge Extend 
Codification and Organizational Memory Support 
Unlearning Extend 
Power Diverge 
Time and codified knowledge Extend 
Time and behavioural/cognitive changes Extend 
Time and types of learning Extend 
Gradualism Extend 
Success as leverage Extend 
Dynamic objectives Extend 
External info rmation gathering Support 
Newcomer as source of innovation Support 
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Finally, I want to briefly consider the secondary research question of this study, stated in 
Chapter 1 : have the processes studied fostered the development or improvement of any 
organizational capability in the companies researched? 
At the end of Chapters 5 and 7, I have already mentioned that both companies have 
developed new capabilities which have put them in a better competitive position in their 
respective markets. I have also indicated which capabilities were developed by each 
company. However, the conclusion that the learning processes studied brought these 
capabilities for the companies may be labelled as tautological , as the method adopted for 
choosing the processes was based on their outcomes for the companies. It is, therefore, 
important to make clear that I am not claiming that all learning processes bring new 
organizational capabilities, but the study supports the notion that invisible assets can be 
responsible for distinctive organizational capabilities. Most of the factors identified as 
enabling conditions for learning are related to the managerial sty les and not to tangible 
resources of the companies. Moreover, it was through the evolution of the processes studied 
that the companies learned how to develop these assets. 
8.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented a cross-case di scussion of the enabling conditions for 
organizational learning proposed for the processes studied . In order to enrich the contextual 
background of the discussion, some differences between the companies, related to their 
structure of ownership, market conditions, and organizational culture were first considered. 
Characteristics of the processes studied which bear upon the cross-case discussion were also 
highlighted. 
In the cross-case di scussion, the enabling conditions for organizational learning proposed for 
each process studied were compared, considering the similarities and differences between the 
companies and processes. They were also compared with the literature in order to understand 
how they support, di verge, or further build on existing relevant research. This last 
comparison is summarized at Table 8.2. 
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Chapter 9 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
This final chapter of the dissertation summarizes the main contributions of the study, 
indicates some policy implications, and suggests some directions for future research. It is 
divided into three sections. The first section recapitulates the objectives of the research, and 
summarizes the study' s main contributions. The second section indicates some policy 
implications which arise from the study. The third and final section suggests directions for 
further research related to some of the issues discussed in this dissertation. 
9.1 Some Contributions and Limitations of this Study 
This study was motivated by the perception of the increasing relevance of international 
business in the world economy, and of the fact that, in spite of the wide recognition that 
knowledge has become one of the most important organizational assets, there is scant 
understanding about the processes by which organizations can create or acquire knowledge. 
The importance of knowledge for organizations has been emphasized in the last few years by 
the development of the resource-based view of the firm, an approach to organizational 
strategy which proposes that firm-specific resources are critical factors for explaining what 
makes firms different from each other, and, consequently, what gives them competitive 
advantage. Authors adopting this approach argue that some of these firm-specific resources, 
specially those which are intangible, can be a result of processes by which a finn create or 
acquire knowledge about its operations, that is to say, processes of organizational learning. In 
the case of IBVs, some distinctive conditions add a number of issues on which these 
companies need to develop knowledge. Examples are the requirement to adapt products and 
processes to local market conditions, and the necessity of coordinating tean1s composed of 
people from different national cultures. 
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The study was guided by a central research question, which aimed at identifying and 
discussing some key enabling conditions for the occurrence of organizational learning in 
IBVs. Processes of organizational learning in two IBVs, TCP and Semp Toshiba, were 
identified, reconstructed and analysed. A secondary research question was whether these 
processes correlated with the development or improvement of any organizational capabi lities 
for the companies concerned. 
The literature review, presented in Chapter 2, provided a va luable framework fo r orienting 
the empirical research undertook at TCP and Semp Toshiba. The main issues debated in the 
literature connected to the objectives of this study were incorporated into the interview 
schedules used for gathering data about processes of organ izational learning in both 
companies, as explained in Chapter 3. Indeed, the analysis of the data indicated that some of 
these issues played an important role in the evolution of the processes, supporting findings 
from the existing literature. But the empirical research and data analysis also allowed a 
number of insights, d iscussed in chapters 5, 7 and 8, which extend our lrnowledge about 
processes of organizational learning in general, and those occurring in IBVs in particular. 
Below I summarize the more relevant of these new insights. 
Control and organizational learning 
The research indicated control as a factor which can facilitate the occurrence of learning. 
Control was related to both the assessment of outcomes in processes, and the establishment 
of limits to human action. Whilst the assessment of outcomes is mentioned in the li terature as 
a factor which helps the provision of feedback and fac ilitates learning, the idea that 
establishing limits to human agency can contribute to learning actually diverges from the 
literature on organizational learning. However, in some of the sub-processes studied in this 
research, the exercise of contro l in this way proved to be an important mechanism fo r 
focusing organizational efforts towards objectives defined by top managers. 
Autonomy, organizational culture and sources of knowledge 
Whenever control was important for the occurrence oflearning, it was skilfully balanced with 
autonomy. The study indicated two relevant characteri stics of a productive use of autonomy 
within the companies studied . First, the existence of an organizational culture in which staff 
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who enjoy autonomy for specific actions share the objectives put forward by the 
organization's top managers. Second, autonomy was given to staff who either were important 
sources of knowledge for the evolution of the processes, or had the closest contact with the 
sources of knowledge when these were located outside the company. 
Use of power by top management in shaping processes of organizational learning 
Another finding of this research which diverges from the literature relates to the use of power 
by top managers for helping the occurrence of organizational learning. Power is a variable 
usually neglected in the literature on organizational learning. However, in two sub-processes 
studied in one company, top managers used their power to replace members of staff who 
resisted the changes involved in these processes. As the new staff started to behave according 
to the requirements of the new procedures, it is possible to say that the organization 
unlearned its past behaviour. The use of power in these cases was also a demonstration of 
commitment by top managers to the changes proposed. 
Use of intermediate success as leverage for furthering the processes of learning 
Jn one of the companies studied, a section of the staff, despite behaving according to the 
requirements of the new procedures, was not convinced of the merits of the changes 
introduced. Nevertheless, these changes generated very successful outcomes in a short period 
of time. Managers then capitalized on this success, initially to convince staff of the merits of 
the changes, and afterwards to motivate them towards higher objectives. Each time that 
objectives were achieved, they were upgraded towards more ambitious targets. Th.is practice 
gave the processes of learning a continuous character. People had to constantly find ways of 
improving their performance, and so far they continue to be able to do so. 
Time, codifled/uncodifled knowledge, behavioural/cognitive changes 
The study indicated the existence of some specific and important relationships between time 
and processes of organizational learning. First, it suggested that when a learning process 
requires people to undergo behavioural changes without previous cognitive changes, as in the 
case of imitative behaviour, time pressure can stimulate these changes to occur. Second, the 
study suggested that when cognitive changes are required prior to behavioural changes, 
people will need time to undergo these cognitive changes. But as time is usually an important 
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contingency in organizational processes, the most common pattern appears to be fo r people to 
undergo cognitive and behavioura l changes simultaneously. 
Types and processes of organizational /earning 
Based on a typology of learning proposed by CIBAM (1993), which distinguishes technical, 
systemic and strategic learning within organizations, this study suggested that these three 
types can be related to different sequences of occurrence of behavioural and cognitive 
changes. Technical learning usually fo llows a behavioural • cogniti ve sequence. Systemic 
learning usually fo llows a cognitive • behavioural sequence, or simultaneous behavioural 
and cogniti ve changes. Strategic learning usually fo llows a cogni tive • behavioural 
sequence. 
Communication within cross-national teams 
The study identified communication as the main problem for the work of cross-national 
teams. Diffi culties of communication were reported by managers working in these teams as 
the main c:ause of misw1derstandings. A relatively effective solution found in one company 
was the presence of a host country manager working as a close assistant to an expatriate 
manager. Their continuous face-to-face contact appears to greatly fac ili tate mutual 
understanding. Besides easing communication difficulties, this practice allowed the managers 
involved to better understand the other's culture and, therefore, reducing the probability of 
cross-cultural conflicts. The host country manager involved in thi s relationship would also 
work as a buffer between the expatriate manager and his tean1, which was generally 
composed by host country personnel. Thi s practice also reduced the occurrence of 
communication and cross-cultural misunderstandings. 
Time and cross-cultural adaptation 
In IBVs, it is the normal practice to replace expatriate managers every few years. However, 
the study identified time as a vital component for overcoming problems related to cross-
cultural adaptation. The regular substitution of expatriate managers results in difficulties 
related to cross-cultura l adaptation fo r both the expatriate managers and the tean1s of host 
country personnel who will work with these managers. The study also noted that the 
companies have found ways of reducing these difficulties. One of them has just been 
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mentioned; another is to establish their production routines on a basis which is not dependent 
on expatriate managers, so as the replacement of such managers will not impact directly on 
the routines. 
l ocal and foreign knowledge 
The study has also indicated that the achievement of an appropriate balance between the 
contributions fro m local and foreign knowledge is both one of the most difficult tasks for the 
management ofIBVs, and one that can create from the diversity ofresources a synergy which 
can positively differentiate IBVs from other companies. There are no recipes which can be 
directly applied to all IBVs, but factors which appear to be important for achieving this 
balance are: a) identification of the main points of knowledge contribution fro m each party; 
b) establishment of structures and processes which create some autonomy for the sources of 
knowledge; c) the building of a shared sense of identity within the IBV, which means an 
organizational culture which reflects the creation of va lues espoused by members of different 
national cultures; and d) the predominance of an attitude of openness in relation to diversity 
of opinion. 
The points summarized above and the identi ficat ion and discussion, in chapters 5, 7 and 8, of 
both the enabling conditions fo r organizational learning and the organizational capabilities 
developed by each company, suggest that this study has achieved the objectives set out in 
Chapter 1. Given the existence of only a few studies which examine the processes of 
organizational learning, the analysis of the processes occurred at TCP and Semp Toshiba, and 
the attention dedicated to their context so as to provide a richer understanding of their 
development, are also methodological contributions from this study to the body of 
knowledge on organizational learning. 
The main limitations of the methodology adopted fo r this study were discussed in Chapter 3. 
One other limitation seems to be relevant. The method adopted fo r selecting the processes 
studied, and the fact that the research was focused on those which had already occurred, 
meant that serendipity played a very small role in the processes discussed in this dissertation . 
I have already mentioned in Chapter 3 that people tend to over rationalize past events, 
leaving small room for acknowledging the role of chance. Although, in my interpretation, 
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none of the processes studied was triggered by chance, the point I want to make here is that 
serendipity may be important for some processes of organizational learning, particularly 
those characterized by exploration, as opposed to exploitation. However, it seems that only 
by following the development of processes in real time, would a researcher be able to assess 
the role of serendipity. 
9.2 Policy Implications 
A number of policy implications can be suggested out of the insights from this study: 
Leadership and organizational learning 
Top managers within organizations have a very important role in shaping the processes of 
organizational learning. This role is particularly important in the configuration of the 
organizational culture, and its transmission to other organizational members. Values 
embedded in the organizational culture should be consistent with the organizational 
objectives defined by top managers. 
The active participation of top managers in the processes of learning indicates to other 
organizational members the issues in which they should concentrate their efforts. In 
processes regarded as essential for the success of the organization, top managers' 
participation may take the form of direct involvement, by setting objectives, creating 
structures which facilitate the development of the process, and exert ing control over the 
achievement of objectives. 
Control and organizational learning 
The idea that control can be both an obstacle to and a facilitator of organizational learning 
gives relevance to the way in which it is exercised during processes of learning. As 
assessment of outcomes, control is important for the provision of feedback. In this sense, it 
must be exercised at all levels within the organization, which implies that it must be 
embedded in organizational routines. This means that control must be delegated to those 
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performing the routines. However, productive use of control demands the understanding of 
the routines , for only from this understanding detected mismatches can be corrected. 
On the other hand, control also acts as an instrument which keeps people confined to the 
performance of organizational routines, limiting alternative actions. These routines can be 
correctly performed, but their outcomes no longer desirable for the organization. In this case, 
control can hinder learning. So, control should not only be directed towards checking 
whether routines are being correctly followed, but also to whether these routines are resulting 
in desirable outcomes, which implies a higher level of control. 
Identification of the sources of knowledge 
Different learning processes have different sources of knowledge. These sources provide the 
fuel which keeps the processes moving forward. Organizations should identify these sources 
in order to provide structures and systems necessary for the development of knowledge. 
Autonomy appears to be a key ingredient for the creation of knowledge, one which should be 
granted to the sources of knowledge, but always balanced with control. 
Time and organizational learning 
Most learning processes involve change and continuity. Change occurs over time, but some 
types of change can be stimulated by time pressure. This appears to be true for behavioural 
changes in which the new desired behaviour can be based on an existing model (codified 
knowledge). In this case, the organization can provide the model and exercise time pressure 
on people for adopting it. 
On the other hand, in most processes people will need to change both their behaviour and 
cognition. The less codified the knowledge concerning to the process, or, in other words, the 
less clear the objectives and procedures of the process, the more cognitive change and 
development people will have to undergo before modifying their behaviour. This means that 
more time will be necessary for people to change. 
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Success and cognitive change 
Changes can be resisted either because the new objectives and procedures are not clear for 
the people involved, or because the new strongly conflicts \vith the old. 1n both ases. initial 
success from the changes. if it happens. can be a powerful in trument for overcoming 
resistance. Thus, for the processes of learning in which resistance is expected. it seems 
important to consider strategies which can demonstrate success in the short term. a this may 
greatly facilitate the introduction of larger changes. 
Managerial adaptation in IBVs 
At the start of operations of an IB . it seems a common practice for the foreign in esting 
company to send some expatriate managers in order to implement administrative systems in 
areas which the foreign company considers important to monitor. After these systems are in 
place, however, the study suggests that the expatriate managers should not occupy positions 
which interfere directly with the production routines of the IBV. This measure will avoid any 
negative interference in the normal operation of the IBV to arise from the regular 
replacement of expatriate managers. 
Expatriate managers and cross-cultural training 
Companies should take advantage of the personal experience of expatriate managers. It has 
been seen in the cases studied that decisions and experiences related to non-technical issues 
are difficult to store and retrieve by means other than individual memory. Companies could 
build their own case studies from the real-life experiences of their managers. These managers 
could discuss their experiences with human resources staff who could then build the cases. 
Such cases could be used in training programmes for managers who will be send abroad. 
Ideally, these training sessions would involve managers from more than one nationality for 
the case discussion be enriched with different cultural approaches. Managers whose 
experiences are portrayed in the cases could also take part in the training to give their own 
first hand interpretation about the issues. Cases which portray experiences from managers of 
the company are bound to raise interest in other managers. Another possible benefit from 
such a practice would be that managers would have fonnal opportunities the make a 
reflection about their own experiences and. perhaps, develop new knowledge out of this 
reflection. 
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9.3 Further Research 
A number of avenues for further research can also be suggested out of the insights from this 
study. Some of these possibilities are related to the same companies which participated in this 
study. In this sense, this research could be extended to involve the Toshiba headquarters in 
Japan. Of particular interest would be the investigation of the company's policies in relation 
to expatriate managers, in which a number of issues could be examined. For instance, the 
preparation of managers who are going to work abroad, the repatriation of managers and 
whether their experiences are formally accumulated by the company for future use, the 
factors which determine the length of the stay of expatriate managers abroad, and whether 
there are differences related to the type of IBVs where the expatriate managers work. Another 
interesting point would be the strategic coordination of the network of companies abroad 
where Toshiba has equity stakes. In this case, the investigation could focus on learning 
processes at the corporate level. How does knowledge generated in local operations impact in 
the global policies of the company? Are successful policies adopted by one of the local 
companies a model for other companies? 
Still within the two JBVs directly involved with this study, a number of other issues could be 
investigated. At TCP, the evolution of the conflicts between the AVD and ACD appears to be 
a process with great learning potential, besides being very relevant for the development of the 
company . Another interesting issue for further research would be to investigate the 
development of the ACD, and see whether Japanese influence will be weakened with both 
the locali zation of management and the replacement of original members by new ones who 
do not know the history of the company. Will new employees be so willing to collaborate 
with the company as those who came from the MWOD? With localization of management, 
what will be the evolution of systems and structures in which the Japanese managers were 
influential in designing? Such an investigation could provide relevant insights on the 
evolution of patterns of management within IBVs. Other possibly fruitful point of 
investigation is the development of local design and the relationship between TCP and its 
markets. As the evolution of local design appears to require an increasing contact with the 
market, and TCP depends on other companies for sales and market research, will the 
development of local design have any impact in this marketing structure? 
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At Semp Toshiba, the two processes invest igated have had their scope successfully extended 
in the last few years. Will the company be able to give continuity to these developments? If 
so, which strategies will be adopted? Another interesting investigation could be on the 
relationship between Semp Toshiba and Toshiba Japan. If Semp Toshiba continues to be so 
successful in the next few years as it has been the past, will Toshiba try to somce any 
managerial knowledge from the joint venture? Can the strategies adopted in Brazil be 
adapted to other emerging economies where the market for TV sets is expected to grow fast, 
as India and China, fo r instance? 
Besides these points related to the evolution of the processes and companies studied, there 
are a lso other, more general strands of research which can be suggested from the insights 
developed in this study. In thi s sense, an exciting perspective would be to gain access to a 
company which is just starting its operations and follow in real time some of the more 
relevant issues suggested in this study. Thus, the relationship between time and learning 
could be monitored in technical , systemic and strategic types of learning. In a new operation, 
all these systems would have to be implemented, allowing a unique opportunity for keeping 
track of their development. Besides, frequent contacts with staff involved in the 
implementation of these systems would make possible an ana lysis of the behavioural and 
cognitive changes undergone by them. Moreover, these frequent contacts would also allow an 
understanding of the processes of codification of knowledge. If the researcher, or group of 
researchers, follows the development of a system, they can ask interviewees to articulate the ir 
views on this development. Over time, it should be possible to interpret how the knowledge 
produced by the interviewees was being codified. Coupled with other forms of data 
collection, such as observation and the examination of documents, behavioural changes could 
also be fo llowed. An ambitious research project of this kind would perhaps be better agreed 
with a company, so as to take the form of an action research, in which the researchers could 
regularly discuss with the company' s staff their reflections on the evolution of the processes. 
These discussions would probably impact on this evolution, and this impact, in turn, could be 
object of further research. 
If this company were an !BY, issues related to cross-cultural adaptation could a lso be 
addressed. The idea that, when developing systems in a cross-cultural setting, people have to 
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codify their knowledge about procedures which are taken for granted in their own culture, in 
order to be able to communicate with people from other culture, is one which deserves more 
investigation. It can arguably be an opportunity for reflection-in-action (Schon 1983), one in 
which values and assumptions behind procedures can be questioned, leaving room for 
learning. Again, the perspective of action research seems appropriate, as researchers could 
discuss these values and assumptions with the personnel involved. 
Another issue for research concerns the relationship between control, autonomy and learning. 
A research project could be specifically targeted at assessing this relationship in a number of 
companies, ideally in the same industry. In this case, procedures which have similar 
objectives within the different companies could be assessed so as to analyse how the 
relationship between control mechanisms and autonomy impact the processes of learning. 
Whilst a survey approach does not appear to be able to grasp the issues which could 
determine a successful balance between control and autonomy in relation to learning, a 
comparative study with a large number of cases within the same industry does. However, this 
approach appears to be feasible only if the research is focused on one objective, otherwise the 
amount of data may overwhelm the researchers. 
The conjunction between types and processes of learning depicted in Figure 8.1 in the 
previous chapter should be further investigated in future research. The suggestion that 
different types of learning can be characterized by different sequences of cognitive and 
behavioural changes, is a new and interesting insight on the development of processes of 
organizational learning. Longitudinal case studies, in which the researcher could have 
frequent access to managers and workers appear to be the most appropriated method for 
undertaking such a research. It is, undoubtedly, a difficult research task, but one in which 
knowledge can be accumulated through a series of individual case studies, which can be done 
by different researchers, in different locations, easing off the burden. 
This study has also indicated the existence of different relationships between teclrnical and 
managerial knowledge and organizational memory. In contrast with teclrnical knowledge, it 
is very difficult, if not impossible, to store managerial knowledge in organizational files , 
databases, or other hard devices. Organizational culture appears to be one of the more evident 
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embodiments of managerial knowledge. In most organizations, periods of succession at the 
top level may represent changes in managerial styles, with unlearning and learning as a 
consequence. In IBVs, the regular replacement of expatriate managers mean that succession 
occurs much more frequently than most organizations. This can be a problem fo r IBVs, 
particularly for successful ones, as the new managers will naturally want to introduce their 
managerial style. From this situation, a number of research questions can then be fo rmulated. 
Is it possible to institutionalize a managerial style? If so, how? Through routines, systems and 
control? If so, how rigid would these systems be? Would they not make learning more 
difficult? Would it be possible to institutionalize a managerial system which enables learning, 
or these are two irreconcilable concepts? 
The study also suggested differences in the autonomy of decision-making between a joint-
venture and a subsidiary of a multinational corporation. With the globalization of business, 
large corporations have established IBVs in different geographical areas around the globe. 
These IBVs, particularly subsidiaries, are connected to a network, usually under the 
guidelines of the companies ' headquarters. This study only involved two companies and, 
therefore, it is not possi ble to make any generalization concerning structural patterns in 
international business. However, it could be interesting to investigate this issue adopting a 
different methodology. Do subsidiaries have less autonomy for decision-making than joint 
ventures? If so, would this mean that joint ventures can more readi ly combine local and 
global knowledge? Such a research could be undertaken initially within one TNC, to see how 
it manages its global network. In a second stage, a number of other TNCs could be added in 
order to compare the different strategies and see whether there is a pattern, or it also depends 
on other factors, like industry, and TNC culture. 
Finally, this study has indicated the existence of a connection between the processes of 
organizational learning and the development of organization capabilities. This cormection 
surely deserves further research. Since the development of organization capabilities is 
currently attracting attention within companies all over the world, this seems to be the right 
moment to address this question. A possible way would be to gain access to a company 
which is consciously proposing the further development of existing capabilities or the 
creation of new ones, and then to analyse how the processes of learning are managed. In this 
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sense, most of the insights developed in this dissertation could be the object of analysis, 
testing the conditions which have been proposed here as facilitators of learning. Attention 
should also be directed into the way in which knowledge created in the processes of 
organizational learning is channelled into organizational capabilities, and whether these 
capabilities give the company any distinctive advantage in its markets. 
These are but a selection of possible research lines which emerge from the issues discussed in 
this dissertation. Knowledge on processes of organizational learning is still incipient, and this 
warrants research for many years to come. 
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APPENDIX A.1 
Interview to Select the Events 
• Could you please name the events you consider critical fo r thi s company in the last five 
years? 
• Could you please put the events in a chronological sequence? 
• Could you please give me a brief description of the events? 
• Who has been involved in the processes related with the events? 
27 1 
APPENDIX A.2 
Interview on Personal Career and Impress ions about the Company 
I. Current job 
• What is your position in this company? 
• What are your major responsibilities? 
• How long have you held this position? 
• What are some of the challenges you face? 
2 . Career history 
• Tell me about how you got to be doing this. 
• How did you get started in your profession/job? 
• What has prepared you for this job? (prior positions, educational background) 
• What other jobs have you had? (at this company or at other companies) 
3. Perceptions of the significant operating values and beliefs of the company 
• Tell me about what this organisation is like. 
• What are its values, in your point of view? 
• What is important to this company? How do you know thi s is important for the company? 
• If l were a new employee, what are the important do's and don'ts that you would want me 
to know about? 
• What does this company do well? 
• What are your concerns about this company? 
4. Personal perceptions 
• What do you particularly like in other people? (in general) 
• What don't you particularly like in other people? (in general) 
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APPENDIX A.3 
Interview to Reconstruct the Process 
1. Objectives of the process 
• What were the reasons for the process? 
• What were the objectives for the process? 
2. External environment 
• What were the major competitive pressures the company faced when the process started? 
• What did you think. at that time, the company could to do in respect to those pressures? 
Do you have a different view now? 
• Were there any different views regarding to the external enviromnent? 
3. Internal environment 
• Help me to understand what was it like to be in the company at that time the process 
started. 
• What, do you think. was generally considered important for the company at that time? 
• What was the mood in the company at that time? 
• What was the strategy of the company regarding the business when the process started? 
4. Constitution of the team 
• Who are the people chosen to participate in the process? 
• Wl1y are they chosen? Which criteria was used to select the people? 
• Were additional people integrated to the original team? If so, why? 
5. Teamwork 
• Could you describe how the team work together? 
• What are the main difficulties within the tean1? 
• What are the major positive qualities of the team? 
• When there is a new idea about the work of the team, how is it discussed? (openly, only to 
legitimate a deci sion already taken, etc.) 
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• Who does usually bring new ideas? (managerial and technical ideas) 
• What, do you think, is the general reaction to ideas, which are different from what is 
generally expected? 
• Could you describe the processes of communication within the team? (lateral , vertical , 
cross-cultural, fom1al and informal) 
• When there is a problem (technical or managerial), how is it discussed? How decisions are 
usually reached and implemented? (the boss communicates it, it is discussed to seek 
agreement, etc.) 
• Were there different positions in relation to any particular aspect of the development of the 
proces? If so : a.) what were these positions?; b.) how do you identify each group which 
held different positions?; c.) how did each group see the other?; d.) what means did each 
group use trying to convince the other?; e.) did the positions become more closer or more 
apart with the evolution of the process? Why do you think so? 
• If there is someone or a group of people who are not satisfied with the solution for a 
problem, are they involved in the implementation of the solution? What is their attitude in 
relation to the solution? 
6. Memory 
• Are the decisions and processes of implementation stored in any way? If so, how? 
(technical and managerial decisions) 
• When a problem occurs, and it is similar to other already occurred, is the past solution 
app lied? If so, how? (directly, reconsidered) How the past is retrieved? 
• Do people discuss future challenges? If so, people from which level ? Why and how do 
they discuss? 
7. Learning (direct question) 
• What do you think you have learned from the process? 
8. Consequences 
• What were the consequences of the process? (for the company, for the people invol ved) 
• What do you think is important for a productive relationship within a cross national team? 
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